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ABSTRACT 
Students’ Conceptions about Climate Change: Using Critical Evaluation to 
Influence Plausibility Reappraisals and Knowledge Reconstruction 
 
by 
 
Doug Lombardi 
 
Dr. E. Michael Nussbaum, Examination Committee, Co-Chair 
Professor of Educational Psychology 
 
Dr. Gale M. Sinatra, Examination Committee, Co-Chair 
Professor 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) reported a greater than 
90% chance that human activities are responsible for global temperature increases over 
the last 50 years, as well as other climatic changes. The scientific report also states that 
alternative explanations (e.g., increasing energy received from the Sun) are less plausible 
than human-induced climate change. These climate scientists have made their plausibility 
judgment—which I define as the relative potential truthfulness of alternative 
explanations—based on the evaluation and coordination of multiple lines evidence with 
competing theoretical perspectives.  
Climate change is a highly relevant and gravely serious topic; in an educational 
setting, climate change also presents an opportunity for students to learn about 
fundamental scientific principles and how scientists construct knowledge. However, 
students may be neither naturally evaluative when learning about controversial topics, 
such as climate change, nor reflective while engaging in judgments about knowledge and 
knowing (King & Kitchener, 2004), such as plausibility judgments. The purpose of this 
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study was to examine how plausibility judgments and knowledge about human-induced 
climate change transform during instruction that promotes critical evaluation abilities. 
An instructional scaffold—called a model evidence link (MEL) diagram— was 
used in this study. The MEL allowed students to weigh the strength of connections 
between two alternative models of climate change (i.e., the scientifically accepted model 
of human-induced climate change and a popular skeptics’ model that climate change is 
caused by increases in the Sun’s energy). The results revealed that treatment group 
participants who used the MEL diagram experienced a significant shift in their 
plausibility judgments toward the scientifically accepted model. This shift was 
accompanied by significantly greater postinstructional knowledge of human-induced 
climate change, with treatment group participants demonstrating reconstruction of 
knowledge about the causes of climate change to be more consistent with scientific 
understanding. Moderate to large effect sizes characterized these changes in treatment 
group participants’ plausibility perceptions and understanding. A comparison group of 
students who experienced a climate change activity that is part of their normal curriculum 
did not experience statistically significant changes. 
The results from this dissertation study, along with previous studies that I and my 
colleagues have conducted (see, for example, Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012), helped to 
inform the development of a model on the role of the plausibility judgment in conceptual 
change. This model has the potential to guide further research that will help educators 
better understand the mechanisms in conceptual change and guide instructional practices 
to promote knowledge reconstruction on scientific topics of great societal importance, 
such as climate change.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The scientific process is a mystery to many individuals. Misconceptions persist 
about how scientists construct knowledge, as well as the actual knowledge scientists have 
constructed, despite the widespread presence of both topics in elementary and secondary 
curricula. Many individuals tend to view science as an objective body of knowledge that 
is independent of theory. However, science is quintessentially a socio-cognitive, 
collaborative process. Communities of scientists create questions and analyze data about 
observed phenomena to construct knowledge that they deem reliable and valid. 
Furthermore, these communities evaluate their constructed knowledge to gauge the 
quality of observed and analyzed data (von Glaserfeld, 2001). It is through evaluation 
that some scientific knowledge gains greater status, to the point of being considered a 
broadly accepted theoretical framework to guide further theorizing and research (e.g., the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics; T. Kuhn, 1962). The process of evaluation may render 
some scientific knowledge false, particularly as individuals collect and analyze new data. 
Constructed scientific belief structures (e.g., hypotheses, theories) must adhere to a 
falsifiability criterion, where evaluations of incoming evidence may invalidate these 
structures (Popper, 1963; Stanovich, 2007). Whereas, individual scientists might not 
adhere to the falsifiability criterion, the scientific community will ultimately eliminate a 
scientific knowledge construction when its evidentiary failures are satisfactorily 
explained by a rival construction (Lakatos, 1970). 
Researchers have extensively documented the existence and persistence of 
students’ misconceptions (see, for example, Chi, 2005; Posner, Strike, Hewson, & 
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Gertzog, 1982; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Recently, Sinatra and Chinn (2011) have 
argued that in order to improve understanding of science, students need to reconstruct 
both their conceptual understanding and epistemic cognitive processes. The former 
(reconstruction of conceptual understanding) is a theoretical perspective commonly 
referred to as conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 1998). The latter (reconstruction of 
epistemic cognitive processes) is called epistemic conceptual change (Sinatra & Chinn, 
2011). Kitchener (1983) defines epistemic cognition as the cognitive processes involved 
in making judgments about knowledge and knowing. Therefore, epistemic conceptual 
change involves transformation of students’ epistemic cognition from less-sophisticated 
“prereflective” thinking (i.e., scientific knowledge is absolute and accumulated solely 
through observation and experimentation) to more sophisticated  “quasi-reflective” 
thinking (scientific knowledge is uncertain and subjective, and one theory may be as 
valid as another), and ultimately to “reflective” thinking (scientific knowledge is 
constructed via evaluation of evidence obtained through scientific inquiry) (King & 
Kitchener, 2004). Essential to the development of more sophisticated epistemic cognition 
are the thinking processes that provide an understanding of how various knowledge 
domains are justified and the use of that understanding in reasoning and problem solving 
(Green, Azevedo, & Torney-Purta, 2008). In other words, an important component of 
epistemic conceptual change is for students to become more critically evaluative of 
knowledge sources.  
Students’ critical evaluation of their knowledge may also be an important 
component of conceptual change. Ohlsson (2009) has proposed that individuals engage in 
a process of competitive evaluation between two alternative conceptions to undergo 
3 
 
knowledge reconstruction. For conceptual change to occur, students must gauge the 
scientifically accurate conception with their experience and background knowledge, 
which are often at odds. Under such a scenario, the two countering conceptions may 
cause cognitive conflict and individuals implicitly evaluate the usefulness of each 
competing knowledge structure. Ohlsson calls this usefulness “cognitive utility,” which 
relates the value of a knowledge structure or conception to how well it supports efficient 
cognitive processing (i.e., “low cognitive load, fast task completion, and high goal 
satisfaction”; Ohlsson, 2009, p. 29). Individuals may employ inferences in the process of 
evaluating the cognitive utility of competing concepts. These inferences are often 
abductive in nature, where individuals select the explanation deemed as the most 
plausible from a group of alternatives. Thus, as postulated by many researchers, students’ 
plausibility judgments appear to be an integral component of conceptual change (see, for 
example, Chi, 2005; diSessa, 1993; Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Posner et al., 1982). 
Furthermore, higher quality plausibility judgments may be dynamically linked to critical 
evaluation, and therefore, facilitate epistemic conceptual change (i.e., shifting from 
thinking processes associated with knowledge subjectivity to evaluative processes of 
knowledge construction based on evidence). 
Working Definition of Plausibility in Conceptual Change 
This dissertation study focuses on conceptual change learning. As a working 
definition for this study on conceptual change, plausibility is a judgment on the relative 
potential truthfulness of incoming information compared to our existing mental 
representations. This definition is based on Nicholas Rescher’s (1976) theory of plausible 
reasoning, where Rescher argues that “the ‘acceptance’ of a proposition as a potential 
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truth is not actual acceptance of it at all, but a highly provisional and conditional 
epistemic inclination towards it, an inclination that falls far short of outright 
commitment” (Rescher, 1976, p. 9, emphasis in original). Rescher is a prolific American 
philosopher of science who has developed his ideas of pragmatic idealism based on the 
philosophical tradition of Gottfried Leibniz and Immanuel Kant, specifically that science 
validates “a plausible commitment to the actual existence of its theoretical entities” 
(Marsonet, 2009, Para. 3). Using Rescher’s plausible reasoning theory as a guide and 
incorporating an educational perspective of constructivism, this definition of plausibility 
reflects a pragmatic constructivist philosophy (Bickard, 1997; Dewey, 1922). 
Plausibility judgments can be a subcategory of epistemic judgments when they 
are comparative and qualitative about knowledge. Plausibility judgments do not rely on 
absolute definitions of and distinctions between knowledge and belief. In the broader 
category of an epistemic judgment, a belief is based on some kind of information that an 
individual connects to that belief (Kalderon, 2009). For example, a person may believe 
that climate is changing because she has experienced an unusually warm summer. 
Without a situation of cognitive dissonance or evaluating competing explanations, she 
may consider her belief to be true and greatly plausible. She has moved outside of the 
tentative and comparative nature of the plausibility judgment because she has decided 
that her belief is true knowledge. Therefore, she has made an epistemic judgment, but not 
a plausibility judgment. 
An individual’s epistemic stance on knowledge and belief probably influences her 
plausibility judgments, but she makes these judgments within whatever epistemic 
perspective she currently has. For example, if an individual thinks an objective reality 
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exists and that people acquire knowledge from this objective reality, then she probably 
makes her plausibility judgments accordingly. On the other hand, if she views knowledge 
as a social construction, she probably makes her plausibility judgments through this lens. 
Epistemic perspectives, however, can potentially change through critical evaluation, or 
what Rescher (1976) calls “retrospective reappraisal of the standards of datahood and 
plausibility” (p. 118). Evolution of an epistemic stance may result in changes to an 
individual’s process of making plausibility judgments. Most importantly, if an individual 
transitions to a stance where critical evaluation (i.e., analyzing how evidentiary data 
support a hypothesis and its alternatives) informs her plausibility judgments, the 
individual elevates what her “truth” means to a more analytical level. 
Purpose and Overview of the Study 
Problems facing our society require a citizenry that can critically evaluate 
incoming information and make reasoned decisions about the plausibility of this 
information. For example, with global climate change issues, individuals are exposed to 
statements from both scientific experts and novice but vocal pundits, and may not 
understand the basic differences between the qualities of their two opposing arguments 
(Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012). Therefore, as educational researchers, we must explore 
effective methods to engender changes in students’ epistemic cognition to be more 
critically evaluative of hypotheses and theories in order to increase their plausibility 
perceptions of scientific claims. In this way, we may be able to assist teachers in bringing 
their students to the most advanced state of reflective judgment, where “conclusions are 
defended as representing the most complete, plausible, or compelling understanding of an 
issue on the basis of available evidence” (King & Kitchener, 2004, p. 7). 
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The purpose of this dissertation study was to examine how plausibility 
perceptions and knowledge about human-induced climate change transform during 
instruction that potentially promotes critical evaluation abilities. In examining the 
relationship between critical evaluation, plausibility perceptions, and knowledge 
restructuring, this study also investigated epistemic conceptual change, a process that is 
critical for promoting greater understanding of science and abilities to engage in scientific 
reasoning. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The following research questions and hypotheses guided this dissertation study in 
accomplishing its purpose.  
1. Does explicit instruction designed to promote evaluation of competing climate 
change theories—specifically, human-induced climate change (i.e., the 
scientifically accurate model; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) 
versus an increasing amount of solar energy received by Earth (i.e., a popular 
model used by skeptics of human-induced climate change; Cook, 2010; Ellis, 
2009)—result in changes to: 
a. plausibility perceptions of climate change, 
b. knowledge of human-induced climate change, as well a basic 
understanding of the distinctions between  weather and climate, and 
c. beliefs about climate change evidence? 
2. What is the relationship between students’ comparative plausibility perceptions of 
competing climate change theories (human-induced climate change versus 
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increasing solar irradiance) and their perceptions about which of these theories 
they think is correct, and how does this relationship change with instruction?   
3. Are model plausibility ratings of these two competing climate change theories 
related to the seven responses theorized by Chinn and Brewer (1993) as ordered 
categories (i.e., very low plausibility is associated with ignoring and rejecting data 
and high plausibility is associated with individual theory change)? 
In response to the first research question, I hypothesize that explicit instruction 
promoting evaluation of the two climate change models will result in both greater critical 
evaluation abilities (H1A) and increased plausibility perceptions about climate change 
(H1B). I also hypothesize that these increases in plausibility perceptions will result in a 
greater degree of conceptual change about human-induced climate change, weather and 
climate distinctions, and beliefs about climate change evidence. (H1C).  
As for the second research question, I hypothesize that even though students may 
consider competing climate change theories to be plausible, the one with the greater 
plausibility will correspond to the theory that students think is correct (H2A). I further 
hypothesize that students who use the instructional scaffold will rank the plausibility of 
the scientifically accepted conception (human-induced climate change) higher than the 
alternative conception (increasing solar irradiance) (H2B). 
My hypothesis for the third research question is that that there will be a 
discernible relationship between model plausibility ratings and response to anomalous 
incoming information (H3). For example, students who rate human-induced climate 
change as implausible will reject or ignore evidence related to this scientifically accurate 
model and students who rate human-induced climate change at a relatively high 
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plausibility level will demonstrate a greater degree of conceptual change about climate 
change.  
Methods 
 This study used a quasi-experimental design to analyze the research hypotheses. 
One hundred sixty-nine grade 7 students served as participants. In the school district 
where the study was conducted, the curriculum first exposes students to climate concepts 
in grade 7. As a quasi-experimental design, the study included a treatment group and a 
comparison group, with 7 classes randomly assigned to the treatment and 7 classes 
randomly assigned to the control. Treatment group participants experienced an 
instructional scaffold designed to help them evaluate competing climate change theories. 
Comparison group participants engaged in an activity from their normal curriculum, 
which involves analysis of climate change evidence and prediction of future climate 
change. Participants completed instruments measuring plausibility perceptions of climate 
change, knowledge of human-induced climate change and weather and climate 
distinctions, beliefs about climate change evidence, and perceptions of model plausibility 
and correctness prior to and just after instructional activities. 
Results 
 The results indicated that treatment group participants experienced a significant 
shift in their perceptions of model plausibility and correctness towards the scientifically 
accepted model of human-induced climate change. The treatment group participants also 
demonstrated significantly greater understanding of human-induced climate change at 
postinstruction, and also, conceptual change about the climate change causes. Moderate 
to large effect sizes showed that these treatment group transformations were also of 
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practical significance. Comparison group participants did not reveal any significant 
changes in model plausibility and correctness perceptions or understanding about human-
induced climate change. 
 Both treatment and comparison participants experienced a significant change in 
overall perceptions about the plausibility of climate change. These overall perceptions 
encompass not only plausibility of human-induced climate change, but also plausibility 
perceptions about evidence for current climate change. The study was inconclusive in 
changes in understanding about weather and climate distinctions and beliefs about 
climate change evidence because scores on these measures lacked reliability. The results 
were also inconclusive about associations between model plausibility perceptions and 
psychological responses to anomalous data. However, treatment group participants did 
show a significant association between their level of critical evaluation and model 
plausibility ratings, specifically when evidence contradicted a model claim.  
Organization 
 In this chapter (Chapter 1), I have provided a brief overview of this dissertation 
study. In Chapter 2, I present a review of the literature that has informed the development 
of a theoretical model of plausibility in conceptual change and perspectives from the 
literature which provide the justification for this study’s purpose. The methodology for 
the dissertation study is presented in Chapter 3. I discuss the results and analyses in 
Chapter 4, and finally, I conclude the dissertation with an overall discussion of this 
dissertation study, including limitations, modification to my theoretical model on 
plausibility perceptions and conceptual change, and implications for instruction and 
future research in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review has two related components. The objective of Part 1 is to 
provide a theoretical framework for plausibility judgments situated within the broader 
context of theory and research in conceptual change and epistemic cognition. More 
simply, Part 1 features a model for plausibility judgments in conceptual change that I 
have developed. The model emerges from philosophical and cognitive theories of 
plausibility reasoning, as well as through theoretical perspectives on plausibility’s role in 
conceptual change. During my discussion of the model, I will overview epistemic 
cognitive processes that influence plausibility judgments. Part 2 of this literature review 
is an application of this proposed plausibility model in conceptual change about a 
controversial topic: human-induced climate change. The research questions and 
hypotheses for this dissertation study flow from this application of the model.  
Part 1: Plausibility Judgments and Conceptual Change 
Plausibility judgments are cognitive actions used to compare the relative potential 
truthfulness of mental representations. Plausibility comes into play in a situation of 
cognitive dissonance (Rescher, 1976), where individuals experience dissatisfaction as a 
negative intrapersonal state when encountering information that is inconsistent with their 
background knowledge (Festinger, 1957). According to Piaget (1954), when experiencing 
a state of dissatisfaction, individuals attempt to reconcile contradictory ideas through a 
process of assimilation (i.e., incorporating the idea into their existing mental 
representations) or accommodation (i.e., changing their mental representations so that the 
new information is no longer contrary). Learning is different under dissonance because 
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background knowledge and prior experiences act as a barrier rather than creating a 
pathway toward understanding. This is specifically the case if individuals assimilate 
information into existing mental representations that are not consistent with scientific 
understanding. Through comparison of the incoming information to the current mental 
representation, plausibility influences the cognitive decision whether to assimilate or 
accommodate information during a cognitive dissonance situation.   
It is important to note that students could experience cognitive dissonance even if 
they have little or no prior knowledge. In such a situation, an individual may encounter 
two or more alternative ideas that relate to a given scenario or situation. The classic 
example is in law adjudication, where a judge or jury must decide between the claims of 
the two opposing parties (e.g., the prosecution and the defendant). Similarly, the 
scientific community may develop comparably plausible but competing hypotheses to 
explain a phenomenon. For example, in the 1970s, two hypothetical explanations of 
rising global temperatures were (a) a natural increase in solar radiation and (b) human 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Climate scientists developed these alternative hypotheses 
from limited data, which may have resulted in some level of cognitive dissonance within 
the climatology community. A limited number of climate scientists also considered a 
third hypothesis at this time that predicted an early ice age (i.e., global cooling; Peterson, 
Connolley & Fleck, 2008). Despite the lack of scientific consensus, the global cooling 
hypothesis was popularized by the national media, which again, may have promoted 
dissonance.  
Walton (2004) addresses such cases of competing hypotheses with abductive 
inference (Peirce, 1958), where individuals think a conclusion is plausible if they deem 
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the supporting claims to be true. Plausible reasoning has the characteristics of (a) 
selecting from a set of alternatives that are (b) “relativized to a given body of evidence” 
(Walton, 2004, p. 31). In other words, plausible reasoning often involves two or more 
alternative explanations of a phenomenon that are based on the same evidence. 
Furthermore, these characteristics may be independent of background knowledge. The 
process of abductive inference might also involve evaluations of competing explanations 
and the plausibility judgment model that I will present in this literature review is 
specifically focused on knowledge reconstruction situations between incoming 
information that is anomalous with background knowledge. This review will therefore 
focus on cognitive dissonance situations where incoming information conflicts with 
background knowledge and leads to the operational definition of plausibility in 
conceptual change that I have discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. As a reminder, 
plausibility is a judgment on the relative potential truthfulness of incoming information 
compared to our existing mental representations. 
Prior Models of Plausibility Judgments 
As shown in Figure 1, Rescher’s (1976) model of plausible reasoning is relatively 
straightforward. Raw data (i.e., incoming information) is pre-processed first, where an 
individual applies a qualitative plausibility index to the incoming data based on the 
potential truthfulness of the information. A high index value means that a proposition has 
greater plausibility than a proposition with a lower value. Rescher (1976) maintains that a 
plausibility index is a function of source reliability, where an information source is 
“understood in a very wide sense” (i.e., including people, text, rules of logic and 
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probability, and/or validating principles). Individuals base reliability on their experiences 
and in terms of questioning “how solid and trustworthy” the source is (p. 7). 
Rescher’s (1976) notion of pre-processing is consistent with other perspectives on 
plausible reasoning. According to Walton (2004), plausibility is one mode in which 
individuals judge the connection between a proposition and its derived set of premises. 
Walton (2004) states that a proposition is plausible if that proposition “seems to be true 
based on appearances” and plausibility increases if the proposition is “consistent with 
other propositions that seem to be true” (p. 35). Furthermore, individuals associate 
greater plausibility to propositions supported by evidence.  
Rescher’s (1976) idea of source reliability and plausibility indexing is supported 
by a plausibility model developed by Connell and Keane (2004; 2006). In their model 
which was developed and calibrated using empirical data, Connell and Keane view 
Figure 1. The systematic structure of plausibility analysis. By Rescher, N. (1976). 
Plausible reasoning: An introduction to the theory and practice of plausibilistic 
inference. Amsterdam: Van Gorcum Ltd, p. 118. 
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plausibility judgments as cognitive mechanisms through which “some concept, scenario, 
or discourse is plausible if it is conceptually consistent” with other knowledge (Connell 
& Keane, 2006, p. 96). Plausibility increases if an incoming idea has many corroborating 
connections with background knowledge and if these connections minimize complexity 
and conjecture, as expressed in the following two equations: 
implausibility ൌ 	 complexitycorroboration െ conjecture 
plausibility ൌ 1 െ implausibility 
Therefore, an idea “will be…plausible…if [it]…has minimal complexity and conjecture, 
and…maximal corroboration” (Connell & Keane, 2006, p. 99). 
 Individuals may often use validating principles to establish source reliability 
(Connell & Keane, 2006; Rescher, 1976; Walton, 2004). Rescher claims a simple idea 
has a greater plausibility index compared to a more complex idea, when other source 
factors are equivalent. This is similar to Connell and Keane’s equation where minimizing 
complexity increases plausibility. Likewise, if an individual perceives an idea as definite, 
the idea may receive a greater plausibility index than one that is uncertain (i.e., a 
conjecture). Large amounts of evidence may provide greater validity to an idea, and 
subsequently, a greater plausibility index. For example, human-induced climate change 
may be particularly implausible because the topic has large degrees of complexity (i.e., 
many scientific concepts are involved) and perceived conjecture (i.e., statements of 
uncertainty associated with predictive models may lead students to believe that scientists 
are guessing), and a low degree of corroboration (i.e., scientific evidence may have few 
connections with students’ prior experience). 
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However, as Rescher (1976) points out, validating principles are only one 
component on which individuals base source reliability. Plausibility indexes may be 
determined primarily based on the person giving the information. If that person is not a 
trusted expert, the plausibility index will be relatively low. For example, a member of 
Political Party A may view all information from Political Party B with low source 
reliability. If the Political Party A member also equates scientific claims about human-
induced climate change as Political Party B claims (e.g., Political Party B supports public 
funding of climate science, therefore climate scientists must be members of Political 
Party B), then the Political Party A member could assign a lesser plausibility index to any 
scientific ideas about climate change. 
Source reliability may also be based on background knowledge and personal 
experiences. In this way, individuals may employ heuristics in assigning a plausibility 
index similar to heuristics used when assessing probabilities and quantifying uncertainity. 
One of these is the availability heuristic, in “which people assess the…probability of an 
event by the ease with which instances or occurrences come to mind” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1127). For example, an individual may experience several unusual 
blizzards in a short period, and when judging the plausibility of global warming, may 
assign low source reliability to that idea because they will use these recent blizzards to 
predict long-term climate trends. 
Source reliability may also share similarities to the representativeness heuristic, 
“in which probabilities are evaluated by the degree…to which [an effect] resembles [a 
potential cause]” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 1124). If a potential cause closely 
resembles an effect, then an individual may think that a causal relationship exists. For 
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example, an individual may think a single record high temperature is representative 
evidence of climate change because greater temperatures resemble the idea that the planet 
is warming over the long term. However, an individual may assign lower probability to a 
greater frequency of extreme events (e.g., blizzard and tornadoes) as evidence for climate 
change because of a lower degree of representativeness.  
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) argue that availability and representativeness, as 
well other heuristics (e.g., adjustment and anchoring) violate the rules of probability and 
lead to judgment biases. These heuristics, however, may not violate the tenants of 
plausibilistic reasoning because such biases may be strongly influenced by source 
reliability. In other words, plausibility reflects “a more basic (or primitive) level of 
analysis than the calculus of probability” (Rescher, 1976, p. 38). Furthermore, individuals 
may rely on the more primitive plausibility judgment much more often because of lower 
level of cognitive resources required and only engage in probabilistic judgments when 
they are required (and able) to do so (Stanovich, 2010).  
Distinctions between probability and plausibility. Cognitive determination of 
source reliability and assignment of a comparative plausibility index to the incoming 
information leads to what Rescher (1976) calls “plausibility screening” (see Figure 1). 
This screening involves what Rescher says is a “cardinal rule” of plausibility: “in cases of 
conflict, never make the more plausible give way to what is less so; by all means retain 
the more highly plausible thesis” (p. 14). In the case of conceptual change, plausibility 
screening will weigh the plausibility of the incoming information to our existing mental 
representation. If our existing representation has greater plausibility than the new 
information, conceptual change might not occur. Change might not occur even if the 
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individual considers the new information to be plausible, but still less plausible than an 
existing representation (Dole & Sinatra, 1998).  
This idea—that individuals may assign a high plausibility index to both an 
incoming conception and an existing mental representation—makes the plausibility 
judgment fundamentally different from probability. In reflecting on the theoretical 
frameworks of Rescher (1976) and Walton (2004), Nussbaum (2011a) states that there 
are two appreciable distinctions between plausibility and probability: (a) “opposing 
propositions can both be plausible, even highly plausible, but both cannot be highly 
probable” and (b) plausibility is gauged on an ordinal scale (i.e., a comparative ranking 
between two or more alternatives), whereas probability is gauged on an interval scale (p. 
90). Friedman and Halpern (2001) claim that a plausibility judgment is often a default 
reasoning mechanism through which probabilistic reasoning is subsumed. Individuals 
may evaluate the strength of competing arguments when probabilistic reasoning is 
understood and properly employed through evidentiary analysis (Nussbaum, 2011a), and 
thus would more carefully parameterize the likelihood of the arguments. However, if 
probability is not used, then a plausibility judgment based on less precise information 
may be the cognitive default. This idea is similar to the fuzzy trace theory of decision-
making, where “decision makers seek the lowest level of precision in [a] hierarchy of gist 
that can be used to accomplish a task” (Reyna, Adam, Poirier, LeCroy, & Brainerd, 2005, 
p. 81).  
Thagard and Findlay (2011) argue that for controversial topics where strong 
emotions are involved, such as global climate change, probabilistic reasoning is 
cognitively impractical, even in simple cases involving only a hypothesis and an 
18 
 
alternative. Specifically, Thagard and Findley state that “probability theory should be 
used whenever appropriate for statistics-based inference, but applying it to qualitative 
cases of causal reasoning such as climate changes obscures more than it illuminates” (p. 
340). Thagard and Findley specifically reference statements made in a major report made 
by an international team of climate scientists (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2007), where the scientists qualitatively classified causes and future impacts of 
climate change in order for more effective communication and understanding. For 
example, one statement in the report says “climate change is likely to lead to some 
irreversible impacts.” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, p. 13, 
emphasis theirs). Similarly, Mukherjee (2010) postulates that judgments made primarily 
through automatic and affective cognitive processes is “insensitive to probabilities” (p. 
245). In situations of strong affect, a coarser plausibility judgment may play a dominant 
role in evaluating incoming information that conflicts with background knowledge. 
Limitations of prior plausibility models. We can classify the plausibility 
reasoning models of Connell and Keane (2006) and Rescher (1976), as well as the model 
of abductive reasoning of Walton (2004), as part of the family of cold cognitive 
processing (Pintrich, Marx, & Boyle, 1993; Sinatra, 2005). In general, cold cognition 
focuses on relationships and processing between knowledge structures (e.g., storage of 
knowledge in long-term memory, processing of information in working memory, 
attention on information, etc.), with little emphasis on the “warmer” constructs of affect, 
motivation, and social context (Sinatra, 2005). Whereas both Rescher and Walton 
acknowledge that uncomfortable feelings associated with cognitive dissonance can 
initiate plausibility judgments, there is virtually no mention of other emotions, nor 
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individuals’ goals and intentions, epistemic motives and dispositions, or the social 
context. However, in a recent study, Lombardi and Sinatra (2011) found a significant 
relationship between plausibility perceptions that humans are contributing to global 
climate change and science educators’ angry feelings about teaching climate change. The 
relationship was negative, where lesser plausibility perceptions were associated with 
greater feelings of anger. Evidence from this empirical study suggests that extra-rational 
constructs may be dynamically and reciprocally related to plausibility judgments.   
Rescher’s (1976) model of plausibility reasoning also implies that individuals 
engage in explicit processing when making a plausibility judgment. Researchers describe 
explicit processing, sometimes called Type 2, as cognition that is “controlled, voluntary, 
and effortful” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009, p. 519). On the other hand, implicit or Type 1 
cognitive processes are associated with automatic and unconscious judgments 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009). When individuals engage in Type 1 thinking, they are 
regularly employing the use of heuristics and acting as “cognitive misers” (Stanovich, 
2010). Because Type 1 processes require a much lower expenditure of cognitive 
resources, students probably make plausibility judgments implicitly. 
One empirical investigation supports this idea that plausibility is often an implicit 
cognitive process. In examining the use of plausibility judgments in solving simple 
multiplication problems, LeMaire and Fayol (1995) asked the study participants to verify 
if answers were true or false. Specifically, the researchers measured verification times in 
problems with a single multiplier (a), multiplicand (b), and product (c) (i.e., a × b = c). 
LeMaire and Fayol used two sets of four equations, where one set was categorized as 
easy and the other difficult based on Ashcraft’s difficulty indexes (Koshmider & 
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Ashcraft, 1991). For more difficult problems, the researchers found that both children and 
adults initially use a false estimation process by comparing the odd-even status of c to 
both a and b. Shorter verification times are needed to conclude that the answer is false 
when a and/or b is even and c is odd (e.g., 9 × 6 = 55). In other words, the answer is 
implausible. However, if both a and b are odd and c is odd (e.g., 9 × 7 = 61), then longer 
verification times were measured as the subjects engaged in more elaborate calculation 
procedures. In this case, the answer is plausible; therefore, additional steps are necessary 
for verification. LeMaire and Fayol propose that this estimation process is a plausibility 
judgment individuals use to avoid longer procedures and lower cognitive load during 
retrieval. Plausibility perceptions may therefore be similar to other cognitive processes, 
including “planning, monitoring, and evaluation, [which] may not be conscious or 
explicit in many learning situations” (Schraw, Crippen, & Hartley, 2006, p.114). 
However, it may be possible to make the plausibility judgment explicit through 
instruction, which I will discuss in some detail below.  
Because Rescher’s (1976) model does not include either (a) mechanisms for both 
implicit and explicit processing and (b) the warmer constructs of affect, motivation, and 
social context, we have a need to reconceptualize a model for plausibility in conceptual 
change situations, which includes these components. Critical to this model’s development 
are some of the ideas found in conceptual change research; specifically relevant are ideas 
about how researchers treat plausibility in several perspectives of conceptual change.   
The Role of Plausibility in Conceptual Change 
 My operational definition for conceptual change—reconstruction of conceptual 
understanding—is based on the philosophical underpinnings of (a) scientific revolutions, 
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which have been used as an analog to conceptual change (Chinn & Brewer, 1993; 
Feyerabend, 1962; T. Kuhn, 1962; Posner et al., 1982), as well as (b) psychological 
learning theories involving reconstruction of knowledge (Chi, 2005; Dole & Sinatra, 
1998; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). From this perspective, conceptual change implies that 
an individual has an existing mental representation (e.g., propositions stored in long-term 
memory, schema, mental model, or naïve theory) that is not consistent with scientific 
understanding. Conceptual change occurs when those types of knowledge structures are 
reformed to represent scientifically accurate knowledge. 
Many conceptual change researchers are currently engaged in an active debate 
about the degree of coherency in students’ misconceptions. On one side are those 
suggesting that misconceptions reside in memory structures that are relatively coherent 
(see, for example, Carey, 1999; Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008). Those on 
the other side claim that naïve ideas most often exist as fragmented pieces of elemental 
knowledge, which lack cognitive structure (diSessa, 2008). Researchers call this latter 
perspective “knowledge in pieces,” where misconceptions are ephemeral because 
students construct concepts from elemental information based on the situation and 
context provided by the environment (diSessa, Gillespie, & Esterly, 2004). 
From the knowledge in pieces perspective, a student learns about a concept 
because she has taken fragmented knowledge and organized it into a coherent structure 
(Mayer, 2002). Change occurs in how knowledge is organized (i.e., fragmented to 
coherent), but not as a shift from one coherent mental model to another. This notion is 
quite different from the reconstruction of knowledge notion present in many other 
conceptual change theories (Carey, 1999; Chi, 2005; Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Ohlsson, 
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2009; Vosniadou, Vamvakoussi, & Skopeliti, 2008). Students integrate naïve knowledge 
fragments and evaluate which fragments create a more complex and scientifically 
accurate mental representation (Mayer, 2002). Evaluation of naïve knowledge fragments 
involves a judgment that diSessa (1993) calls “mutual plausibility” (p. 116). However, 
the knowledge in pieces perspective is much more akin to concept development (see for 
example, Gellman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994; Mandler, 2008) than conceptual change. 
Furthermore, this perspective gives plausibility only a very superficial treatment. 
Therefore, I have not used knowledge in pieces to inform the model’s development. 
Responses to anomalous information. Chinn and Brewer (1993) discussed what 
happens when students experience scientific evidence that disagrees with their naïve 
theories. According to Chinn and Brewer, there are seven outcomes when students 
experience “anomalous data:” (1) ignore (discard data with no explanation), (2) reject 
(discard data with explanation), (3) exclude (place data outside the domain of their 
existing conception), (4) hold in abeyance (deal with the data later), (5) reinterpret 
(incorporate data into the domain of their existing conception), (6) modify peripherally 
(make a superficial change to their existing conception), or (7) reconstruct theory 
(undergo strong conceptual change so that their understanding is consistent with 
scientific knowledge). 
Plausibility judgments play a critical factor in determining which of these seven 
responses occurs (Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Specifically, Chinn and Brewer argue that a 
new theory that accurately accounts for the anomalous data must be plausible. Because 
Chinn and Brewer strongly associate individual conceptual change with the history of 
science, they say, “the essential ingredient in a plausible theory is a plausible physical 
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mechanism” (p. 21, emphasis theirs). From my earlier example, scientists did not have a 
unique explanatory physical mechanism for increasing global temperatures until the 
1980s. Before that time, increasing solar activity and/or increased human emissions of 
greenhouse gases were both reasonable explanations. Solar activity began to decrease in 
the 1980s, but human emissions of greenhouse gases continued to increase. At this point, 
human-induced greenhouse gas emissions became a more plausible explanatory 
mechanism for climate change (at least among climate scientists). 
The classic conceptual change model. Chinn and Brewer (1993) based their 
analysis of plausibility on the classic conceptual change model of Posner et al. (1982). In 
this model, Posner et al. proposed that conceptual change proceeds in a linear fashion 
analogous to the process that occurs within scientific revolutions. First, the student has 
dissatisfaction with his existing conception. Then, the student must find the competing 
conception to be intelligible and appear initially plausible. The conceptual change will 
occur if the new conception also “leads to new insights and discoveries” (Posner et al., 
1982, p. 222) when applied to a broader perspective (i.e., the new conception is fruitful). 
When discussing initial plausibility, Posner et al. viewed it “as the anticipated degree of 
fit of the new conception into an existing conceptual ecology” (p. 218). Their idea of 
plausibility is different from mine (i.e., plausibility is a judgment on the relative potential 
truthfulness of incoming information compared to our existing mental representations). 
Instead of a comparative and ordinal judgment, Posner et al. view plausibility as a 
wellness of fit between the new information and existing mental representation. 
However, their notion of plausibility is incomplete because it fails to address how 
students reconstruct their conceptual ecology when the degree of fit is not good.  
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 Despite their limited perspective on plausibility, Posner et al. (1982) made 
several important recommendations about instructional strategies to promote conceptual 
change. With regard to plausibility, Posner et al. say, “any available metaphors, models, 
and analogies should be used to make a new conception more intelligible and plausible” 
(p. 224). This idea of associating intelligibility (also called message comprehensibility) 
and plausibility is found in many subsequent discussions of conceptual change. However, 
Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) state that “comprehensibility is related to the coherency and 
consistency of the message (i.e., is the message understandable)” (p. 4). Consequently, 
even if students comprehend the incoming information, they may still find the message 
implausible. For example, “students may understand that scientists are measuring 
increased temperatures around the world and that humans are emitting a large quantity of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.., [but] students may feel that it is implausible that 
human activity could influence global climate” (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012, p. 204). 
Whereas Posner et al. (1982) tend to fuse intelligibility and plausibility, their 
insight into the instructional use of analogies is consistent with Rescher’s (1976) notion 
that plausibility is a comparative and qualitative evaluation of competing conceptions. 
Clement (1993) argues that experts often use “qualitative physical intuition schemas” and 
not “formal” (p. 1252) quantitative strategies to create bridging analogies in solving 
problems. These bridging analogies “may therefore be important plausible reasoning 
strategies for developing and refining physical intuitions” (Clement, 1993, p. 1252). 
Analogical reasoning may also promote an inference to understand a relationship 
between the source and target analog (Holyoak, 2005). Subsequently, analogical and 
plausibilistic reasoning may be connected if the inference used in making an analogy is 
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abductive in nature. This analogical/plausible mechanism may be involved when 
individuals shift their categorization of ideas from one ontological category to another, 
which is another major perspective on how conceptual change occurs.  
Ontological shift. Chi (2005) stated that students naturally categorize concepts 
into ontological categories, which are formed by a mutually exclusive set of plausible 
attributes (i.e., an attribute that a category member may plausibly, but does not 
necessarily, have). For example, anything within the object ontological category may 
plausibly have the attribute of color, even though some objects may be colorless (e.g., 
air). However, color would not be a plausible attribute of the process ontological category 
(e.g., melting of Antarctic ice sheets would not plausibly possess the attribute of color). 
Because conceptual change occurs when a student shifts a concept from one ontological 
category into another, plausibility plays a central role in Chi’s model. In other words, for 
a shift to occur, the concept must be reliably consistent with the ontological attributes that 
the student may have assigned to that category. 
The ontological perspective, along with the conceptual change theories of Chinn 
and Brewer (1993) and Posner et al. (1982), were established using the framework of 
cold cognitive processing. As I have discussed earlier, we need to consider the “warmer” 
extra-rational processes, such as motivation, affect, and social context to gain a more 
complete understanding of plausibility’s role in conceptual change.  
Integrating Conceptual Change and Plausibility into a Warmer Cognitive Arena 
A major shift in conceptual change research occurred with a seminal article by 
Pintrich et al. (1993). These researchers posited that conceptual change is not necessarily 
analogous to history of science because learner characteristics (e.g., motivation) and the 
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social environment in the classroom strongly influence conceptual change. In other 
words, conceptual change may not necessarily be an overly rational process for the 
student. Furthermore, Pintrich et al. proposed that when students seek plausibility in a 
new mental representation, they may undergo a deeper level of cognitive processing 
through elaboration and organization, which “facilitate encoding and learning” (p. 174). 
This is consistent with the work of LeMaire and Fayol (1995) discussed earlier, where 
shorter verification times (i.e., indicating a superficial level of processing) are associated 
with quick implausibility judgments and longer verification times (i.e., indicating deeper 
processing) are associated with a more deliberate determination of plausibility. 
   Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) cognitive reconstruction of knowledge model (CRKM) 
embraced the viewpoint of Pintrich et al. (1993) by postulating an interaction between the 
qualities of a student’s existing conceptions (i.e., the strength of, coherence of, and 
commitment to the existing conception), his motivation to process new information, and 
the incoming “message” conflicting with the existing conception. Dole and Sinatra claim 
that plausibility is one of four critical aspects of an incoming message, along with 
degrees of comprehensibility, coherency, and compelling rhetoric. Two of these aspects, 
comprehensibility and plausibility, were theoretical holdovers from Posner et al.’s (1982) 
conceptual change model. 
Plausibility and coherence. Dole and Sinatra (1998) claim that the incoming 
message must have explanatory coherence. Thagard (1989, 2006) presents the idea of 
explanatory coherence as an evaluation of explanations between two or more competing 
hypotheses. In making the cognitive evaluation of alternatives, explanatory coherence 
examines the fit of evidence to the alternatives, as well as the how well the two 
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alternatives fit with each other. In his theory of explanatory coherence, he claims that 
individuals accept an alternative based on its degree of coherency (Thagard, 2006). In the 
case of conceptual change, knowledge reconstruction would occur because the existing 
mental representation has lower explanatory coherence than the new, incoming message. 
In the explanatory coherence model, evaluation of explanations relies on 
plausibility perceptions (Ranney & Schank, 1998). However, explanatory coherence 
primarily concerns the degree of corroboration with background knowledge, which I have 
noted above is only one aspect of validating principles that result in plausibility indexing. 
Explanatory coherence also dichotomously categorizes the perceived complexity and 
conjecture in the connections between the incoming message and background knowledge 
(e.g., hypothetical versus evidentiary). These dichotomous categories are somewhat 
similar to the plausibility factors discussed by Connell and Keane (2006), but lack the 
breadth of Rescher’s (1976) source reliability. 
An expanded explanatory coherence model does take into account the influence 
of emotions on cognitive judgments (Thagard, 1998, 2006; Thagard & Finley, 2011).  In 
running simulations of this expanded model, Thagard and Finley (2011) show how 
emotions can interfere with belief revision by undermining hypotheses that are better 
supported by the evidence. Yet, explanatory coherence lacks the power of the plausibility 
judgment because one source may override all the others. Coherence may describe how 
an explanation aligns into a conceptual whole, but plausibility explains how students 
qualitatively compare dissonant information to background knowledge in order to apply a 
relative potential truthfulness value. Some researchers have noted this limitation in 
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Thagard’s theory (Adams, 2002) when compared to the broader utility of the plausibility 
judgment (Chinn & Brewer, 2001).  
Plausibility and compelling rhetoric. The last message variable in Dole and 
Sinatra’s (1998) model is compelling rhetoric, which emerges from the social psychology 
literature on persuasive text (see, for example, Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Dole and Sinatra 
claim that “some individuals may be more compelled [toward conceptual change] by an 
impassioned and emotional speech” given by an authority figure (p. 120). Compelling 
rhetoric may then interact with plausibility judgments if we consider the idea of source 
reliability from Rescher’s (1976) model. An individual who is deemed highly reliable 
(e.g., a well-respected politician) could deliver a message with compelling rhetoric, and 
consequently, individuals could give the message a high plausibility index. On the other 
hand, a person could deliver compelling rhetoric, but individuals could consider the 
person to be unreliable (e.g., a politician who is deemed untrustworthy). In this case, the 
source reliability and the associated plausibility index will be low despite the 
persuasiveness of the speaker. 
 Dole and Sinatra (1998) do express a major difference from Rescher’s (1976) 
model of plausible reasoning by making the following claim: when individuals make a 
plausibility judgment about the message, they weigh the probability of evidence by 
deciding on the probability of its usefulness. Probability demands that when one 
alternative is highly likely, the other alternative must be unlikely. This is counter to the 
idea of simultaneously considering two opposing alternatives to be plausible. Unlike 
probability, a plausibility judgment is not an “either or” proposition, but a relative and 
ordinal ranking of alternatives. My model will hold to Rescher’s general perspective on 
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plausibility, and therefore, will deviate somewhat from Dole and Sinatra. However, many 
elements of Dole and Sinatra’s CRKM have informed my model of plausibility in 
conceptual and epistemic change, which I have detailed in the next section.  
Model of Plausibility Judgments in Conceptual Change 
 Figure 2 is my model of plausibility judgments in conceptual change. The 
structure of the model is similar to Rescher’s (1976) model of plausible reasoning. 
However, the details in the boxes have been expanded to reflect Dole and Sinatra’s 
(1998) model, which has influenced the warming trend in conceptual change, as well as 
Chinn and Brewer’s (1993) theoretical framework on students’ responses to anomalous 
data and Connell and Keane’s (2006) model of plausibility. Perspectives on epistemic 
cognition have also contributed to the processes involved in the critical evaluation 
feedback loop, as well as the degree of evaluation in the plausibility judgment. I consider 
this critical evaluation feedback to be a sociocognitive route because plausibility 
reappraisal would likely be initiated via interactions with other people or information 
sources (e.g., texts and video), whereas the initial pathway (i.e., from anomalous 
incoming information to the plausibility judgment to the result) is primarily cognitive. 
The model then heeds the call made by Sinatra and Mason (2008) for researchers to pay 
attention to both the socio-cultural and cognitive perspectives of conceptual change. 
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Figure 2. A model of the role of plausibility judgment in a conceptual change situation 
initiated by cognitive dissonance. 
Pre-processing of anomalous incoming information. Incoming information that 
is anomalous to background knowledge can result in cognitive dissonance and 
dissatisfaction. Students pre-process this anomalous incoming information in order to 
establish source reliability. Because of the importance placed on validating principles in 
Connell and Keane’s (2006) model, I have highlighted three screening principles as key 
factors in establishing a plausibility index: (a) corroborative alignment of information 
with background knowledge, (b) complexity of the incoming information, and (c) 
perceived degree of conjecture or uncertainity. I call the fourth screening principle 
heuristic rules (e.g., representativeness, availability, and anchoring; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). As I have discussed earlier, source reliability may be influenced by 
these heuristics, where biases that are contrary to the laws of probability, but not to the 
tentative judgment of plausibility, are cognitively activated.   
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Plausibility judgments and the degree of evaluation. Central to the model is the 
actual plausibility judgment (see Figure 2), where individuals compare the incoming 
information to their existing mental representation. The plausibility judgment may 
involve some degree of implicit processing (i.e., Type 1, with low awareness and low 
cognitive effort) and explicit processing (Type 2, with high awareness and high cognitive 
effort). Because of students’ proclivity toward Type 1 cognition (i.e., acting as “cognitive 
misers”; Stanovich, 2010), the plausibility judgment might often be implicit. I have 
represented the degree to which the plausibility judgment is implicit or explicit as a 
continuum, which I am calling the degree of evaluation. This evaluation would only be 
critical and reflective if the plausibility judgment is (a) primarily an explicit comparison 
of the connection between evidence and alternatives, (b) based on skilled intuition 
developed through expertise in a particular domain (e.g., a theoretical physicist may 
implicitly use critical evaluation when considering the validity of new theory on 
subatomic particles; Kahneman & Klein, 2009), or (c) representative of individuals’ 
dispositions to think deeply, and possibly their motivations toward and emotions about 
the topic. 
 Epistemic dispositions and motives. Research on epistemic dispositions and 
motives emerges from the social psychology literature that, in part, helped to form Dole 
and Sinatra’s cognitive reconstruction of knowledge (CRKM) model. In particular, 
epistemic dispositions are associated with relatively stable personality traits relating to 
our views about knowledge and/or its acquisition. Dole and Sinatra specifically identify 
need for cognition in their model, which is a disposition toward engaging deeply in topics 
because of enjoyment (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Individuals with a 
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high need for cognition tend to appreciate complexity and do not seek closure on an issue 
prematurely, and therefore may be more implicitly evaluative in making plausibility 
judgments. In a study involving undergraduate students, Sinatra, Southerland, 
McConaughy, and Demastes (2003) found “that willingness to entertain knowledge 
change intentionally (the central theme of the dispositional scales) affects acceptance of 
evolution” (p. 521). In such a case, the initial plausibility judgment could place a 
relatively high index on complex and controversial incoming information, but only if the 
individual has a tendency to be more explicitly evaluative. 
Epistemic motives are an individual’s inclination toward a particular view of 
knowledge, such as seeking or avoiding closure (Kruglanski, 1989). Epistemic motives 
may also be dispositional in that they are relatively stable for extended periods. In a 
recent study, Lombardi and Sinatra (2011) found that decisiveness (a need for closure 
subcomponent; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) and anger about teaching about climate 
change were significant predictors of an individual’s plausibility perceptions about 
human-induced climate change. In this study, greater decisiveness predicted lower 
plausibility, potentially indicating that individuals with an urgent desire to decide may 
tend to evaluate information heuristically (i.e., as theorized by Dole & Sinatra, 1998, p. 
117). This tendency could assign a comparatively greater weight to existing mental 
representations, and because of this decisiveness, the plausibility judgment could favor 
background knowledge over new, incoming information. 
Sinatra, Kardash, Taasoobshirazi, and Lombardi (2011) found that another need 
for closure subcomponent, specifically close-mindedness, was related to undergraduates’ 
willingness to commit to actions that would mitigate climate change. Greater levels of 
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close-mindedness predicted a lower degree in commitment to act. Whereas, Sinatra et al. 
did not measure plausibility perceptions, we may speculate that one reason for the lack of 
willingness may have been because the participants did not consider human-induced 
climate change to be plausible.   
 Motivation. Students’ motivation would also influence the degree of evaluation. 
In their conceptual change model, Dole and Sinatra (1998) list several motivational 
factors, including students’ (a) “stake in the outcome,” (b) “interest in the topic,” and (c) 
“self-efficacy about the topic” (Dole & Sinatra, 1998, p. 119). These motivational factors 
may also influence the plausibility judgment implicitly. For example, students with low 
interest about the incoming anomalous information may rank this information’s source 
reliability lower than that of their background knowledge, which may hold greater 
interest. This could result in a lower comparative plausibility perception of the incoming 
anomalous information. For example, an individual may have little interest in protecting 
the environment for future generations, but have a strong interest in racing monster 
trucks. In this case, the interest in truck racing may promote a strong belief in drilling for 
oil in environmentally sensitive areas to maintain lower gasoline costs. An interest in 
truck driving could also create a strong desire to rebut the anomalous information. 
Therefore, this individual may place greater source reliability on climate change skeptics 
who are supported by the oil industry because of their interest in racing over that of 
climate scientists who may be considered “environmentalists” (and by association, of 
much lower interest).  
Recent research in motivation and conceptual change reveals that students’ goal 
orientation (e.g., mastery versus performance) interact with “awareness, knowledge, and 
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the intentional reconstruction of knowledge” (Sinatra & Mason, 2008, p. 565). Students 
with a mastery orientation could provide a greater ranking to incoming information even 
though it is anomalous just because of their desire for greater understanding. 
Furthermore, mastery goals may result in more explicit and critical evaluation of the 
incoming information, thereby changing the comparative plausibility judgment.  
Topic emotions. Emotions based specifically on the topic of instruction may also 
influence the plausibility judgments’ degree of evaluation. Topic emotions may 
potentially interfere with motivation and cognition in a reciprocal fashion, similar to the 
way that general academic emotions interfere with motivation and cognition (Pekrun, 
Frenzel, Goetz, & Perry, 2007). In an overview of recent research on emotion in 
education, Linnenbrink (2007) states that current research is converging on “the view that 
there are bi-directional, reciprocal relations among motivation, affect, and cognition” (p. 
311). From the conceptual change perspective, an individual’s feelings about a particular 
topic may affect the comparative judgment of the anomalous information to the existing 
mental representation. Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) showed that teachers who expressed 
anger about teaching about climate change (as well as an epistemic motivation toward 
decisiveness) found the idea of human-induced climate change implausible. However, 
despite this initial evidence, the direction of the plausibility and topic emotion is still 
uncertain. Gregoire (2003) argues that affective appraisals, such as threat and stress, 
“happen automatically before characteristics of the message [e.g., plausibility] are 
seriously considered and that message characteristics may never be fully processed on the 
basis of appraisals made” (p. 168). The potential reciprocal nature of plausibility 
judgments and topic emotions could provide a fruitful arena for future research.   
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Result of the plausibility judgment. As shown in the model (Figure 2), the 
plausibility judgment would be implemented through some degree of implicit and explicit 
processing and would result in one of the seven responses to anomalous information (i.e., 
as theorized by Chinn & Brewer, 1993). Chinn and Brewer’s use of the term “data” 
actually represents a wide variety of scientific information, including ideas that we can 
consider hypotheses and theories. For example, to support the idea of weak conceptual 
change (i.e., peripheral theory change), Chinn and Brewer recount early astronomers’ 
reactions to Galileo’s discovery of lunar mountains. According to the prevailing 
astronomical theory, celestial objects were considered perfect spheres. The astronomers 
made a weak (and still incorrect) modification to their theory by allowing mountains to 
be embedded within a perfect crystalline sphere (Chinn & Brewer, 1993, p. 11). 
 The idea that plausibility is a judgment on the relative potential truthfulness of 
incoming information compared to our existing mental representations aligns with these 
seven responses. Incoming information that students perceive to be essentially impossible 
(i.e., because the source reliability is virtually zero) would be ignored because the 
existing mental representation would certainly have a greater plausibility. Similarly, 
students may assign incoming information a low plausibility index due to topic emotions 
that generate adverse feelings and they would reject this information because the current 
conception would usually have a greater comparative plausibility. When students exclude 
the incoming information or hold it in abeyance, they might assign the information a 
somewhat greater plausibility index because they accept the information as potentially 
truthful. However, due to greater explanatory power, existing conceptions would retain 
greater plausibility. Incoming ideas with still greater plausibility would require some 
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level of change, depending on the strength of the source reliability. A student may 
reinterpret the information in order to assimilate it into the existing conception, resulting 
in weak restructuring. Only when the plausibility of the new information is greater than 
the current mental representation would knowledge reconstruction occur. The process 
does not necessarily end with these results because the plausibility judgment would be 
tentative and reappraisal of the judgment could occur (Rescher, 1976). 
Reappraisal of the plausibility judgment. Interactions, which are sociocultural 
in nature, may facilitate reappraisal of students’ plausibility judgments and subsequent 
disposition of the incoming information (see Figure 2). Dole and Sinatra (1998) state that 
“a host of social contexts,” such as “students in a group discussion, may be motivated to 
consider new or conflicting information that they have disregarded in the past because 
they value their peers’ viewpoints” (p. 119-120). Sociocultural interactions could also 
include reading text or watching video from a highly reliable source. This could then 
change the new information’s plausibility index. If the change is great enough, the new 
information may result in knowledge reconstruction (i.e., if the plausibility of the 
incoming message is now greater than the existing mental representation). However, 
these interactions most likely require critical reflection and evaluation to result in 
plausibility change, such that students “are reflective about what they are thinking and 
why” (Dole & Sinatra, 1998, p. 121). 
Critical comparison of the incoming information to the existing mental 
representation may be more apt to lead to strong and enduring conceptual change. This 
evaluation can be thought of as a problem solving process, where “students 
would…engage in metacognitive reflection, rethinking their old beliefs and comparing 
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them with the new ideas in order to judge the new ideas as more plausible and fruitful” 
(Pintrich et al., 1993, p. 174). Similarly, Dole and Sinatra (1998) call this critical 
comparison high metacognitive engagement. Rescher (1976) states that when the 
comparative reappraisal “happens systematically …we are in the position to reevaluate—
and revise—the existing criteria of plausibility themselves” (Rescher, 1976, p. 118). The 
challenge then is to promote strong conceptual change through epistemic cognitive 
processes, which in turn leads to systematic plausibility reappraisal. In other words, the 
use of critical evaluation may move the plausibility judgment from implicit to explicit 
thinking. Instruction may be one way to facilitate explicit cognition in making the 
plausibility judgment. If students can undergo epistemic conceptual change through 
instruction that promotes critical evaluation, they may develop the ability to reappraise 
their plausibility judgments and criteria in light of the several factors influencing the 
judgment.  
Epistemic Cognition and Critical Evaluation 
Cognitive development researchers often view epistemic cognition in discrete 
stages. For example, D. Kuhn and colleagues’ developmental model of critical thinking 
has four levels of epistemological understanding (D. Kuhn, 1999; D. Kuhn, Cheney, & 
Weinstock, 2000). The realist and absolutist levels are the first two stages, where 
“knowledge is certain” and critical thinking is minimal (D. Kuhn, 1999, p. 23). Likewise, 
in the third level (multiplist stage), “critical thinking is irrelevant” because knowledge is 
based solely on opinions of equal weight and value (D. Kuhn, 1999, p. 23). However, 
critical thinking is essential in the evaluative level, which is the most advanced stage in 
Kuhn’s model. In this stage, individuals use reasoned criteria to compare and evaluate 
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alternative assertions. Furthermore, the evaluative level exhibits similarities to King and 
Kitchener’s (2004) notion of reflective thinking. Having an evaluative epistemological 
understanding introduces the idea of judgments based on argument, evidence, and 
criteria. Therefore, with regard to scientific knowledge, one theory would have 
preference over another based on the strength of evidence and collaborative 
understanding. D. Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) view this as a “coordination of theory and 
evidence in a consciously controlled manner” (p. 114), and classify mature scientific 
thinking as a metacognitive process. 
Whereas the development of such mature scientific thinking may be a conscious 
and explicit cognitive process, expert scientists may conduct such coordination implicitly, 
with little metacognition. Mayer (1992) claims that physics experts categorize schematic 
knowledge through structural similarities (as compared to superficial similarities used by 
novices). In problem solving, expert physicists examine data through a theoretical 
perspective (e.g., Newton’s Laws of Motion) rather than the type of problem (e.g., 
inclined plane). The physicists demonstrate that they have a theory-based procedural 
schema through which they interpret data. Thus, theory and data coordination may 
become part of intuitive judgment process, which is a characteristic of Type 1 thinking 
(Kahneman & Klein, 2009). These intuitive judgments form via experience, rather than 
relying on more simplified heuristics characteristic of novices (e.g., use of superficial 
similarities). Instruction could potentially provide the necessary experience for students 
to coordinate data and theory intuitively, and therefore, develop mature scientific 
thinking. This may then move students’ epistemic cognition toward a more naturalistic 
and critical type of evaluation. Cognitive development researchers acknowledge that 
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instruction can result in such transformations, but they provide a limited amount of detail 
on how to do so. Fortunately, research in science education and educational psychology 
provides some insight.   
Sinatra and Chinn (2011) claim that science education researchers have been 
investigating epistemic cognition by examining students’ learning about the nature of 
science. Included as a content area in the National Science Education Standards (NRC, 
1996), nature of science covers the ideas that (a) science is a dynamic sociocognitive 
process of knowledge construction, (b) the history of science illuminates this process, and 
(c) knowledge constructed through the scientific process has unique characteristics. This 
latter idea directly concerns epistemic cognition, where scientific knowledge 
“distinguishes itself from other ways of knowing…through the use of empirical 
standards, logical arguments, and skepticism, as scientists strive for the best possible 
explanations about the natural world” (NRC, 1996, p. 200). Arriving at the best possible 
explanation implies that analyses, evaluations, and arguments are central to the scientific 
process. In Part 2 of the literature review, I will provide more details on promoting 
critical evaluation through instruction and how such instruction may result in plausibility 
appraisal, and ultimately, conceptual change. 
Part 2: Applying the Model to Students’ Conceptions About Climate Change 
Global climate change is receiving increased attention as a classroom topic. 
Recently, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science developed a guide to promote greater 
understanding of climate change (U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2009). The 
guide lists four abilities of a climate literate person, including (a) demonstrating 
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knowledge about the “essential principles of Earth’s climate system,” (b) understanding 
“how to assess scientifically credible information about climate,” (c) communicating 
“about climate and climate change in a meaningful way,” and (d) being “able to make 
informed and responsible decisions with regard to actions that may affect climate” (U.S. 
Global Change Research Program, 2009, p. 3). This literature review will focus on the 
first three aspects, particularly how students and teachers understand the fundamental 
scientific concepts related to climate change, and how students and teachers develop 
epistemic cognitive processes needed to think scientifically about climate change.  
Climate change science is complex. Developing understanding about Earth’s 
climate requires fundamental knowledge in many domains, including physics, chemistry, 
geology, astronomy, meteorology, and ecology. Many of these scientific ideas are 
counter to students’ existing mental representations. Often called misconceptions, these 
alternative or naïve mental representations may be present at birth or very early in 
infancy (see, for example, Carey, 1992; Gellman, Coley, & Gottfried, 1994; Mandler, 
2008) and also form via experiences with the natural world, as well as experiences at 
school, church, and other everyday interactions (see, for example, diSessa, 1993; 
Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992). Many misconceptions are notoriously robust to change and 
can act as a barrier to learning scientifically accurate ideas (Chi, 2005). To reconstruct 
knowledge structures into correct conceptions, Dole and Sinatra (1998) have theorized a 
complex interaction between characteristics of (a) students’ existing mental 
representation and their motivation to change and (b) the incoming, scientifically accurate 
message that teachers present to students. 
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The question of why scientists think Earth’s climate is changing is also complex. 
In addition to understanding scientific principles, students also need to engage in 
epistemic cognitive processes that reflect scientific reasoning used to understand complex 
topics (Sinatra & Chinn, 2011). Students’ underlying epistemological assumptions about 
knowledge and how they gain knowledge influences their epistemic cognition (Kitchener, 
1983). Of particular importance to understanding climate change, students need to deepen 
their ability to critically evaluate the quality of scientific information and weigh 
alternative explanations in a reasoned manner. This will help them to construct 
knowledge consistent with the scientific community. Such knowledge construction (i.e., 
via evaluation of evidence obtained through scientific inquiry) would be a characteristic 
exhibited by reflective thinkers. Unfortunately, few high school graduates demonstrate 
reflective thinking (King & Kitchener, 2004). Therefore, to facilitate improved 
understanding of climate change and other complex science topics, students need to 
reconstruct their epistemic cognition processes to be more evaluative and reflective, as 
well as their conceptual understanding (Sinatra & Chinn, 2011). 
Plausibility judgments may be an important way in which students evaluate an 
incoming message. In situations of cognitive dissonance, plausibility judgments 
comparing the incoming information to the existing conception would influence if and 
how much conceptual change may occur (Dole & Sinatra, 1998; Pintrich et al., 1993; 
Posner et al., 1982). Plausibility judgments may often be implicit and automatic cognitive 
processes, influenced by students’ epistemic dispositions and motives, topic emotions, 
and motivations. However, a plausibilistic comparison may be reappraised through 
explicit and effortful critical evaluation as I have discussed in more detail in Part 1 of this 
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literature review. Given the association between potentially robust misconceptions and 
complex concepts, topics such as climate change may need an explicit reappraisal of 
plausibility for students to reconstruct their knowledge successfully. Furthermore, the 
consensus among climate scientists is that human activities are the primary cause of 
recent increases in global average temperatures (Doran & Zimmerman, 2009). This is a 
controversial stance outside of this scientific community, where non-climate scientists 
may view competing theories with greater plausibility. The controversial nature of 
human-induced climate change may therefore contribute to a lower comparative 
plausibility of the scientific conception. 
Based on these circumstances, my underlying thesis in Part 2 of the literature 
review is that critical evaluation of competing climate change models would increase 
plausibility perceptions of human-induced climate change. This in turn would result in a 
greater degree of conceptual change about the topic. The remainder of this section will 
discuss the nature of misconceptions related to climate change, potential importance of 
plausibility judgments in conceptual change, connection between critical evaluation and 
plausibility reappraisal, and emergence of research questions that may reveal insights into 
instructional methods that facilitate deeper understanding of climate change and science 
learning in general.   
Climate Change Misconceptions 
Table 1 lists several misconceptions that students have about climate change, 
along with the associated scientifically accurate understanding. This is an update to 
Lombardi and Sinatra’s (2012) list, which I have modified using recently published 
information (Choi, Niyogi, Shepardson, & Charusombat, 2010). The table shows two 
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categories of misconceptions, evidence-related and cause-related. The single evidence-
related misconception concerns student confusion about weather and climate distinctions 
(see, for example, Gowda, Fox, & Magelky, 1997; Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012; 
Papadimitriou, 2004; Pruneau, Gravel, Courque, & Langis, 2003). 
Cause-related misconceptions include (a) attributing global warming to increasing 
solar irradiance (i.e., the amount of solar energy received at the top of the Earth’s 
atmosphere) (see, for example, Boyes & Stanisstreet, 1993; Pruneau et al., 2003), (b) 
stratospheric ozone depletion (i.e., the ozone hole) causing either increased amounts of 
energy to reach the Earth’s surface or allowing more of Earth’s energy to escape out to 
space (see for example, Andersson & Wallin, 2000; Boyes & Stanisstreet, 1994; Keller, 
2006; Österlind, 2005), (c) a gas or dust layer at the top of Earth’s atmosphere behaving 
similarly to a glass roof on a greenhouse (see, for example, Andersson & Wallin, 2000; 
Pruneau et al., 2003), and (d) some form of pollution (i.e., pollution other than 
greenhouse gas emissions) contributing to global warming (see, for example, Gowda et 
al., 1997; Keller, 2006; Papadimitriou, 2004; Read, Bostrom, Morgan, Fischhoff, & 
Smuts, 1994). We used conclusions from an international team of climate scientists for 
the table’s comparative listing of scientifically accurate conceptions (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2007). 
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Table 1 
Comparisons of Some Student Misconceptions and Scientific Conceptions about Global 
Climate Change 
Student misconceptions Scientific conceptions 
Evidence-related 
 Short-term and local weather events are 
evidence of global climate change. 
Long-term observations show a statistically 
averaged and global-wide warming trend. 
Cause-related 
 Increasing amounts of solar irradiation 
because the Sun is releasing more energy 
or the Earth is getting closer to the Sun. 
Whereas the amount of solar radiation from 
the Sun varies, in the past 30 years, the 
Earth has been receiving slightly 
decreasing amounts of solar energy.  
 Stratospheric ozone depletion causes 
significant increases in global 
temperatures. 
 A gas or dust layer at the top of the 
atmosphere is trapping Earth’s energy 
similar to the glass roof covering a 
greenhouse. 
Increased atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases (primarily carbon 
dioxide) are resulting in increased global 
temperatures. These greenhouse gases are 
mainly located in the lowest layer of 
Earth’s atmosphere and generally well 
mixed throughout this layer 
 Pollution (e.g., smog, acid rain, nuclear 
waste) is directly linked to global climate 
change. 
Human activities are causing increasingly 
greater concentrations of atmospheric 
greenhouse gases 
Note: Adapted from “College students’ perceptions about the plausibility of human-induced climate 
change,” by D. Lombardi and G. M. Sinatra, 2012, Research in Science Education, 42, 201-217, and “Do 
earth and environmental science textbooks promote middle and high school students’ conceptual 
development about climate change?:Textbooks’ consideration of students’ misconceptions,” by S. Choi, D. 
Niyogi, D. P. Shepardson, and U. Charusombat, 2010, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 91, 
p. 890. 
 
Researchers have studied other climate change misconceptions, which are outside 
the categories of “evidence related to” and “causes of” climate change (see, for example, 
Choi et al., 2010; Moxnes & Saysel, 2009; Shepardson, Niyogi, Choi, & Charusombat, 
2011). These misconceptions, along with the cause-related misconceptions concerning 
stratospheric ozone depletion, a gas and dust layer, and other forms of pollution are 
beyond the scope of this review. Understanding these misconceptions probably has 
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implications for climate change education, but for the purposes of gaining better 
understanding about the relationship between plausibility judgments and critical 
evaluation, I will limit my focus to the first two misconceptions listed in Table 1 
(confusion about weather and climate distinctions and attributing climate change to 
increasing amounts of solar irradiation). These two misconceptions are especially 
relevant to initial learning about climate change (i.e., at the middle school level) based on 
learning progressions implied by the National Science Education Standards (NRC, 
1996). 
Confusion about weather and climate distinctions. Scientists use localized and 
short-term weather events to determine regional climate trends, and periods of 30 years or 
greater are the classical time spans for determining climatic averages and extremes 
(National Climatic Data Center, 2008). Unlike climate scientists, students and the public 
sometimes use unique weather events to make conclusions about climate change. For 
example, two blizzards hit Washington, D.C. within one week during the winter of 2010 
and President Obama nicknamed these events as “Snowmageddon” (Silva, 2010). During 
that snowstorm, “Oklahoma Republican Sen. James Inhofe, an outspoken skeptic of 
global warming…mocked Al Gore” [Nobel Prize winner for his work on informing the 
public about potential climate change impacts] by showing images of him and his family 
“building an igloo near the Capitol, with a sign that read ‘Al Gore's new home’” (Page, 
2010). The inference here is that these short-term blizzards invalidated predictions about 
increasing global temperatures associated with long-term climate change. 
Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) summarized three research studies documenting 
confusion about weather and climate distinctions occurring in members of the public, 
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high school students, and preservice teachers. These survey studies found that individuals 
(a) used “local weather excursions” (e.g., extreme storms) to make judgments about 
climate trends (Read et al., 1994, p. 974), (b) claimed that “climate often changes from 
year to year” and to have personally experienced climate change by witnessing a 
“memorable weather event” (Gowda et al., 1997, p. 2236), and (c) cited recent weather 
events (e.g., extremely hot summer days) as evidence of climate change (Papadimitriou, 
2004). Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) used this information to develop the Distinctions 
between Weather and Climate Measure (DWCM), a 13-item dichotomous choice 
instrument, where students classify statements as pertaining to weather or climate. Prior 
to this study, we administered the DWCM to 83 undergraduate students, 40 secondary 
science teachers, and 45 preservice elementary teachers, with average overall correct 
responses of 61% (students at semester’s beginning) and 48% (teachers). Semester-long 
geoscience instruction, with at least some coverage of weather and climate distinctions, 
significantly increased undergraduate students’ understanding of these distinctions 
(increasing to 71% correct responses; Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012). These results show that 
students and teachers had an appreciable level of misunderstanding about weather and 
climate distinctions, which persisted somewhat after instruction. 
Attributing climate change to increasing solar irradiance. The Sun is the 
predominant energy source for Earth’s weather and climate. Recent paleoclimate studies 
have shown a strong association between solar activity and global temperatures over the 
past 11,000 years (Solanki, Usokin, Kromer, Schüssler, & Beer, 2004). However, 
“correlations between the Sun’s behavior and the Earth’s climate have completely failed 
since the 1970s” (Priest, Lockwood, Solanki, & Wolfendale, 2007). Solar activity has 
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been decreasing since that time, and in the absence of an enhanced greenhouse effect 
caused by human activities, this lessening solar irradiance should have resulted in slightly 
lower global temperatures (Lockwood, 2010). 
Despite these recent scientific observations, the increased solar activity argument 
has been popular with those who are skeptical of human influences on climate (Cook, 
2010). For example, a blog called the Dakota Voice misinterpreted a NASA study by 
claiming “we have still more evidence that any warming occurring on planet earth is 
coming from natural sources [i.e., the Sun] and is cyclic in nature” (Ellis, 2009, p.1). 
Educational researchers have also found that students hold misconceptions about the 
connection between climate change and solar irradiance. For example, Boyes and 
Stanisstreet (1993) found that 59% of secondary students (N = 128) incorrectly thought, 
“the greenhouse effect is made worse because too many of the sun’s rays get to the earth” 
(p. 538). Pruneau et al. (2003) surveyed 39 teenage students prior to instruction and 
found that two believed that climate change is occurring because “the planet gets closer 
to the sun and gets warmer” (p. 437). Although this is a very small percentage, this 
ranked as the third most popular explanation because 67% of the students responded that 
they did not know what caused climate change. 
Both the blogger’s and students’ irradiance misconception may be related (at least 
in part) to the judgment that increased solar energy output is more plausible than 
implicating human emissions of invisible greenhouse gases. Similarly, it may seem 
plausible that short-term weather events are indicative of long term climate changes, thus 
muddling weather and climate distinctions. To examine this relationship in more detail, 
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we now turn to a discussion of studies showing the connection between plausibility 
perceptions and climate change conceptions.  
Empirical Evidence of Plausibility Judgments in Conceptual Change 
Theorists have long included the plausibility judgment as a critical component in 
knowledge reconstruction (Dole & Sinatra, 1998, Posner et al, 1982); however, 
plausibility has received little empirical attention in conceptual change (Dole & Sinatra, 
1998). Treagust and Duit (2008) reported on a series of three studies conducted from the 
early 1990s to the early 2000s, where the classical conceptual change model of Posner et 
al. (1982) was examined using qualitative interviews. These studies support the idea that 
students must first comprehend the incoming message before they can make plausibility 
judgments. Interestingly, intentional learners (i.e., students with the goal of mastering the 
material) engaged in deeper levels of processing, which resulted in more reflection when 
making their plausibility judgment (when compared to learners who did not have a 
mastery goal). Beyond these studies, conceptual change researchers have not engaged in 
collecting data about plausibility perceptions until our recent research (Lombardi & 
Sinatra, 2012). 
Plausibility judgments and reconstructing conceptions of climate change. We 
conducted a study with 83 undergraduate students and found that plausibility perceptions 
about human-induced climate change accounted for statistically significant changes in 
knowledge about weather and climate distinctions over semester-long instruction, above 
and beyond their existing background knowledge (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012). We also 
found that plausibility perceptions did not significantly change during instruction, even 
though one of the courses involved in the study focused on climate science for the entire 
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semester. There might have been no significant changes in students’ plausibility 
judgments because the courses did not explicitly weigh “the plausibility of geoscientists’ 
claims with alternative claims” (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012, p. 212). This suggestion 
helped inform the preliminary development of a model of plausibility judgments (see 
Figure 2), specifically on the potential importance of the “plausibility appraisal through 
critical evaluation” feedback loop. If the students had engaged in critical evaluation, their 
plausibility perceptions about human-induced climate change may have increased, with a 
subsequently potential greater increase in the knowledge of weather and climate 
distinctions. This is a speculative, but these results point toward the need for more 
research.  
Factors influencing the degree of evaluation in plausibility judgments. In a 
follow up study, we examined some factors relating to teachers’ initial plausibility 
judgment (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2011). This study involved 40 secondary science teachers 
attending a summer workshop that discussed air quality and climate change, and 45 
preservice elementary teachers enrolled in a science methods course. Study participants 
completed five questionnaires: (a) emotions about human-induced climate change (and 
teaching about climate change), (b) knowledge of weather and climate distinctions (i.e., 
the DWCM), (c) plausibility perceptions of human-induced climate change, and (d) need 
for cognition and (e) need for closure. Need for cognition is an epistemic disposition that 
is relatively stable over time, indicating the extent to which individuals engage in and 
enjoy effortful cognitive activities. The epistemic motive of need for closure is also 
somewhat dispositional and represents individuals’ “motivation with respect to 
information processing and judgment” (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994, p. 1049). 
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We found two significant predictive relationships in the follow-up plausibility 
study (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2011). The first regression model included individuals’ topic 
emotions about climate change, but not their topic emotions about teaching climate 
change. Of the several emotions that we measured, anger and hopelessness about human-
induced climate change were significant predictors, with greater anger predicting lower 
plausibility perceptions and greater hopelessness predicting greater plausibility 
perceptions. In this model, background knowledge and needs for cognition and closure 
did not significantly contribute to students’ prediction of plausibility. The second 
regression model included individuals’ emotions about teaching climate change, but not 
their emotions about the topic per se (as was the case in the first model). Anger about 
teaching climate change and decisiveness (a need for closure subcomponent) were 
significant predictors, with both greater anger and greater decisiveness resulting in lower 
plausibility perceptions of human-induced climate change. Similar to the first model, 
background knowledge and need for cognition did not significantly contribute to 
prediction of plausibility. 
Our study was limited because we did not measure conceptual knowledge post 
instruction, and therefore, were unable to determine if any conceptual change occurred 
(i.e., either during the week-long workshop for the secondary science teachers or over the 
course of semester-long instruction for the preservice elementary school teachers) 
(Lombardi & Sinatra, 2011). However, the study did provide some tentative evidence for 
the degree of evaluation that occurs in the plausibility judgment and potential 
contributing factors—in this case, topic emotions of hopelessness and anger, and the 
epistemic motive of decisiveness. We can speculate that if these participants had engaged 
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in critical evaluation, they may have reappraised their plausibility judgment and 
potentially had greater plausibility perceptions about human-induced climate change. 
Critical evaluation may have been particularly effective in the case of one teacher 
who participated in the study (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2011). In follow-up interviews, one 
secondary science teacher focused almost exclusively on plausibility perceptions of 
scientific statements in general, and human-induced climate change specifically. About 
her understanding of scientific knowledge, the teacher said,  
I have a network of people that I can go to and I am not afraid to pick of a 
phone and say, ‘I don’t understand this.’ So, I will call people. I will ask 
questions. I am not afraid to go to the experts. You know I enjoy reading 
the primary source, the primary references. 
Just after this comment, the teacher related how she heard that many of the world’s 
glaciers are actually advancing and not receding as reported by scientific statements. 
When I asked her about the source of this information, she said, 
I read it online…I haven’t found the primary source for that yet. I am still 
looking for those primary sources. I was told that there was this think-tank 
in DC where a lot of this information is coming out of, but my first 
question is: who are they being funded by…who’s paying their salary? 
Toward the end of the interview, the teacher seemed extremely agitated by a recent 
mistake in a scientific report on global climate. Her reaction to apologies made by 
scientists when the mistake was discovered was: 
Oh yeah, [the scientists] lied about it… Well, you just discredited 
yourselves! Well, now how am I supposed to believe you when you then 
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come out with another statement…are you lying again? My question then 
becomes what is your agenda? 
It seems that this teacher is directing her anger squarely at scientists and their claims 
about climate change. Her plausibility judgment may have been influenced by the low 
source reliability she places on the scientists and the scientific report. However, had she 
conducted a more thorough and careful critical evaluation of the mistake, as well as 
considered the preponderance and quality of evidence in the report, she may have been 
less angry. Consequently, her plausibility judgments may have changed. 
 Researchers have found that instruction can dampen topic emotions. Broughton, 
Sinatra, and Nussbaum (2010) examined emotions of elementary students in association 
with the scientific reclassification of Pluto from a major to a dwarf planet. In their study, 
Broughton et al. found that during interviews, three out of the four students reported that 
they felt “kind of sad..., mad and frustrated” (p. 29), but also, that these feelings 
diminished after reading a refutational text (a text designed to promote conceptual 
change, see Sinatra & Broughton, 2011) and participating in a collaborative, peer-to-peer 
discussion. This study shows that students brought these feelings of anger, frustration, 
and sadness into the learning environment. However, this instruction was also able to 
muffle these feelings such that these students were more willing to engage with the 
scientific viewpoint. Although Broughton et al. did not measure plausibility perceptions, 
their study does suggest that reappraisal of the plausibility judgment could occur, in this 
case by explicit and critical evaluation, with associated reductions in adverse topic 
emotions. 
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Reappraising Plausibility through Critical Evaluation 
 Halpern (2007) lists many attributes of critical thinking and specifically states that 
critical thinking, “involves evaluating the thinking process—the reasoning that went into 
the conclusion we’ve arrived at or the kinds of factors considered in making a decision” 
(p. 5). However, as I have discussed earlier, to employ critical evaluation, an individual 
must examine the connection between evidence and an explanation, as well as 
connections between the same evidence and alternative explanations. Critical evaluation 
is likely a single construct (i.e., without subcomponents) that is often an explicit and 
effortful process that requires considerable cognitive resources. Stanovich (2010) calls 
such explicit thinking a Type 2 cognitive process, with implicit and low effort cognition 
being Type 1. In this dual process view of cognition, individuals often resort to Type 1 
thinking because of the limited amount of cognitive resources required. The plausibility 
judgment may often be implicit, as I have detailed earlier in this review. To reappraise 
our plausibility judgments, Type 2 thinking and specifically critical evaluation may be 
necessary. 
The need for explicit evaluation. Students may be naturally curious about 
scientific topics, but are not necessarily evaluative as they consider hypotheses and 
theories. Chinn and Buckland (2012) state that some students adopting a creationist 
perspective on biological evolution may engage in non-collaborative argumentation 
tactics that bias evidence. Such a stance may prevent learning about “the ontological 
conceptions of species, populations, variation, and extinction” (Chinn & Buckland, 2012, 
p. 7), tenants central to biological evolution. To overcome this bias and promote deeper 
learning of evolution, Chinn and Buckland argue that students should gain a coordinated 
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understanding of both the (a) theory’s ontological conceptions and (b) scientists’ 
epistemic practices. Scientific judgments about the strength of the theory of biological 
evolution are based on a large body of evidence. Furthermore, these judgments have 
emerged from an environment of argumentation that has co-considered alternative 
explanations (e.g., creationism and intelligent design). 
An individual’s bias toward a particular perspective may be reflective of their 
stance on controversial issues. In a recent experimental study, Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and 
Braman (2010) found significant disagreement on the state of scientific consensus about 
global climate change based on an individual’s cultural values. Individuals who are more 
egalitarian (i.e., those who value equality in politics, economics, and society) and 
communitarian (i.e.,  those who place greater value on contribution to the community 
compared to individual gain) were much more likely to think that expert scientists agree 
that global temperatures are increasing than those who are hierarchical (i.e., those who 
value graded authority in politics, economics, and society) and individualistic (i.e., those 
who place greater value on individual gain compared to contribution to the community). 
Conversely, hierarchical-individualistics were much more likely to think that expert 
scientists are divided about increasing global temperatures. 
Kahan et al. (2010) found similar differences between the two value orientations 
regarding the evidence for human-induced climate change. These findings provide 
additional support to the wider body of research on confirmation bias (discussed in detail 
by Nickerson, 1998). However, Kahan et al.’s (2010) experiment also revealed that 
judgment about “whether an individual of elite academic credentials, including 
membership in the [National Academy of Sciences], was a ‘knowledgeable and 
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trustworthy expert’” depended “on the fit between the position the…expert was depicted 
as adopting and the position associated with the subjects’” values (p. 21). Because 
students are not predisposed to critically evaluate data and data sources (Schraw et al., 
2006), it may be particularly important for students to reflect metacognitively on their 
epistemic practices when the topic is controversial. Therefore, students should experience 
instructional practice that develops their critical evaluation skills. 
Critical evaluation involves understanding how evidence can potentially support 
both an idea (e.g., an argument, a scientific model) and its alternatives (e.g., a 
counterargument, a contrary hypothesis). Furthermore, through critical evaluation an 
individual seeks to weigh the strengths and weaknesses in the connection between the 
evidence and the ideas. Mere critique is not sufficient. For example, people can exhibit a 
disconfirmation bias, “where when faced with evidence contrary to their beliefs, people 
try to undermine [this incoming] evidence” (Edwards & Smith, 1996, p. 6). Such 
evidence undermining is almost certainly a Type 2 process because Edwards and Smith 
(1996) have shown that individuals who display a disconfirmation bias engage in a 
deliberative memory search.  The purpose of this undermining memory search is to 
“retrieve material [e.g., stored beliefs] for use in refuting the position advocated”  
(Edwards & Smith, 1996, p. 18). However, this disconfirmation bias is not necessarily 
evaluative because less cognitive processing is involved when individuals agree with a 
particular position. Therefore, critical evaluation must try to find fault with both the 
existing idea and the alternative, gauged on the level of support provided by evidence. In 
this way, critical evaluation embraces the scientific standard of falsifiability.    
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Instruction promoting critical evaluation. Students’ classroom use of critical 
evaluation should mimic that used by scientific experts (Duschl, Schweingruber, & 
Shouse, 2007). By publishing their work in research journals and participating in 
symposia, panels, and presentations, the scientific community engages in collaborative 
argumentation, defined by Nussbaum (2008) as a constructive and social process where 
individuals work together to compare, critique, and revise conceptions. Collaborative 
argumentation is different from adversarial argumentation, where opponents attempt to 
reduce one another’s viewpoint to a point of uselessness. Individual scientists may 
engage in adversarial argumentation; after all, scientists are human too. However, as a 
community, science thrives due to collaborative argumentation, which is an inherently 
constructive process (Osborne, 2010). 
Nussbaum (2008) stresses that students can use collaborative argumentation to 
achieve deep understanding through cognitive elaboration; thereby, making multiple 
connections with their background knowledge. Collaborative argumentation should also 
examine alternative ideas presented through the group discourse, which promotes critical 
thinking and evaluation of alternative ideas. Nussbaum, Sinatra, and Poliquin (2008) 
found that students with an evaluativist epistemological stance engage in deeper and 
more critical argumentation. Enhancing “students’ willingness to be critical of scientific 
theories and awareness of inconsistencies in their own thinking” may result in strong 
conceptual change (Nussbaum, Sinatra, & Poliquin, 2008, p. 1994). However, students 
may not naturally be critically reflective when engaging in collaborative argument, and 
therefore, “students need tools to evaluate arguments” (Nussbaum & Edwards, 2011, p. 
447). 
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Nussbaum and Edwards (2011) examined the combined use of critical questioning 
and argumentation and found that when middle school students or the teacher “asked 
critical questions, it helped move the discussion to…productive ground, where arguments 
could be evaluated.” (p. 481). The study took place in a social studies classroom; 
however, some of the information and discussion implicitly touched upon scientific 
principles (e.g., conservation of energy, energy efficiency, and energy transformation in 
association with fossil fuel emissions and global climate change). In particular, some of 
the critical questions used by Nussbaum and Edwards had a distinctly scientific flavor, 
including “What’s the likelihood?” and “How do you know?”(p. 457). Nussbaum and 
Edwards used these questions as effective guides to help students critically evaluate each 
other’s arguments. 
The use of critical questions as guides may help students develop what Glassner 
and Schwarz (2005) call “the antilogos ability,” a term which comes from classical Greek 
philosophy and means “the art of contradiction” (Glassner & Schwarz, 2005, p. 354). In 
terms of students’ argumentation skills, Glassner and Schwarz (2007) define antilogos as 
“the ability to critically evaluate whether specific information may support different 
claims” (p. 11). Glassner and Schwarz (2005) measured antilogos ability in 173 
secondary school students through an activity in which students figured out as many 
reasonable flaws as they could in two claims: one supporting the death penalty and the 
other opposed. The results of the study indicated that the number of flaws increased with 
age (i.e., high school students were able to figure out more flaws compared to middle 
school students). However, two manipulations lessened results due to age differences. 
One manipulation gave students a worked out example showing a claim with a list of 
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identified flaws. The worked out example provided an instructional scaffold that cued 
students to be more critically evaluative. A second manipulation involved having students 
construct their own argument for or against the death penalty prior to the antilogos 
activity. Glassner and Schwarz (2005) speculate that construction of their own argument 
led to greater processing of different perspectives and promoted evaluation.  
Argument construction does not necessarily promote greater critical evaluation. A 
study conducted by Nussbaum and Kardash (2005) showed that when students were 
given a persuasion goal, they generated fewer counterarguments in their writing. In other 
words, trying to persuade led to more one-sided thinking. Nussbaum and Kardash also 
found a connection with the intensity of students’ beliefs about a topic and their ability to 
generate counterarguments, where more extreme attitudes led to fewer counterarguments. 
Whereas Nussbaum and Kardash were not specifically examining the idea of a 
disconfirmation bias, where individuals seek to undermine arguments counter to their 
own by disregarding contrary evidence (Edwards & Smith, 1996), their results may 
provide some evidence for this tendency. Nevertheless, Nussbaum and Kardash 
recommend that further research be conducted that specifically examines how explicit 
instruction can promote “deeper, but more balanced reasoning” (p. 165).  
Critical questions, the ability to find flaws in both a hypothesis and alternative, 
and generation of counterarguments on both sides of an issue may then stimulate critical 
evaluation in collaborative argumentation, but science may involve additional 
complexities for learning. Specifically, students encountering science topics in a school 
setting often possess existing mental representations that conflict with scientific 
understanding, and often, these naïve understandings seem more plausible than the 
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correct conception. For students to be able to critically judge plausibility when comparing 
competing models (naïve vs. scientific), they could engage in both (a) collaborative 
argumentation and (b) a method that allows them to weigh evidentiary data (Chin & 
Osborne, 2010).  
Using model-based reasoning to promote critical evaluation. Chinn and 
Buckland (2012) report on the recent use of an instructional scaffold, called the model-
evidence link (MEL) diagram, which assists students in making arguments based on 
relative weighting of evidence that support an explanatory model and an alternative. In 
MEL diagrams, students draw different types of linking arrows between evidentiary data 
and alternative models. Students draw arrows in different shapes to indicate relative 
weight of the evidence. Straight arrows indicate that evidence supports the model; 
squiggly arrows indicate that evidence strongly supports the model; straight arrows with 
an “X” through the middle indicate the evidence contradicts the model; and dashed 
arrows indicate the evidence has nothing to do with the model. Students then use these 
MEL diagrams in collaborative argumentation and explanatory tasks to critically evaluate 
their links and construct understanding. 
In a year-long study involving middle school life science students, Chinn, Duschl, 
Golan Duncan, Buckland, & Pluta (2008) found that the treatment group (724 students 
using MEL diagrams to assist in their argumentation) made “substantially greater 
advances in their ability to effectively coordinate models and evidence” than the 
comparison group (1,961 students who did not use the modeling scaffold) (p. 2). The year 
of instruction was broken down into units that discussed fundamental life science 
concepts. For each unit, treatment group participants constructed a MEL diagram in 
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coordination with argumentation and other instructional activities designed to develop 
deep understanding. The MEL diagrams featured two models (e.g., the naïve stress model 
of ulcer inducement versus the scientific bacteria model of ulcer inducement). Students 
would gather evidentiary data during the instructional activities (e.g., reading a passage 
about a scientific experiment) and collaborate on constructing MEL diagrams. 
Participants in the control group completed the same argumentation and other activities, 
but did not use the MEL diagrams. Many of these units involved topics for which 
students typically have robust misconceptions (e.g., photosynthesis, cellular respiration, 
and mitosis). Pre and post testing for each unit demonstrated that treatment group 
participants experienced a greater degree of conceptual change than control group 
participants (Chinn & Buckland, 2012). 
The Present Study 
In this literature review I have presented a model of plausibility judgments in 
conceptual change and discussed how this model might be applied to transforming 
students’ conceptions about climate change. Although the model is grounded in 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives, the empirical evidence supporting the model is 
limited. I have made some assertions that are speculative and require further research. Of 
particular importance to me is the plausibility reappraisal feedback loop, which represents 
a “terra nova” in science education. Through this loop, teachers may potentially engender 
both conceptual change, where students reconstruct their knowledge to be consistent with 
the current scientific understanding, and also epistemic conceptual change, where 
students transform their way of thinking to be more critically evaluative and cognizant of 
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how they are making plausibility judgments about information that conflicts with their 
background knowledge.  
Many instructional methods may result in an explicit plausibility reappraisal; 
however MEL diagrams may be particularly useful because this instructional scaffold 
presents an opportunity for students to compare competing models. Subsequently, use of 
MEL diagrams raises some interesting questions. For example, would use of MEL 
diagrams increase students’ critical evaluation skills? Chinn et al. (2008) showed better 
coordination of evidence and models with diagram use, but did not report any increases 
in students’ ability to evaluate two competing explanatory models critically. Furthermore, 
plausibility judgments were not the focus of their research, but the greater degree of 
conceptual change in the treatment may be due—in part—to increased plausibility 
perceptions about scientific conceptions (i.e., per the model of plausibility judgments in 
conceptual change that I have proposed earlier). If the students were more critically 
evaluative while comparing competing models, did this change their plausibility 
judgment about the scientific conception? Finally, Chinn and Buckland’s (2012) list of 
life science topics covered included only non-controversial topics (e.g., biological 
evolution was not included). How then would students’ critical evaluation and 
plausibility judgments change when the topic is controversial (e.g., human-induced 
climate change)? Would the explicit reappraisal of plausibility judgment be great enough 
to overcome the more implicit topic emotions, cognitive dispositions, and motivations 
that shape the plausibility indexing of existing, naïve conceptions? Finally, if critical 
evaluation promotes changes in plausibility perceptions, does conceptual change also 
occur? 
62 
 
Research Questions 
The research discussed in this literature review demonstrates that it may be 
possible to strengthen students’ critical evaluation of competing climate change models 
and subsequently increase plausibility perceptions of human-induced climate change. 
With increased critical evaluation and the ability to reappraise plausibility judgments, 
students may experience knowledge reconstruction about human-induced climate change 
and associated scientific principles (e.g., weather and climate distinctions). Furthermore, 
with increased critical evaluation and explicit plausibility reappraisal abilities, students 
may also experience epistemic conceptual change because they have achieved greater 
understanding of how scientists construct knowledge. The following research questions 
and hypotheses have emerged from this review. 
1. Does explicit instruction designed to promote evaluation of competing climate 
change theories—specifically, human-induced climate change (i.e., the 
scientifically accurate model; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) 
versus an increasing amount of solar energy received by Earth (i.e., a popular 
model used by skeptics of human-induced climate change; Cook, 2010; Ellis, 
2009)—result in changes to: 
a. plausibility perceptions of climate change, 
b. knowledge of human-induced climate change, as well a basic 
understanding of the distinctions between  weather and climate, and 
c. beliefs about climate change evidence? 
2. What is the relationship between students’ comparative plausibility perceptions of 
competing climate change theories (human-induced climate change versus 
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increasing solar irradiance) and their perceptions about which of these theories 
they think is correct, and how does this relationship change with instruction?   
3. Are model plausibility ratings of these two competing climate change theories 
related to the seven responses theorized by Chinn and Brewer (1993; see Figure 
2) as ordered categories (i.e., very low plausibility is associated with ignoring and 
rejecting data and high plausibility is associated with individual theory change)? 
Hypotheses 
 In response to the first research question, I hypothesize that use of MEL diagrams 
as an instructional tool will increase students’ plausibility perceptions of human-induced 
climate change (H1A). This hypothesis stems from the model of plausibility judgments I 
have presented earlier in the review, where explicit reappraisal of the plausibility 
judgment may be induced through instruction promoting critical evaluation, as well as 
previous research that Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) have conducted on students’ 
plausibility perceptions of human-induced climate change. I also hypothesize that 
increases in plausibility perceptions of human-induced climate change will result in 
reconstruction of students’ knowledge about human-induced climate change, conceptual 
change about a fundamental scientific principle related to climate change—weather and 
climate distinctions, and beliefs about climate change evidence (H1B). I have based this 
hypothesis on the theoretical conceptual change model of Dole and Sinatra (1998), 
empirical research by Lombardi and Sinatra (2012), and the model of plausibility 
judgments (see Figure 2).  
My hypothesis for the second research question is that even though students may 
consider competing climate change theories to be plausible, the one with the greater 
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plausibility will correspond to the theory that students think is correct (H2A). 
Furthermore, I hypothesize that students who use MEL diagrams will rank the 
plausibility of the scientifically correct conception (human-induced climate change) 
higher than the alternative conception (increasing solar irradiance) (H2B). I have based 
this hypothesis on the model of plausibility judgments in conceptual change, which I 
presented earlier in this review (see Figure 2). 
As for the third research question, I hypothesize that there will be a discernible 
relationship between model plausibility ratings and response (H3). This hypothesis is 
based on Chinn and Brewer’s (1993) theoretical framework on responses to anomalous 
data during knowledge acquisition, in which they have categorized seven responses 
ranging from ignoring and rejecting data to strong theory (i.e., conceptual) change. For 
example, students who rate human-induced climate change as implausible will reject or 
ignore evidence related to this scientifically accurate model and students who rate 
human-induced climate change at a relatively high plausibility level will demonstrate a 
greater degree of conceptual change.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS 
Participants and Setting 
 Middle school students from a large urban district in the Southwestern USA were 
the participants in this study. In the state where this district resides, science education 
standards specify that teachers should introduce climatic concepts at the middle school 
level (i.e., grades 6-8). Weather concepts are also taught to middle school students, but 
weather is introduced much earlier, i.e., in the primary (kindergarten to grade 2) band. 
One middle school standard explicitly addresses weather and climate, saying, “By the end 
of the [6-8] grade band, students…understand the relationship between the Earth’s 
atmosphere, topography, weather, and climate” (Nevada Department of Education, 2005). 
Under this standard, three benchmarks specify what middle school students should 
understand about climate: (a) “Students know how the processes involved in the water 
cycle affect climatic patterns,” (b) “Students understand the composition of Earth’s 
atmosphere, emphasizing the role of the atmosphere in Earth’s weather and climate,” and 
(c) “Students know the difference between local weather and regional climate” (Nevada 
Department of Education, 2005). This last benchmark concerning student understanding 
of weather and climate distinctions is the one addressed in this study. 
 The school district involved in this study teaches the weather and climate 
distinction benchmark during grade 7, when all students are required to take an Earth 
science class. Study participants were drawn from an entire middle school’s grade 7. 
These participants were enrolled in grade 7 Earth Science and were taught by one of four 
grade 7 science teachers. At the time of the study, 429 students were enrolled in grade 7 
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science and I invited all to participate in the study. About 63% (N = 269) of the students 
provided both parental consent and self-assent, and just under two-thirds (N = 169) fully 
participated in the study—I defined “full participation” as being present for the study’s 
instructional activities and completing instruments in a manner that allowed me to 
ascertain meaningful information (e.g., ensuring the a participant’s name was on a 
questionnaire and that a participant did not leave many blank items on a questionnaire). 
Of the 169 students who participated in the study, 108 (64%) were Hispanic, 29 (7%) 
were White (17%), 19 (11%) were African American, and 13 (7%) were Asian/Pacific 
Islander (7%). Eighty-seven participants (51.5%) were male. Eighteen (11%) of the 
participants had individualized education plans, 36 (22%) had limited proficiency in the 
English language, and 79 (47%) were eligible for free or reduced-cost lunch. 
Design and Materials 
The study was conducted toward the end of the school year’s first quarter. At this 
time, the grade 7 students were completing an introductory unit on the nature of Earth 
science. The instructional activities occurred over two class periods (about 90 minutes of 
instructional time total). Fourteen total classes were involved in the study (three different 
teachers were instructors for four classes each and one teacher was the instructor for two 
classes). I randomly assigned half of the classes to the treatment condition (i.e., using an 
instructional activity promoting critical evaluation of two competing climate change 
models) and the other half of the classes to the comparison condition (i.e., using regular 
curriculum materials that discuss climate change). The study design is shown in Figure 3, 
with details on instrumentation below. 
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Plausibility Perceptions of Climate Change 
To measure participants’ plausibility perceptions of climate change, I used the 
Plausibility Perceptions Measure (PPM) (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012). The PPM has eight 
statements about climate change based on the latest summative report produced by a 
United Nations’ expert panel (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007). In the 
version used by Lombardi and Sinatra, the PPM’s statements matched the major 
conclusions made in the report, including, for example, the following: “Warming of the 
Figure 3. Study design. 
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climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global 
average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising 
global average sea level” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007, p. 2). 
Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) report that “that the PPM’s readability [is] at the college 
level” (p. 207). Because of the advanced reading level, I used a modified version of the 
PPM (see Appendix A), which is at a grade 7 reading level based on the Flesch-Kincaid 
formula. For example, the statement above was modified to “The Earth is warming. 
Rising air and ocean temperatures, melting glaciers, and rising sea levels are evidence of 
this warming.”  
Participants rated each statement on a 0–10 plausibility scale (0 = greatly 
implausible or even impossible and 10 = highly plausible). In previous studies with adult 
and undergraduate participants, the PPM’s coefficient alpha values have been good to 
excellent (α ≥ .8; Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012, 2011; George & Mallery, 2009). Stability 
measurements (e.g., test-retest reliability) have not been reported for the PPM. However, 
a science education expert examined the PPM for evidence of face and “content validity 
and we revised the instrument based on her comments” (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012, p. 
208). The same science education expert reviewed the PPM that I modified to be at a 
lower reading level and I made all of her suggested revisions. This revised version is 
shown in Appendix A. 
Prior to taking the PPM, classroom teachers conducted a short discussion with the 
participants about judgments made using plausibility perceptions, with one or two 
practice items that did not relate to the concepts of weather and climate. Participants then 
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engaged in a classroom discussion to ensure they understood the meaning of plausibility 
and then took the PPM. 
Knowledge of Human-induced Climate Change 
I used a 34-item instrument to measure participants’ knowledge of human-
induced climate change (HICCK), both prior to and after instruction. I created this 
instrument to measure correct and incorrect conceptions about human-induced climate 
change, based on a recent study that surveyed American citizens on their understanding 
of scientific phenomena related to global warming (Leiserowitz & Smith, 2010), the 
latest summative report produced by a United Nations’ expert panel (Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change, 2007), and common misconceptions about human-induced 
climate change (Choi et al., 2010).  The participants rated each item on a 5-point Likert 
scale gauging the level of agreement that they thought climate scientists would indicate 
for each statement, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. As DeVellis 
(2003) recommends, HICCK items were strongly worded, unambiguous declarative 
statements without jargon. The Flesch-Kincaid formula indicates that readability of 
HICCK items are slightly below the grade 7 level, on average. Seven of the HICCK items 
directly address misconceptions reported in the literature and summarized by Choi et al. 
(2010). The HICCK is shown in Appendix B, with “misconception” items indicated by 
asterisks. 
I administered a shorter, 18-item version of the HICCK to grade 7 students in a 
pilot study. This shorter version used a dichotomous true/false scale rather than a 5-point 
Likert scale. Coefficient alpha values of the shorter version ranged from .48 
(preinstruction) to .57 (postinstruction), both below the acceptable threshold of .7 
70 
 
(George & Mallery, 2009). Therefore, the instrument was extended to include an 
additional 16 items and increase reliability by more fully exploring the construct (i.e., 
more fully exploring participants’ understanding of human-induced climate change). A 
follow up pilot study with the34-item instrument revealed that the coefficient alpha value 
was .64, which is still below the acceptable threshold. However, by eliminating five items 
that exhibited a negative corrected item total correlation, the coefficient alpha value 
exceeded the acceptable threshold (α = .73).   
Weather and Climate Distinctions 
The Distinctions between Weather and Climate Measure (DWCM; Lombardi & 
Sinatra, 2012) was used to measure participants’ understanding about a topic that is 
fundamental to understanding global climate change: weather and climate distinctions. 
Both students and adults exhibit misconceptions about these distinctions (Gowda et al., 
1997; Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012; Papadimitriou, 2004). As I have discussed in the 
literature review, individuals sometimes use weather events, which are localized and 
short term, to make conclusions about the potential for climate change, which would 
occur regionally over much longer time periods—30 years or greater (National Climatic 
Data Center, 2008). 
The original form of the DWCM contained 13 single-sentence statements that 
individuals classified as being either weather or climate (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012). 
Based on the results of our first research study (i.e., specifically, the unsatisfactory 
reliability of the measure, with coefficient alpha values less than .6), we have now 
developed a longer form containing 35 single-sentence statements (see Appendix C). In 
the longer version, individuals who take the test continue to classify each statement as 
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either weather or climate; therefore, both the short and long forms are dichotomous 
measures similar to a true/false test. The first 13 items of the longer form are identical to 
the original form. 
The statements included in both the shorter (13-item) and extended (35-item) 
DWCM versions reflect the results of research into students’ confusion about weather 
and climate (Gowda et al., 1997; Papadimitriou, 2004). For example, the first statement 
says, “There was a heat wave last summer.” This statement reflects a memorable weather 
event that may confuse individuals about being a predictor of future climate changes. 
Some of the statements examine other aspects of weather and climate that—to my 
knowledge—researchers have not studied empirically. For example, in the extended form 
we now include the following statement, “Strong and dry winds have contributed to an 
active fire season.” This statement includes the phenomenon of wind and is correctly 
classified as weather. Perhaps past misconceptions researchers did not consider winds to 
be a salient feature of weather and climate, and therefore, omitted wind from their 
research studies. However, we felt that the extended version of the DWCM should 
include wind and other weather and climate phenomena in order to explore the construct 
more fully (e.g., ocean currents, glaciers, topography, as well as precipitation and 
temperature).  
We also developed the DWCM for use with a wide range of ages (middle school 
to adult). Therefore, we worded the DWCM items as unambiguous declarative 
propositions in the form of short simple statements without jargon (DeVellis, 2003). In 
the short form, the statements were easy to read, with the Flesch-Kincaid formula 
indicating readability was at or below the sixth grade level. A panel of three science 
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education experts and one climate scientist reviewed the extended version. The panel 
examined the extended DWCM for scientific accuracy and precision, comprehensibility 
and clarity, and face validity. We used all review comments to modify the longer form.  
 Forty-seven preservice elementary school teachers (Lombardi & Sinatra, 2011) 
and 98 middle school students (in a pilot study) have completed the extended DWCM. A 
one-way univariate analysis of variance revealed that the mean DWCM score for the 
preservice elementary teachers (M = 25.1, SD = 3.83) was significantly greater than 
middle school students (M = 18.23, SD = 4.24), F(1,143) = 88.1, p < .001, η2 = .38 (note 
that the maximum score would be 35). The extended DWCM’s coefficient alpha value 
for both groups combined was .72, which exceeds the acceptable reliability level (George 
& Mallery, 2009). The extended version of the DWCM is more reliable than the shorter 
version due to the increased length and associated additional sampling of the construct, as 
well as using a more heterogeneous sample (i.e., preservice elementary teachers and 
middle school students) (Osterlind, 2010). Finally, there is a strong association (r = .73, p 
< .001) between short version scores (i.e., the first 13 items of the form) and the 
remaining extended version items. This provides some evidence for concurrent validity 
the two versions of the DWCM.  
Beliefs about Climate Change Evidence 
 To measure participants’ beliefs about climate change evidence (BCCE), I 
developed a short 6-item instrument, with statements reflecting major observations of 
Earth’s changing climate (Appendix D). For example, the first item says that “Global 
temperatures have increased over the past 100 years.” These statements mirror those that 
were used in the climate change model-evidence link diagram (MEL) activity 
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experienced by treatment group participants only. Similar to the other instruments that I 
used in this dissertation study, the BCCE statements are unambiguous and declarative 
statements just below the grade 7 reading level. Participants rated each statement using a 
5-point Likert scale gauging their level of agreement, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree 
to 5 = strongly agree. Note that this is different from the scale used in the knowledge 
instrument (HICCK), where students rated the degree to which they thought climate 
scientists would believe these statements. With the BCCE, participants indicated their 
own beliefs.  
Perceptions of Model Plausibility and Correctness 
Two items measured the comparative plausibility evaluation of Model A (human-
induced climate change) and Model B (solar irradiance causing climate change), as well 
as which of the models participants perceived to be correct (see Appendix E). The first 
item, which measured comparative plausibility, uses the same 0–10 scale as the 
Plausibility Perceptions Measure (PPM), where 0 = greatly implausible or even 
impossible and 10 = highly plausible. To determine which model participants perceive to 
be correct, I used a five category scale, spanning from “very certain that Model A is 
correct” to “very certain that Model B is correct.” These two items are new for this study, 
with results used to test the potential interaction between the two models’ comparative 
plausibility weightings and perceived correctness (i.e., directly examining my second 
hypothesis). Participants completed these two items at the end of a one page text 
discussion of the two alternative models. These items and associated discussion are found 
in Appendix E.  
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Instructional Scaffold 
The treatment group used the model-evidence link (MEL) diagram activity to 
promote critical evaluation and potential changes in participants’ judgments about 
human-induced climate change (Appendix F). On the MEL, participants drew different 
types of arrows linking evidentiary data to the two alternative models of climate change 
(Model A: human-induced and Model B: solar irradiance). Participants drew arrows in 
different shapes to indicate the relative weight of the evidence. Straight arrows indicated 
that evidence supports the model; squiggly arrows indicated that evidence strongly 
supports the model; straight arrows with an “X” through the middle indicated the 
evidence contradicts the model; and dashed arrows indicated the evidence has nothing to 
do with the model.  
I have conducted two pilot studies using different versions of the MEL. In the first 
pilot study, participants used a MEL with six evidence statements, and I examined 
changes in the knowledge about human-induced climate change (HICCK) scores, as 
wells as perceptions of model plausibility and correctness. I used the nonparametric sign 
test to measure changes from preinstruction to postinstruction. Note that the 
nonparametric sign test was an appropriate analysis because of the relatively small 
sample size (N = 35) and the highly kurtotic nature of the examining within-subjects 
changes in pre- and post-HICCK scores, which are interval data, as well as model 
plausibility and perceived model correctness, which are ranked ordinal data (Nussbaum, 
2011b). The null hypothesis for the sign test is that within-subjects’ scores are the same at 
both preinstruction and postinstruction. 
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Results from this first pilot study showed significantly greater knowledge 
(HICCK) scores postinstruction compared to preinstruction, z = -2.68, p = .007. About 
60% of the participants had a greater score postinstruction, with only 25% having a lower 
score postinstruction. The percentage difference between those that gained knowledge 
(60%) to those that and those that did not (25%) was appreciable (i.e., about 35%) 
indicating a large effect size. However, the sign tests for model plausibility ratings and 
perceived model correctness did not reveal significant differences preinstruction to 
postinstruction (all ps > .7). 
The first pilot study results showing no advantage for plausibility ratings of the 
scientifically correct model higher was likely due to problems with the preliminary 
version of the MEL used. I suggest that the six evidences in the MEL may have resulted 
in cognitive overload as students attempted to critically evaluate the strength of each of 
the evidences supporting each model. Therefore, for the second pilot study I used a MEL 
with only four evidence statements, corresponding to items 3-6 in the beliefs about 
climate change evidence (BCCE) instrument. This version of the MEL is shown in 
Appendix F.  
To analyze for differences in the second pilot study, I used the nonparametric 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test. Results of this test showed that both model plausibility 
ratings and perceived model correctness changed significantly from preinstruction to 
postinstruction. The difference in percentage of participants who rated the plausibility of 
the scientifically correct model greater (51%) from pre to post to those who rated the 
alternative model greater (22%) was 29%, z = -2.86, p = .004. The difference in 
percentage increase in participants who perceived the scientific model to be correct 
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(46%) to those who rated the alternative model greater (12%) was 34%, z = -3.79, p < 
.001. Based on these significant gains, the adjustments I made in the MEL may have 
reduced cognitive overload and allowed for clearer connections between evidentiary data 
and the models. 
Procedures 
 Table 2 shows the timeline of instrument administration and the quasi-
experimental activity. Details of these activities follow the table. 
Table 2 
Schedule of instrument administration and instructional activities 
Activity Duration 
Preinstruction instrument administration 
 Plausibility Perceptions Measure (PPM) 
 Human-induced Climate Change Knowledge (HICCK) instrument 
 Distinctions between Weather and Climate Measure (DWCM) 
 Beliefs about Climate Change Evidence (BCCE) instrument 
 Ratings of model plausibility and correctness 
Two class 
periods 
Quasi-experimental phase (note that normal classroom instructors taught 
both the treatment and comparison groups) 
 Treatment group: Climate change model-evidence link (MEL) 
diagram activity 
 Comparison group: Normal instruction (Investigation 8 of the 
weather and climate module) 
Two class 
periods 
Postinstruction instrument administration  
 Plausibility Perceptions Measure (PPM) 
 Human-induced Climate Change Knowledge (HICCK) instrument 
 Distinctions between Weather and Climate Measure (DWCM) 
 Beliefs about Climate Change Evidence (BCCE) instrument 
 Ratings of model plausibility and correctness 
Two class 
periods 
Preinstruction Phase 
Two class periods prior to the instructional activity, participants completed the 
Plausibility Perceptions Measure (PPM), Human-induced Climate Change Knowledge 
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(HICCK) instrument, Distinctions between Weather and Climate Measure (DWCM), 
Beliefs about Climate Change Evidence (BCCE) instrument, and climate change model 
ratings of plausibility and perceived correctness.   
Quasi-Experimental Phase 
Participants in the treatment group engaged in a model-evidence link (MEL) 
diagram activity (Appendix F) that was taught by their regular classroom teacher. Part A 
of the activity is titled “How do scientists change their plausibility judgments.” This 
helped students understand how scientists weigh connections between evidence and 
scientific ideas (e.g., scientific models). Specifically, Part A asked students to rank the 
importance of the following four types of evidence connections in changing plausibility 
judgments: 
1. The evidence supports an idea. 
2. The evidence strongly supports an idea. 
3. The evidence contradicts (opposes) an idea. 
4. The evidence has nothing to do with the idea. 
Note that these statements correspond to the four types of errors that the participants used 
when they developed their MELs (Part C). 
 After making their initial rankings, the students read a short paragraph discussing 
falsifiability, and specifically, how evidence that contradicts an idea has a large influence 
on how scientific knowledge changes. After reading this paragraph, students re-ranked 
the four types of evidence. At the end of Part A, teachers conducted a short discussion 
with the class on their rankings and directly reinforced that contradictory evidence 
generally does have the greatest weight in changing scientists’ plausibility judgments.    
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In Part B, the instructor had the participants individually read short (about one 
page) expository texts discussing each piece of evidence (Appendix F). These pages also 
included graphs and figures. The instructor asked the students if they had any questions 
about the evidence texts and figures to clear up any confusion or misunderstandings. In 
Part C, treatment group participants evaluated the four evidentiary statements and link 
them to each model using different arrows for the weighting scheme. Participants 
developed their MEL diagrams, completed their associated explanatory tasks, and then 
rated each model’s plausibility and correctness individually.  
Comparison group participants used instructional materials from Integrating 
Earth Systems (IES) Weather and Climate module (Smith, Southard, & Mably, 2002). 
The weather and climate module has eight investigations. I specifically used the 
Investigation 8, titled “How is Global Climate Changing,” for the comparison activity. In 
this activity, comparison group participants were initially asked the following guiding 
questions: “Do you think the world’s climate is changing? If so, what will happen in the 
future? What will the climate be like for you, your children, and your grandchildren?” 
Comparison group participants then read about evidence related to past and current 
climate change, and then make predictions about future climate change as a collaborative 
group.  
The investigation was adapted so that comparison group participants would read 
and use the same four pieces of evidence used in treatment activity (see Appendix F). 
These evidence texts were used to answer questions throughout the investigation so that 
comparison group participants could evaluate these evidences. For example, two 
questions ask the participants to consider “What parts of the four evidences support your 
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final prediction? What parts of the four evidences do not support your final prediction?” 
Whereas such questions are evaluative, Investigation 8 did not ask the participants to 
weigh evidence between two competing models. This is the critical difference between 
the comparison task and the treatment task (i.e., the MEL diagram activity). The time 
needed by comparison group participants to complete Investigation 8 was the same 
amount of time spent by the treatment group participants in the MEL diagram activity 
(i.e., two class periods).  
Postinstruction Phase 
At the end of the learning module, treatment and comparison group participants 
completed the same measures as in the pre instruction phase. One minor difference in 
post instruction measurement was that treatment group participants completed the two 
items measuring comparative plausibility and the model that participants think is correct 
at the end of the MEL diagram activity (see Appendix F). Comparison group participants 
completed these two items at the end of a one page text discussion of the two alternative 
models (i.e., the same instrument used in the preinstruction phases; see Appendix E).  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
This chapter discusses the quantitative and qualitative analyses, with associated 
results, that I used to address this study’s three research questions. As a reminder, 
research question 1 asked: Does explicit instruction designed to promote evaluation of 
competing climate change theories—specifically, human-induced climate change (i.e., 
the scientifically accurate model; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2007) 
versus an increasing amount of solar energy received by Earth (i.e., a popular model used 
by skeptics of human-induced climate change; Cook, 2010; Ellis, 2009)—result in 
changes to (a) plausibility perceptions of climate change, (b) knowledge of human-
induced climate change, (c) understanding of weather and climate distinctions, and (d) 
beliefs about climate change evidence? My hypotheses for research question 1 were the 
following: 
 H1A: explicit instruction promoting critical evaluation of the two climate 
change models (i.e., instructional use of model-evidence link diagrams) 
will result in increased plausibility perceptions about human-induced 
climate change. 
 H1B: increases in plausibility perceptions will result in a greater degree of 
conceptual change about human-induced climate change, weather and 
climate distinctions, and beliefs about climate change evidence. 
Research question 2 asked: What is the relationship between students’ 
comparative plausibility perceptions of competing climate change theories (human-
induced climate change versus increased solar energy output) and their perceptions about 
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which of these theories they think is correct, and how does this relationship change with 
instruction? My hypotheses for research question 2 were the following: 
 H2A: Even though students may consider competing climate change 
theories to be plausible, the one with the greater plausibility will 
correspond to the theory that students think is correct.  
 H2B: Students who use the instructional scaffold will rank the plausibility 
of the scientifically accepted conception (human-induced climate change) 
higher than the alternative conception (increasing solar irradiance). 
Research question 3 asked: Are model plausibility ratings of these two competing 
climate change theories related to the seven responses theorized by Chinn and Brewer 
(1993) as ordered categories (i.e., very low plausibility is associated with ignoring and 
rejecting data and high plausibility is associated with individual theory change)? My 
hypothesis for research question 3 was the following: 
 H3: There will be a discernible relationship between model plausibility 
ratings and response to anomalous incoming information. Prior to 
detailing the results and analyses for these three research questions, I 
describe the study participants. 
Participants 
 One hundred sixty nine (N = 169) grade seven students fully participated in this 
study. These participants were from an available pool of 429 students enrolled in grade 7 
science at a public middle school located in the southwestern United States. I invited all 
429 to participant in the study, but only 63% (N = 269) of the students provided both 
parental consent and self-assent. Of those providing assent and consent, just under two-
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thirds (N = 169) fully participated in the study, where I defined “full participation” as 
being present for the study’s instructional activities and completing instruments in a 
manner that allowed me to ascertain meaningful information (e.g., ensuring the a 
participant’s name was on a questionnaire and that a participant did not leave many blank 
items on a questionnaire). 
 Participants reflected the demographics of their school, which is located in a 
large, urban school district of predominantly Hispanic ethnicity. About 64% of the 
participants were Hispanic (N = 108), with 17% White (N = 29), 11% African American 
(N = 19), and 7% Asian/Pacific Islander (N = 13). Just over half (N = 87, 51.5%) of the 
participants were male. Furthermore, about 11% (N = 18) of the participants had 
individualized education plans, 22% (N = 36) had limited proficiency in the English 
language, and 47% (N = 79) were eligible for free or reduced-cost lunch.  
The participants were enrolled in science classes taught by four different teachers. 
Three of the these teachers taught four grade 7 science classes and one teacher taught two 
grade 7 science classes. I randomly assigned participants to the treatment and comparison 
groups at the class level, with an even number of treatment and comparison classes taught 
by each teacher (i.e., three of the teachers taught two treatment classes and two 
comparison classes, and the other teacher taught one treatment class and one comparison 
class). The total number of participants in the treatment classes (N = 86) was nearly equal 
to the number in the comparison classes (N = 83).  
Analyses of Research Questions 1 and 2: Pre to Postinstruction Changes 
Of the three research questions that motivated this dissertation study, research 
questions 1 and 2 related to participants’ changes from pre to postinstruction. Whereas 
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the analyses differ for the two research questions, the data for both questions are the 
same; therefore, the following section covers both research questions 1 and 2, and 
specifically, the changes that occurred in these variables from pre to postinstruction. This 
section first details the preliminary data analyses. I then discuss analyses that I used to 
determine group (treatment and comparison) differences pre to postinstruction. Finally, I 
demonstrate how these differences relate to the nature of the instructional activities and 
not to individual effects from the classroom teachers.  
Preliminary Data Analysis 
Data outliers. I used Mahalanobis distance to calculate multivariate outliers, 
which is a multidimensional measure representing the distance of a particular case from 
the centroid of all variables and other cases (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Mahalanobis 
distance values for all but two cases were from 1.3 to 18.9. However, two cases were 
separated from the others with relatively high Mahalanobis distances of 24.2 and 22.3. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), “Mahalanobis distances at p < .001…are 
evaluated using χ2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of variables” (p. 99). For 
this analysis there were four dependent variables, measured at pre and postinstruction, 
yielding a df = 8 and a critical χ2(8) = 26.13. Therefore, these two cases were not 
multivariate outliers. There were also no univariate outliers in any of the cases (i.e., z-
values for all variables and participants were less than an absolute value of 3). 
Reliability of instrument scores. I used classical test theory to inform my 
evaluation of reliability in participants’ scores of plausibility perceptions of climate 
change (PPM), knowledge of human-induced climate change (HICCK), understanding of 
weather and climate distinctions (DWCM), and beliefs about climate change evidence 
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(BCCE). In this way, I conceptualized reliability as an important component of validity 
evidence based on Osterlind’s (2010) premise that reliability is “properly interpreted only 
in the framework of a particular” measure (p. 123). 
I calculated coefficient alpha values for all measures pre- and post-activity to 
ascertain reliability. Coefficient alpha values for the DWCM and BCCE were 
unacceptable (i.e., well below the .5 threshold; George & Mallery, 2009), with all < 0.41 
both pre and postinstruction. Therefore, I excluded these measures from the remainder of 
the analyses because scores measured by these instruments do not reliably reflect student 
understanding of weather and climate distinctions or beliefs about the climate change 
evidence. Without a reliable estimate of these constructs, further analysis and subsequent 
conclusions would not have validity.  
The coefficient alpha value for the PPM was .51, preinstruction, which is a 
marginal value. However, the postinstruction PPM alpha value was .71, a value that 
exceeds the acceptable threshold of .7 (George & Mallery, 2009). The marginal reliability 
prior to the activity may have been due to the sensitivity of the coefficient alpha 
calculation to homogeneity of the participants (Thompson, 2003). The 7th grade 
participants in this study probably had limited understanding of the meaning of 
plausibility prior to instruction because this word is typically introduced formally into the 
lexicon (i.e., via instruction) in the middle school grades (see, for example, Snow, 2010). 
Therefore as a sample, participants may have been homogeneous in their limited 
experience with the concept of plausibility judgments, and therefore, responded 
somewhat randomly. The participants became more familiar with plausibility judgments 
while completing subsequent preinstructional instrumentation and engaging in the study’s 
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instructional activities. As students became more familiar with plausibility judgments, 
reliability increased. I will discuss the potential implications of the marginal 
preinstruction PPM reliability later in this chapter.  
Preinstruction coefficient alpha values for the HICCK were initially equal to .37. 
However, removing seven items (specifically, Items 5, 8, 9, 10, 26, 29, and 33; see 
Appendix B), increased coefficient alpha values to .58. Furthermore, with these seven 
items removed, postinstruction coefficient alpha values for the HICCK were .71, again 
above the acceptable threshold. Following the same argument that I have made with the 
PPM above, the HICCK appears to be a reliable measure of participants’ developing 
understanding of human-induced climate change with these seven items removed. 
Furthermore, removal of these seven items had little impact on measurement of 
participants’ understanding of human-induced climate change. Items 5 and 10 are very 
similar to items 21 and 22; therefore removal of item 5 and 10 did not result in a 
reduction of full construct examination. Items 8 and 9 are only peripherally aligned with 
the concept of climate change. Items 26, 29, and 33 represent sophisticated and subtle 
aspects of climate change knowledge that require understanding and experiences that are 
likely well-beyond the grade 7 level. Therefore, removal of items 8, 9, 26, 29, and 33 did 
not prevent examination of participants’ basic understanding of human-induced climate 
change. 
I calculated perceptions of relative model plausibility as the difference between 
participants’ plausibility ratings of Model A and Model B (i.e., the difference in 
perceived plausibility between human-induced and Sun-induced climate change). Recall 
that as a working definition, I view plausibility as a judgment on the relative potential 
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truthfulness, and therefore, the difference in plausibility ratings is appropriate when 
looking at relationships involving conceptual change. In terms of reliability, model 
plausibility perceptions are only two items and calculation of model plausibility score 
reliability would have little meaning. Likewise, model correctness perception is a single 
item and classical reliability calculations are not meaningful.  
Bivariate correlations.  Table 3 shows Pearson bivariate correlations between all 
the measures, both pre and postinstruction. For all but model correctness perceptions, 
there were medium to large positive correlations (r = .3 to .6; Cohen 1988) within a 
specific variable pre to postinstruction (e.g., model plausibility perceptions preinstruction 
were significantly correlated to model plausibility perceptions post), with all p-values less 
than .01. Model correctness perceptions had a small to medium positive correlation (r = 
.24, p < .01) pre to postinstruction.  
Table 3 
Bivariate Correlations for the Study Variables (N =169) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Mplaus-pre  −        
2. Mplaus-pst .30** −       
3. Mcorrect-pre .73** .20** −      
4. Mcorrect-pst .25** .71** .24** −     
5. HICCK-pre .26** .12 .18* .26** −    
6. HICCK-pst .22** .28** .17* .32** .55** −   
7. PPM-pre .25** .23** .20** .31** .40** .38** −  
8. PPM-pst .26** .28** .26** .29** .47** .44** .52** − 
*p < .05,  **p < .01 
Note. Mplaus-pre = perceptions of model plausibility preinstruction; Mplaus-pst = perceptions of model 
plausibility postinstruction; Mcorrect-pre = perceptions of model correctness preinstruction; Mcorrect-pst 
= perceptions of model correctness postinstruction; HICCK-pre = knowledge of human-induced climate 
change preinstruction; HICCK-pst = knowledge of human-induced climate change postinstruction; PPM-
pre = plausibility perceptions about climate change preinstruction; PPM-pst = plausibility perceptions 
about climate change postinstruction.
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Small to large positive correlations (r = .2 to .7) existed between the 
preinstruction variables (e.g., model plausibility perceptions preinstruction were 
significantly correlated to model correctness perceptions pre), with all p-values less than 
.01. Similarly, medium to large positive correlations (r = .3 to .7) existed between the 
postinstruction variables, with all p-values less than .01. The only non-significant 
correlation existed between model plausibility perceptions postinstruction and knowledge 
of human-induced climate change scores preinstruction, with p > .05. Furthermore, no 
bivariate correlations exceeded a value of 0.8, which reduced the possibility of 
multicollinearity (i.e., that variables were redundant measures of each other). 
This correlation analysis partially addresses the first part of question 2 (i.e., what 
is the relationship between students’ comparative plausibility perceptions of competing 
climate change theories). A significant and strong relationship existed among 
participants’ perceptions of model plausibility and correctness prior to instruction (r = 
.73, p < .01) and after instruction (r = .71, p < .01). 
Group Differences Pre to Postinstruction 
Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations for perceptions of model 
plausibility (Mplaus) and model correctness (Mcorrect), knowledge of human-induced 
climate change (HICCK), and plausibility perceptions of climate change (PPM). The 
table shows means and standard deviations by time period (pre and postinstruction), as 
well as group (treatment and control). 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Deviations (in Parentheses) for the Study Variables (Ntreatment = 86, 
Ncomparison = 83, Ntotal = 169) 
Variable Group Preinstruction Postinstruction 
Mplaus Treatment -0.30 (3.99) 1.60 (2.82) 
 Comparison 0.04 (3.85) -0.19 (3.61) 
 Total -0.14 (3.91) 0.72 (3.34) 
Mcorrect Treatment 2.97 (1.35)  3.79 (0.97) 
 Comparison 3.11 (1.24) 2.90 (1.17) 
 Overall 3.04 (1.30) 3.36 (1.16) 
HICCK Treatment  92.3 (8.65)  95.5 (10.1) 
 Comparison  91.5 (8.27)  90.7 (8.84) 
 Overall  91.9 (8.45)  93.2 (9.77) 
PPM Treatment  53.8 (8.94)  55.4 (9.38) 
 Comparison  51.0 (9.40)  53.4 (10.8) 
  Overall  52.4 (9.25)  54.4 (10.1) 
Note. The possible score ranges were: (a) perceptions of model plausibility (Mplaus) = -9 to +9; (b) 
perceptions of model correctness = 1 to 5; (c) knowledge of human-induced climate change (HICCK) = 34 
to 170; and (d) plausibility perceptions of climate change (PPM) = 8 to 80. 
 
Assumptions testing. To address research questions #1 and 2, I performed a 
repeated measures multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to assess changes pre to 
postinstruction, with group (treatment and comparison) as the between-subjects variable, 
time (pre and postinstruction) as the within-subjects variable, and Mplaus, Mcorrect, 
HICCK, and PPM as the dependent variables. To gauge applicability of the normality 
assumption inherent in MANOVA designs, I examined outliers (as discussed earlier), as 
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well as skewness and kurtosis values. All skewness and kurtosis values were less than an 
absolute value of 1.1, and with no outliers in the data, the normality assumption was held.   
I also examined the basic MANOVA assumptions of linearity and homogeneity of 
the variance-covariance matrices. Scatterplots for pair combinations of the dependent 
variables did not reveal any concern regarding linearity. Similarly, scatterplots of 
standardized residuals for each of the dependent variables revealed no concerns regarding 
linearity. This analysis also met the assumption of homogeneity of the variance-
covariance matrices based on Box’s M test, with F(36, 93595) = 1.49, p = .029 (a p-value 
greater than .001 indicates homogeneity with the relatively conservative Box’s M test; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
Potential class effects. Individual participants were nested in classrooms creating 
possible statistical dependencies among students within these classrooms. For example, 
the possibility existed that participants in one classroom talked to each other about the 
topic more than another classroom. I therefore calculated the intra-class correlations 
(ICC) to ascertain levels of statistical independence among the observations. I 
specifically calculated the ICC for each of the four dependent variables retained in the 
study: perceptions of model plausibility (Mplaus), perceptions of model correctness 
(Mcorrect), knowledge of human-induced climate change (HICCK), and plausibility 
perceptions of climate change (PPM).  The ICC “describes the…similarity of individuals 
within a group compared to the similarity of people belonging to different groups” 
(Cress, 2008, p. 73). Therefore, the ICC measures potential classroom effects because a 
high absolute ICC value would indicate that participants in a particular classroom setting 
(i.e., participants clustered by teacher) have relatively strong within-group dependency. 
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In addition to phenomena such as teacher effects, ICC can be used to ascertain the effects 
of participation in collaborative groups (Cress, 2008).  
A common way to determine ICC is to calculate the proportion of variance 
explained by group membership. Kashy and Kenny (2000) developed the following 
formula for calculating ICC using one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) parameters: 
ICC ൌ 	 ܯܵ஻ െܯܵௐܯܵ஻ ൅ ሺ݉ െ 1ሻܯܵௐ 
where MSB is the mean sum of squares between cluster groups, MSW is mean sum of 
squares within, and m is the cluster size. When clusters are unequal in size, Kashy and 
Kenny advise using the mean cluster size for m. To determine the p-value for the 
calculated ICC (i.e., to ascertain whether potential cluster effects are significant), Kashy 
and Kenny recommend using Fisher’s  r –to–z transformation (Fisher, 1928), replacing 
the Pearson bivariate correlation (r) with the calculated ICC value, using this value and 
the mean cluster size to calculate the test statistic (z), and then determining the p-value 
from the test statistic.  
 Table 5 shows the ICC values that I calculated for the four dependent variables 
(all using postinstruction scores), with associated one-way ANOVA parameters (with 
teacher as the independent variable category) and calculated z- and p-values. The ICC 
values ranged from .00024 (Mcorrect) to .17 (PPM), with all p-values greater than .4. 
Cress (2008) states that “only if the ICC is significant must a multilevel model be 
used…so, if the ICC is not significant, we can apply a standard regression without any 
concern, because there is no group effect in the data” (p. 79). Furthermore, only ICC 
values greater than or equal to .2 are generally considered large enough to require 
multilevel modeling in educational research (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Therefore 
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because all dependent variables had no significant ICC values and were less than .2, the 
participants in a particular teacher cluster did not have significantly greater similarity 
than the overall similarities in the treatment and comparison groups; thereby indicating 
that potential differences between the treatment and comparison groups (see subsequent 
analyses in this section) are most likely the result of the study’s instructional activities 
and are not due to potential classroom effects. In other words, this analysis supports the 
assumption in ordinary-least squares analyses, such as repeated measures MANOVA, of 
independence in observations. 
Table 5 
Intra-class Correlation Coefficient (ICC) Values for the Study Variables Clustered by 
Teacher, with Nteacher = 4, and m (Mean Cluster Size) = 21.13 
Variable MSB MSW ICC z p-value 
Mplaus 5.218 8.035 0.0169 0.0719 0.943 
Mcorrect 0.939 0.944 0.0003 0.0011 0.999 
HICCK 285.827 95.317 0.0864 0.3689 0.714 
PPM 401.781 76.481 0.1676 0.7203 0.473 
Note. Mplaus = perceptions of model plausibility; Mcorrect = perceptions of model correctness; HICCK = 
knowledge of human-induced climate change; PPM = plausibility perceptions about climate change; MSB = 
mean sum of squares between clusters; and MSW = mean sum of squares within. 
 
Multivariate effect. The repeated measures MANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between group and time for the combined scores of perceptions of model 
plausibility and model correctness, knowledge of human-induced climate change, and 
plausibility perceptions of climate change, with F(4,164) = 7.76, p < .0001. There was 
also a medium to large effect size, with ηp2 = .16 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  
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Follow-up univariate analyses on significant interaction effects. Follow-up 
univariate analyses of variance indicated that interactions between time and group were 
significant for perceptions of model plausibility, F(1,167) = 10.89, p = .001, η2 = .061 
(small to medium effect size); perceptions of model correctness, F(1,167) = 21.90, p < 
.0001, η2 = .12 (medium to large effect size); and knowledge of human-induced climate 
change F(1,167) = 9.26, p = .003, η2 = .053 (small to medium effect size). There was no 
significant interaction between group and time with participants’ plausibility perceptions 
of climate change, with p =.57. These three analyses were run concurrently, and to 
properly account for family-wise error, I used a Bonferroni adjusted critical value (α = 
.013) as a conservative gauge of significance.  
Simple effects analyses. For the three variables that showed a significant 
interaction in the follow-up univariate tests, I conducted an additional simple effects 
analysis to determine the exact nature of the group differences at both preinstruction and 
postinstruction. There were no significant differences preinstruction between the 
treatment and comparison groups in any of the three variables, with all p-values > .47. 
However at postinstruction, treatment group scores were significantly greater than the 
comparison group scores in all three variables, with F(1, 167) = 13.09, p < .001, η2 = .073 
(medium effect size) for participants’ perceptions of model plausibility; F(1, 167) = 
28.99, p < .0001, η2 = .15 (medium to large effect size) for perceptions of model 
correctness; and F(1, 167) = 10.67, p = .001, η2 = .060 (small to medium effect size) in 
scores of knowledge of human-induced climate change.  
The simple effects analysis also showed that there were no significant differences 
in any of the comparison group scores, pre to postinstruction, with all p-values > .19. 
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However when comparing each variable from preinstruction to postinstruction, the 
treatment group has statistically greater scores in perceptions of model plausibility and 
correctness, and knowledge of human-induced climate change (all p-values < .001; see 
Table 4 for means and standard deviations, as well as graphical representations of means 
in Figures 4 through 6). 
 
Figure 4. Pre to postinstruction scores of model plausibility perceptions for the treatment 
and comparison groups, with bars showing standard errors. 
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Figure 5. Pre to postinstruction scores of model correctness perceptions for the treatment 
and comparison groups, with bars showing standard errors. 
 
Figure 6. Pre to postinstruction knowledge of human-induced climate change (HICCK) 
scores for the treatment and comparison groups, with bars showing standard errors. 
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Main effects analysis. Whereas the interaction between time and group was not 
significant for plausibility perceptions of climate change (PPM, with p = .57), there was a 
significant main effect with time, F(1,167) = 7.28, p = .008, η2 = .042 (small to medium 
effect). As shown in Table 4 and Figure 7, all participants had significantly greater PPM 
scores postinstruction than at preinstruction.  
 
Figure 7. Pre to postinstruction scores of plausibility perceptions of climate change 
(PPM) for the treatment and comparison groups, with bars showing standard errors. 
One potential reason for the lack of interaction between the treatment and 
comparison groups may be the marginal reliability of PPM scores at preinstruction. 
Lower reliability could mean greater attenuation of scores at preinstruction, and 
therefore, relatively greater error in measurement. With greater error, potential 
differences between the treatment and comparison groups are harder to ascertain.  
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Another reason for a lack of interaction may be due to the breadth of the PPM’s 
statements relative to the instructional activities. For example, one item specifically asked 
participants to measure the plausibility of the statement saying, “Human caused global 
warming will lead to some impacts that are abrupt or irreversible, such as massive polar 
ice melt.” Such a statement reflects the notion of a “tipping point,” where Earth cannot 
easily return back to its earlier condition. Both the treatment and comparison instructional 
activities focused on causes of current climate change and not future impacts. Because 
the PPM measured plausibility perceptions of a wider range of climate change issues, it is 
possible that the effects of the treatment activity may have not been precisely measured. 
It is also possible that instruction promoting critical evaluation of future climate change 
impacts, which would directly follow the MEL activity used in this study, could lead to 
greater increases in overall plausibility perceptions of climate change as measured by the 
PPM. Such a sequence of instruction may therefore result in an interaction in a future 
follow up study to this dissertation. 
Focused Analyses Related to Questions 1 and 2 
 An overall purpose of this study is to examine conceptual change and epistemic 
conceptual change through plausibility reappraisal. The following two analyses provide a 
focused look at these two phenomena. 
 Indicators of conceptual change. Conceptual change involves reconstructing 
cognitive knowledge structures. Teachers often desire to transform preexisting 
conceptions that are inconsistent with scientific understanding (often referred to as 
misconceptions) into those that are consistent with scientifically accepted knowledge. In 
this study, the knowledge of human-induced climate change (HICCK) instrument 
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measured participants’ understanding about the causes of climate change, and as I 
discussed above, treatment group participants experienced a significant change in 
understanding from pre to postinstruction, whereas comparison group participants did 
not. Inasmuch as overall HICCK scores showed a transformation in treatment 
participants’ understanding and may have represented significant conceptual change, six 
of the items on the HICCK directly examined knowledge about the causes of current 
climate change and the potential for a conceptual shift in understanding about these 
causes. One of these items reflected the scientific model that humans are the current 
cause of climate change (i.e., the correct conception). The other five items looked at 
misconceptions about the causes of climate change; i.e., current climate change is caused 
by (a) an increase in the Sun’s energy, (b) the ozone hole, (c) changes in Earth’s orbit 
around the Sun, (d) volcanic eruptions, and (e) increasing dust in the atmosphere (Choi et 
al., 2010).  
Figure 8 shows how participants changed their conceptions on these six items, pre 
to postinstruction. Change is shown for the treatment and comparison groups for each 
item and is expressed as the mean gain score (mean postinstruction score minus mean 
preinstruction score). The treatment group had positive gains scores on all six items; 
however these gains were only significant on two items as measured by dependent 
measures t-tests. On the item measuring understanding of the scientific model, 
postinstruction scores (M = 3.70, SD = .94) were significantly greater than preinstruction 
scores (M = 3.28, SD = 1.24), t(85) = -2.75, p = .007, (Cohen’s d = .30, a small effect 
size; Cohen, 1988). This result shows that treatment group participants’ experienced 
significant conceptual change toward a view that is consistent with that of climate 
98 
 
scientists. Treatment group participants also had significantly greater postinstruction 
scores (M = 3.16, SD = 1.17) on the item measuring the misconception that climate 
change is caused by variations in Earth’s orbit around the Sun, t(85) = -2.74, p = .007 
(Cohen’s d = .29, a small effect size), compared to preinstruction scores (M = 2.76, SD = 
1.20). For this misconception, a greater score indicates both a greater understanding and a 
lesser degree of misunderstanding. Therefore, in the case of variations in Earth’s orbit 
around the Sun, treatment group participants significantly lessened their misconceptions, 
again indicating the occurrence of conceptual change.  
Figure 8. Gain scores (postinstruction – preinstruction) on six items from the knowledge 
of human-induced climate change (HICCK) instrument relating to causes of current 
climate change. The two treatment group gain scores with an asterisk (*) are statistically 
significant gains scores (assuming α = .05), with both p-values = 0.007. 
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 None of the other postinstruction gains made by treatment group participants were 
statistically significant for preinstruction, with all p-values > .19. Of particular interest is 
that treatment group participants did not show conceptual change about the 
misconception that current climate change is caused by increasing energy from the Sun, 
(i.e., the alternative model in the treatment activity). The question directly asked 
participants if “current climate change is caused by an increase in the Sun’s energy.” 
Whereas treatment group participants showed changes in plausibility and correctness 
perceptions away from this model, this alternative may still have seemed to be at least a 
partial cause of current climate change because participants’ understood (correctly) that 
the Sun is the primary energy source for Earth’s climate. Of course with the treatment 
activity only being a relatively short intervention and representing a single science lesson, 
I did not anticipate appreciable conceptual change in all areas of understanding. 
Likewise, it is interesting to note that treatment group participants did experience change 
about the misconception of Earth’s orbit, revealing that they were refining their 
understanding of the Sun’s role in global climate. 
Comparison group participants had negative gain scores on all but one of the 
items. However, these negative gains were not significantly different pre to 
postinstruction. 
Indicators of epistemic conceptual change. Participants’ reappraisal of 
plausibility judgments is an indicator of epistemic conceptual change, which is the 
transformation from less-sophisticated thinking that is absolute or subjective to scientific 
thinking based on critical evaluation. As discussed above, results from the repeated 
measures MANOVA show that treatment group participants reappraised their perceptions 
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of model plausibility, whereas comparison group participants did not. These results also 
show that both treatment and comparison group participants experienced changes to their 
overall plausibility perceptions of climate change as measured by the plausibility 
perceptions measure (PPM). Specifically, the PPM measures participants’ plausibility 
perceptions about (a) evidence for current climate change (first two items), (b) 
connection between current climate change and human activities (next three items), and 
(c) future impacts of climate change (last three items). In order to gain a better 
understanding of the difference in plausibility perceptions between the treatment and 
comparison groups, I examined responses for each item on the PPM.  
Figure 9 shows changes in the eight PPM items, pre to postinstruction. Similar to 
Figure 8, change is shown as the mean gain score (mean postinstruction score minus 
mean preinstruction score). The treatment group had positive gain scores for items 1, 3, 4, 
6 and 8, with slightly negative scores on items 2 and 5, and a greater magnitude of 
negative gain on item 7. The comparison group had positive gain scores on items 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, and 6, with a slightly negative gain on item 8, and a greater magnitude of negative 
change on item 7. 
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Figure 9. Gain scores (postinstruction – preinstruction) on eight items from the 
plausibility perceptions measure (PPM). The two treatment group and one comparison 
group gains scores with an asterisk (*) are statistically significant gains pre to 
postinstruction (assuming α = .05), with all p-values ≤ 0.017. 
 I conducted a dependent measures t-test for each item to determine statistically 
significant differences in each item pre to postinstruction. Treatment group participants 
had significantly greater postinstruction scores on item 1 (M = 8.00, SD = 1.94) compared 
to preinstruction scores (M = 7.36, SD = 2.18), with t(85) = -2.43, p = .017 (Cohen’s d = 
.26, a small effect size; Cohen, 1988). This item asks participants to rate the plausibility 
of the statement that Earth is warming, with rising air and ocean temperatures, melting 
glaciers, and rising sea level evidence of this warming. Unlike comparison group 
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participants who did not experience significantly greater plausibility perceptions of this 
item pre to postinstruction (p = .093), treatment participants showed significant changes 
in plausibility perceptions about evidence of current climate change. The treatment 
activity had participants weigh evidence-to-model connections and may have resulted in 
plausibility reappraisal. 
For item 3, both treatment (M = 7.57, SD = 1.81) and comparison group (M = 
6.82, SD = 2.18) participants had significantly greater postinstruction scores compared to 
preinstruction scores (treatment : M = 6.77, SD = 2.48; and comparison: M = 5.84, SD = 
2.52), with treatment t(85) = -2.47, p = .015 (Cohen’s d = .27, a small effect size; Cohen, 
1988) and comparison t(82) = -1.70, p = .017 (Cohen’s d = .37, also a small effect size). 
Item 3 asked participants to rate the plausibility that concentrations of greenhouse gases 
are increasing in Earth’s atmosphere and human industry has caused these increases, 
which is perhaps the least controversial of the items. Therefore it is not surprising that 
both the treatment and comparison group participants found this significantly more 
plausible, especially because both groups engaged with evidence that discussed these 
increased emissions. Participants also did not have significantly greater postinstruction 
scores on items 2, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, with all p-values > .10. 
These results show that the only significant changes occurred with the items 
examining the plausibility perceptions about evidence of current climate change 
(treatment group only) and that humans are increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in 
the atmosphere (both groups). However, there was no significant change in items 4 and 5, 
which measure the plausibility perceptions that link humans to current climate change. 
This is somewhat surprising because treatment group participants showed a significant 
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shift in plausibility perceptions toward the scientifically accepted model of human-
induced climate change. The last three items measure plausibility perceptions of future 
climate change, which was not the topic of this study. Finally as a reminder, PPM scores 
at preinstruction were of marginal reliability. This may attenuate preinstruction scores, 
increase potential error, and therefore make it more difficult to determine differences in 
individual items from pre to postinstruction. 
Analysis of Research Question 3: Results of the Plausibility Judgment 
Research question 3 asks about the association between participants’ plausibility 
reappraisal (i.e., the postinstruction plausibility judgment) and their psychological 
response to anomalous data, as theorized by Chinn and Brewer (1993). These responses 
fall into seven categories relating to how individuals respond “when they encounter 
scientific information that contradicts their” preinstructional theories (Chinn & Brewer, 
1993, p. 1) and are: 
1. ignore the anomalous data; 
2. reject the anomalous data; 
3. exclude the data from the domain to the preinstructional theory; 
4. accept the data, but hold the data in abeyance; 
5. accept and reinterpret the data while retaining the preinstructional theory; 
6. accept and reinterpret the data while making peripheral change to the 
preinstructional theory; and 
7. accept the data and change their preinstructional theory. 
In this section, I present the results of my coding analysis and the subsequent 
development of a rubric to score treatment group participants’ written explanations. I 
104 
 
then discuss the results of the scoring and associations between the variables that 
emerged from the coding analysis.  
Content Analysis of Written Explanations 
To address research question 3, I specifically examined the explanatory task 
responses generated by treatment group participants at the end of the model-evidence link 
(MEL) diagram activity (see Appendix F). This task asked the participants to select three 
(out of a possible eight) evidence-to-model links that they had made on their MEL 
diagram. In their explanations, participants identified each end of the link, with an 
evidence (numbered 1, 2, 3, or 4; see Appendix F) at one end and the model (A: human-
induced model of climate change or B: sun-induced model of climate change) at the 
other. Participants then wrote their judgment about the weighting of link’s strength 
between an evidence and a model (i.e., the evidence strongly supports the model, the 
evidence supports the model, the evidence has nothing to do with the model, or the 
evidence contradicts the model). The participants also provided a justification for their 
weighting of link strength, starting with the provided prompt “because.” For example, a 
full explanation from one participant said that “Evidence #1 strongly supports Model A 
because atmospheric greenhouse gases have been rising for the past 50 years because of 
humans.”  
I conducted a content analysis to examine participants’ explanations, which is a 
technique for systematically coding large amounts of text to create a small number of 
content categories (Stemler, 2001). I read through the explanations multiple times until I 
had categorized all the explanations and no new relationships emerged. One major issue 
emerged during coding: The structure of the task did not allow me to explicitly identify 
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whether explanations about evidence-to-model links were psychological anomalies of 
participants’ preinstructional theories about climate change. In other words, I was not 
able to find direct evidence of any of Chinn and Brewer’s (1993) responses because the 
explanation task did not specifically query participants to determine if their 
preinstructional theories were at conflict with either of the two models in the MEL 
diagram. 
However during coding, one phenomenon emerged that appeared to closely relate 
to participants’ reappraisals of their plausibility judgments. Specifically, participants’ 
explanations reflected a range of cognitive processing, elaboration, and reflection, from 
low to high. This range is similar to the continuum of engagement hypothesized by Dole 
and Sinatra (1998), where low cognitive engagement results in little or no conceptual 
change and high cognitive and metacognitive engagement is required for enduring and 
strong conceptual change. Greater engagement would require more critical evaluation of 
the evidence-to-model link, and therefore, a higher potential for plausibility reappraisal. 
The content analysis revealed that explanations fell into four well-defined 
categories reflecting the levels of participants’ critical evaluation and the potential for 
them to reappraise their plausibility judgments. Whereas, these categories do not directly 
address research question 3, which asked about participants psychological responses to 
anomalous data, they do help to answer the broader question of the role of critical 
evaluation in plausibility reappraisal, and specifically how this can be facilitated through 
instruction. The four categories are discussed in more detail below. 
Category 1: Incorrect explanations. Many participants had incorrect 
explanations about evidence-to-model links. For example, one participant said that 
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Evidence #2 strongly supports Model B because the evidence “talks about the Sun’s 
energy and the temperature rising and Model B talks about energy released from the 
Sun.” However, Evidence #2 states that solar activity has been decreasing since 1970 and 
that Earth has received less energy from the Sun, while Earth’s temperatures have 
continued to rise. The participant was clearly incorrect because Evidence #2, which 
reveals that solar activity has been decreasing, contradicts Model B, which states that our 
current climate change is caused by increasing amounts of energy released from the Sun. 
Table 6 shows correct and incorrect evidence-to-model links based on 
participants’ judgments about the weighting of a link’s strength (i.e., strongly supports, 
supports, has nothing to do with, or contradicts). The table combines the weights of 
strongly supports and supports because from the perspective of correctness, it was not 
possible to differentiate between these two. I determined correct and incorrect responses 
based solely on the information provided in the evidence and the cause/effect statement 
made in a model. Whereas, someone with a sufficient amount of background knowledge 
(i.e., an expert in climate science) could argue that other correct options exist, such 
nuances are beyond the level of these middle school participants, who were clearly 
novices in the area of climate science. Table 6 also shows if correct links are weak or 
strong, which relate to the next three categories (see below).  
107 
 
Table 6 
List of Correct (C) and Incorrect Responses (I) for Evidence-to-model Links (+ Indicates 
a Strong and Correct link and – Indicates a Weak and Correct Link) Based on 
Participants’ Judgments 
Evidence-to-model 
link 
Link Weight 
Strongly 
supports/supports 
Has nothing to do 
with Contradicts 
E1_MA C+ I I 
E1_MB I C- I 
E2_MA I C- I 
E2_MB I I C+ 
E3_MA C+ I I 
E3_MB I C- I 
E4_MA I C- I 
E4_MB C+ I I 
Note. En-Mx = evidence-to model link for evidence n (1, 2, 3 or 4) and model x (A or B). 
Category 2: Correct with weak links. Many of the participants’ explanations 
discussed how certain evidence had nothing to do with a particular model. In many cases, 
these explanations were correct, but represent a weak level of cognitive processing 
because they demonstrate no elaboration, reflection, or metacognition. Without these 
deeper cognitive processes, the participants may have engaged in a low level of 
evaluation, which was not sufficient for plausibility reappraisal and conceptual change 
(Chinn & Brewer, 1993; Dole & Sinatra, 1998). For example, one participant wrote 
“Evidence #3 has nothing do with Model B because the evidence is about satellites and 
greenhouses, and Model B is about energy released from the Sun.” These types of 
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explanations share some similarity to Chinn and Brewer’s (1993) psychological response 
of excluding the data from the domain of the theory.  When data are excluded, “they 
obviously do not lead to any theory change” (Chinn & Brewer, 1993, p. 8), and therefore 
reflect minimal amounts of critical evaluation and reappraisal.  
Category 3: Correct with strong links and superficial explanations. Many of 
the participants had correctly discussed links that had strong connections (i.e., 
contradicts, supports, or strongly supports) a particular model. These were signs of a 
deeper level of processing by indicating commitment (i.e., taking a definite positional 
stance), which in some cases could lead to a greater potential for conceptual change 
(Dole & Sinatra, 1998). These explanations concurrently reflected superficial 
explanations lacking depth of analysis and evaluation. Such a response was given by one 
participant who said that “Evidence #1 strongly supports Model A because Evidence #1 
talks about greenhouse gases just like Model A.” This explanation was typical of many 
participants, who often made their judgments based on the similarities of words used in 
the evidence text to words used to describe the model, but did not reveal deeper thinking 
or analysis about the context of the connection. At best, strong links with superficial 
explanations reflect a low to moderate level of engagement because even though 
participants are making meaningful connections between evidence and a model, they are 
still not elaborating or reflecting beyond surface details. Superficial connections may be 
somewhat akin to peripheral cues that are most often associated with low cognitive 
engagement, but “has the potential to draw an individual into high engagement with the 
issues and arguments” (Dole & Sinatra, 1998, p. 122). 
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Category 4: Correct with strong links and robust explanations. Some 
explanations of strong evidence-to-model links expressed a greater degree of elaboration 
and reflection than in other types of explanations. For example, one participant indicated 
that “Evidence #3 strongly supports Model A because the satellites are measuring energy 
being absorbed by greenhouse gases, which makes the Earth’s climate change.” This 
participant provided a causal statement about increasing energy absorbed by greenhouse 
gases as a mechanism for climate change, which in turn corresponded to Model A. This 
causal statement does not necessarily indicate any change to the participants’ 
preinstructional theory, but it does reveal deeper thinking about the evidence-to-model 
link, and a greater potential for plausibility reappraisal and possibly conceptual change. 
Scoring Rubric for Written Explanations  
   From the results of the content analysis, I created a scoring rubric for student 
explanations (Table 7). The four categories in the rubric represent a natural ordering of 
levels of critical evaluation and potential for plausibility reappraisal—from no or minimal 
potential (incorrect responses) to low potential (correct explanations of weak link) to low-
moderate potential (correct but superficial explanations of strong links) to moderate-high 
potential (correct and explanations of strong links). Again it was not directly possible to 
know if participants viewed any of the evidence as psychological anomalies so I am 
unable to use this scoring rubric to answer research question 3. However, this scoring 
rubric provides a meaningful instrument to examine the relationship between critical 
evaluation and plausibility reappraisal.  
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Table 7 
Scoring Rubric for Explanatory Tasks.  
Category Description Score 
Incorrect 
explanations 
Explanation contains an incorrect model-to-evidence link 
and/or is mostly inconsistent with scientific understanding. 
1 
Correct 
explanations of 
weak links 
Explanation is correct, but the evidence-to-model link weight 
states that the evidence has nothing to do with the model. 
2 
Correct but 
superficial 
explanations of 
strong links 
Explanation is correct, with an evidence-to-model link weight 
of strongly supports, supports, or contradicts as appropriate. 
However, the explanation is superficial, demonstrating only 
surface similarities between evidence and model. 
3 
Correct and 
robust 
explanations of 
strong links 
Explanation is correct, with an evidence-to-model link weight 
of strongly supports, supports, or contradicts as appropriate. 
The explanation also reflects deeper cognitive processing that 
elaborates on an evaluation of evidence and model. 
4 
I scored participants’ explanations using this rubric (Table 7). Each treatment 
group participant was asked to provide three explanations at the end of the Model-
Evidence Link (MEL) diagram activity. With 86 treatment group participants, a 
maximum of 258 explanations were possible. However, a few participants left some 
explanations completely blank, and therefore I was not able to score six explanations, 
yielding a total of 252 scored explanations. A science education expert also scored 
participants’ explanations independently. Initial rater scores were at a high level of 
agreement (r = .94, p < .01). We discussed differences in our initial scores and ultimately 
reached full consensus on every explanation. 
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  Figure 10 shows the frequency of scores for each evidence-to-model link. 
Participants wrote the greatest number of explanations (N = 74; 29.4% of the total 
explanations) for the link between Evidence #1 and Model A. Evidence #1 describes  
how atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations have increased over time, and how 
carbon dioxide emissions due to human activities have also increased over time (see 
Appendix F for more details). Model A is the human-induced model of climate change. 
For this evidence-to-model link, the predominant score was 3 (correct but superficial 
explanation of a strong evidence-to-model link; N = 62). This indicates that most of the 
participants’ explanations discussed only the similarity in wording between Evidence #1 
and Model A.  
 
Figure 10. Frequency of scores for each evidence-to-model link. In the figure, evidence-
to-model links are coded based on the evidence number (1, 2, 3, or 4) and model (A or B) 
at each end of the link (e.g., E1-MA therefore shows the link from Evidence #1 to Model 
A). 
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Participants wrote the second greatest number of evidence-to-model link 
explanations (N = 45; 17.9% of the total explanations) for Evidence #2 and Model B. 
Evidence #2 describes the association between energy output by the Sun and average 
global temperatures over the past 100 years (see Appendix F for details). Model B 
attributes current climate change to increasing amounts of energy released from the Sun. 
Interestingly, the predominant score for this link was 1 (N = 30), indicating that many 
participants incorrectly thought that Evidence #2 supported Model B. In fact, this 
evidence, contradicts Model B because it shows a decreasing amount of solar energy 
received by Earth over the past 30 years.  
The fewest explanations (N = 12; 4.8% of the total explanations) were written for 
the link between Evidence #4 and Model A. Evidence #4 describes paleoclimatic 
associations between sunspots (one measure of the Sun’s activity) and average global 
temperatures as measured by tree rings. Evidence #4 is the only evidence which supports 
Model B.  
Nonparametric Associations 
The content analysis and subsequent scoring of explanations show evidence of 
various levels of participants’ ability to be critically evaluative. However, the following 
question arises that is of particular importance to this dissertation study: Are participants’ 
levels of critical evaluation associated with reappraisal of their plausibility judgments? 
To examine this question, I conducted a nonparametric analysis using Kendall’s τ-b. This 
ordinal-by-ordinal analysis is appropriate for looking at correlational relationships 
between ordered categories, such as the explanation scores generated using the rubric 
shown in Table 7. Model plausibility scores at postinstruction can also be considered as 
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ordered categories, where a score of 1 = greatly implausible (or impossible) and 10 = 
highly plausible. Unlike other correlational analyses, Kendall’s τ-b is not based on 
covariance between two variables, but on two variables’ relative ranking as they are 
examined for each case (Nussbaum, 2011b). If Case 1 and Case 2 both have the same 
relative ranking for a variable pair (e.g., both rank variable A greater than variable B), 
they are concordant. On the other hand if Case 1 and Case 2 have different relative 
rankings for a variable pair (e.g., Case 1 ranks variable A greater than variable B, but 
Case 2 does the opposite), they are discordant. A statistical predominance of either 
concordant or discordant pairs helps to gauge degree of association between ordinal 
variables. Like other tests of association, Kendall’s τ-b values range from -1 (strong 
negative association or discordance) to 1 (strong positive association or concordance; 
Nussbaum, 2011b). 
Table 8 shows Kendall’s τ-b values for the evidence-to-model link scores and 
participants’ perceptions of model plausibility postinstruction. The table shows 
associations between the eight possible evidence-to-model links (four evidences by two 
models) and three measures of model plausibility perceptions (plausibility of Model A 
and Model B at postinstruction, as well as overall model plausibility at postinstruction, 
calculated as Model A minus Model B).  
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Table 8 
Kendall’s τ-b Showing Associations between Evidence-to-model Links and 
Postinstruction Perceptions of Model Plausibility  
Variable Aplaus-pst Bplaus-pst Mplaus-pst 
E1-MA (74) .17 .01 .08 
E2-MA (27) .10 .01 .08 
E3-MA (35) -.16 -.02 -.07 
E4_MA (12) .02 -.02 -.04 
E1-MB (16) .00 .22 .01 
E2-MB (45) .31* .10 .09 
E3-MB (24) .15 -.12 .18 
E4-MB (19) .06 .06 -.04 
E_TOTAL .17 .06 .06 
*p < .05. 
Note. Number of explanations shown in parentheses.  En-Mx = evidence-to model link for evidence n (1, 
2, 3 or 4) and model x (A or B); Aplaus-pst = Model A plausibility, postinstruction; Bplaus-pst = Model B 
plausibility, postinstruction; Mplaus-pst = Model A – Model B plausibility, postinstruction. E_TOTAL is 
the sum of the three link scores. 
 
As shown in Table 8, perceptions of model plausibility at preinstruction had 
nonsignificant correlations with scores relating to participants’ evaluation of evidence-to-
model links. Most of the associations between perceptions of model plausibility at 
postinstruction were also nonsignificant. Interestingly, however, there was one significant 
correlation between participants’ evaluation of the link between Evidence #2 and Model 
B, with Kendall’s τ-b = .31, p = .018. This link is the only one which shows evidence 
contradicting a model. This reveals an important finding that contradictory evidence had 
the only significant association with participants’ postinstruction plausibility judgments, 
where a greater critical evaluation score was correlated with a greater plausibility of 
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Model A (i.e., the scientific model of human-induced climate change) and vice versa (i.e., 
low scores were correlated with lower plausibility). Whereas, the well-known principle 
that correlation does not imply causation certainly applies with this result, the significant 
association with contradictory evidence and plausibility appraisal is a promising finding, 
supporting continued investigation of the relationship between critical evaluation that can 
be facilitated by instruction, reappraisal of plausibility judgments, and an increased 
potential for conceptual change.    
These associations do provide some evidence of a connection between various 
levels of critical evaluation promoted by instruction and participants’ postinstruction 
plausibility judgments. Such a connection is of particular interest as we endeavor to 
understand the role of plausibility judgments in conceptual change and instruction that 
facilitates conceptual change.  
Results Summary 
 The results showed that treatment group participants experienced significant 
change in their perceptions of model plausibility and correctness, as well as knowledge of 
human-induced climate change, after experiencing an activity that promoted critical 
evaluation (i.e., the model-evidence link diagram instructional scaffold, or MEL). These 
changes represented medium to large effect sizes and show that participants’ moved 
toward greater plausibility perceptions and knowledge toward the scientific model of 
human-induced climate change. The comparison group, which experienced the regular 
curriculum, did not show any significant changes in these variables. However, both the 
treatment and comparison groups had significant change in the overall plausibility 
perceptions of climate change, with a small to medium effect size. These results address, 
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in large measure, research questions 1 and 2, and also support my hypothesis that the 
MEL activity would facilitate plausibility reappraisal of alternative climate change 
models, as well as knowledge reconstruction about human-induced climate change. 
Because scores of participants’ beliefs about climate change evidence and understanding 
about weather and climate distinctions lacked reliability, this study could not address 
changes in these measures pre to postinstruction.  
 The results also revealed an interesting relationship between student explanations 
and their perceptions of model plausibility. Specifically, the contradictory evidence to 
model link was significantly associated with perceptions of model plausibility. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to directly determine if student explanations of 
evidence-to-model links were strictly psychological responses to anomalous data, as 
theorized by Chinn and Brewer (1993). This finding may indicate a connection between 
how participants weigh evidence (an indicator of critical evaluation) and plausibility 
reappraisal.  
The results were inconclusive about students’ understanding of weather and 
climate distinctions because of low score reliability. Similarly, score reliability of 
participants’ beliefs about climate change was also low, which also led to inconclusive 
results regarding their beliefs. 
I will discuss implications of these findings in the next chapter. Specifically, I will 
discuss how these results provide support of my model of plausibility in conceptual 
change, implications for instruction, and potential avenues for further study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter discusses the results within the context of the model on the role of 
plausibility judgments in conceptual change situations initiated by cognitive dissonance 
(see Figure 2 and accompanying explanation) and suggests a modification to this model. 
The chapter then discusses the implications of the modified model on instruction and 
future research. Prior to discussing these implications, I briefly summarize the study’s 
findings within the perspective of the three research questions and the associated 
hypotheses, as well as the study’s limitations. 
 Summary of the Findings 
 In broad terms, research questions 1 and 2 asked about the effect of critical 
evaluation on reappraisal of students’ initial plausibility judgment and subsequent 
conceptual change. As a reminder, I am using a working definition that plausibility is a 
judgment on the relative potential truthfulness of incoming information compared to our 
existing mental representations. Researchers have theoretically implicated plausibility as 
an important mechanism in conceptual change learning (i.e., where concepts may be 
cognitively reconstructed through instruction; see, for example, Chi, 2005; Dole & 
Sinatra, 1998; Posner et al., 1982). In this study, I specifically examined participants’ 
plausibility judgments about two competing climate change theories (human-induced 
climate change, which is the scientifically accepted theory, and increasing energy 
received from the Sun, which is a popular theory used by skeptics), as well as 
participants’ degree of transformation in their understanding about climate change. 
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The results of the analyses show that treatment group participants had statistically 
significant changes pre to postinstruction in their relative judgments about two models 
explaining climate change. The treatment group participants also had statistically 
significant change from pre to post instruction in which of the models they thought was 
correct. Similarly, treatment group participants had statistically greater scores at 
postinstruction on a questionnaire that probed their understanding of the fundamental 
principles underlying climate change, as well as demonstrating knowledge reconstruction 
about the causes of climate change. The effect sizes of all these changes were medium to 
large, indicating a practical significance that has increased bearing on instructional 
implications and future research. Furthermore, changes experienced by treatment group 
participants were toward the scientifically accepted model of human-induced climate 
change and away from a popular alternative model that current climate change is caused 
by increasing energy received from the Sun. Comparison group participants had no 
significant changes pre to postinstruction in their relative judgments and ideas about 
model correctness, or in the questionnaire scores.  
The results suggest that the treatment group instructional activity, which promotes 
critical evaluation of these two climate change models and their connections to evidence, 
might potentially be a causal mechanism for these changes. Furthermore, the results 
suggest that participants’ critical evaluation may have resulted in a plausibility 
reappraisal toward the scientifically accepted model of human-induced climate change, 
which in turn contributed to conceptual change (i.e., reconstructing their knowledge from 
misconceptions about the causes of climate change to conceptions that are consistent with 
climate scientists). These findings support my hypotheses that when students consider 
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competing climate change models, the one with the greater plausibility will correspond to 
the theory that students think is correct (H2A), and also that students who use MEL 
diagrams (i.e., the instructional scaffold promoting critical evaluation) will give a greater 
plausibility ranking to the scientifically accepted model of human-induced climate 
change compared to the alternative model that Earth is receiving an increasing amount of 
energy from the Sun (H2B). It is important to note that this hypothesis deals with 
plausibility perceptions about the alternative models of climate change and not the overall 
plausibility of scientific statements about climate change—these overall plausibility 
perceptions are part of my first set of hypotheses, which I discuss below. 
The findings also partially support my hypothesis that increases in plausibility 
perceptions of human-induced climate change will result in reconstruction of students’ 
knowledge about human-induced climate change, conceptual change about weather and 
climate distinctions, and beliefs about climate change evidence (H1B). Whereas, the 
results reveal that participants reconstructed their knowledge about human-induced 
climate change, I could not reliably measure students’ understanding about weather and 
climate distinctions or beliefs about climate change. Therefore, in terms of these two 
variables, the results are inconclusive.  
The findings are also inconclusive toward my hypothesis that instruction 
promoting critical evaluation will increase students’ overall plausibility perceptions of 
scientific statements about climate change (H1A). Both treatment group participants, who 
experienced the model-evidence link diagram activity, and control group participants, 
who did not, expressed greater plausibility perceptions of climate change at 
postinstruction. This result may be due—in part—to the marginal reliability of 
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preinstructional scores. However, Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) showed that even limited 
instruction can result in significant changes in overall plausibility perceptions that Earth’s 
climate is changing, and the results of this study support our earlier findings.  
Research question 3 asked specifically about how participants’ psychological 
responses to anomalous data were related to their plausibility judgments. Unfortunately, 
the nature of the explanatory tasks at the end of the model-evidence link diagram activity 
provided a barrier to directly answering this question. Because of the wording of the 
tasks, no participants provided any indication that the climate change evidences were 
anomalous to their pre-existing theories. However, qualitative examination of the 
explanations revealed participants engaged in various levels of critical evaluation. 
Furthermore, quantitative analysis showed that participants who expressed a greater level 
of critical evaluation about evidence contradicting a climate change model had 
significantly greater plausibility perceptions about the scientifically accepted model of 
human-induced climate change. 
This finding does not directly test my hypothesis that there would be a discernible 
relationship between model plausibility ratings and psychological response to anomalous 
data (H3); however, it does provide some tentative support of the connection between 
critical evaluation and plausibility reappraisal, as suggested by my model on the role of 
the plausibility judgment in conceptual change situations. These results also suggest a 
need to modify my model, which I discuss later in this chapter. Prior to that discussion, I 
provide a brief overview of some this study’s limitations.    
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Limitations of the Study 
 Limitations are inherent within all forms of educational research and this study is 
no exception. One limitation relates to study participants and the degree to which the 
findings are generalizable. The participants are a representative sample of middle school 
students in many urban southwestern U.S school districts (i.e., predominantly Hispanic, 
with a relatively high proportion—just about half—in a low socioeconomic status). 
However, one should exercise caution generalizing these results beyond this population 
and this caution raises the need for future work on the relationships between critical 
evaluation, plausibility reappraisal, and conceptual change with various other populations 
and age levels.  
 Another limitation lies within the nature of the quasi-experimental research 
design. With this design, I could not truly control the experimental situation through 
random selection of participants. Participants were randomly assigned to either the 
treatment or comparison condition, but were randomly assigned at the class level (i.e., 
preexisting participant groups experienced the random assignments).  The results 
revealed no significant classroom effects, however, indicating a much lower potential for 
unaccounted confounding variables and subsequently a greater level of internal validity. 
In other words with significant and practical differences among from pre to 
postinstruction in classes taught by different teachers, the instructional scaffold appears to 
be a plausible catalyst for promoting critical evaluation, plausibility reappraisal, and 
conceptual change under various classroom conditions. 
The lack of true experimental conditions might weaken somewhat the causal 
claims linking critical evaluation to plausibility reappraisal to conceptual change. 
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However in addition to the results showing no significant classroom effects, this study 
was based on a pre/post design and results showed no significant differences in any either 
group prior to instruction. This result also creates increased confidence levels that 
significant and practical gains experienced by the treatment group are due to the 
instructional scaffold. 
Finally, results relating to overall plausibility perceptions of climate change 
(PPM) show only a main effect pre to postinstruction. It is important to note that PPM 
scores should not be confused with the more specific scores of perceptions of model 
plausibility (i.e., scores that show statistically significant shifts in treatment group 
participants’ plausibility perceptions toward the scientifically accepted model of human-
induced climate change).The lack of interaction in overall plausibility may have been a 
result of the marginal reliability of preinstruction scores. An alternative explanation is 
that the PPM measured plausibility perceptions of scientific statements that extended 
beyond the instructional topic (i.e., the causes of current climate change).   
A Modified Model of Plausibility in Conceptual Change 
 The results show that treatment group participants reappraised their plausibility 
judgments and experienced change toward conceptions consistent with scientific 
understanding. However, the explanatory tasks revealed only one significant association 
between scores relating to participants’ evaluation of evidence-to-model links and their 
perceptions of model plausibility at postinstruction. Interestingly, this suggests that 
critical evaluation of individual evidence to model links are not as powerful in 
reappraising plausibility judgments as the synergistic effect of considering multiple 
evidence to model links, as was the case with the model-evidence link diagram activity 
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(i.e., where participants simultaneously consider eight evidence to model links). Indeed, 
such consciously controlled coordination of different types of evidence with theories 
serves as a foundation for development of scientific thinking (Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000) 
and may contribute to more robust critical evaluation. In the case of the model-evidence 
link diagram, the process of considering several links between evidences and models may 
have had a greater impact on participants’ plausibility reappraisal than the consideration 
of single evidence-to-model links in isolation.  
 One component of the model that I presented in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2)—the 
response to the plausibility judgment—may not properly account for the process of 
considering multiple alternatives. Earlier, I proposed that Chinn and Brewer’s (1993) 
seven responses to anomalous data aligned with plausibility judgments. Chinn and 
Brewer’s responses are based on the connection between an incoming piece of anomalous 
data and individuals’ preexisting theories. In my model, I theorized that plausibility 
judgments acted as mediators between incoming anomalous information and a 
psychological response. However, the results were inconclusive about whether the 
participants’ explanations reflected psychological responses to anomalous data. 
Furthermore, I found only one significant association between participants’ evaluation of 
evidence to model links (i.e., Evidence #2—recent decreases in solar energy—was 
contradictory to Model B—climate change is caused by increasing energy from the Sun) 
and their plausibility perceptions of a single model (i.e., Model A—climate change is 
caused by human activities). Participants’ change in relative model plausibility 
perceptions (Model A – Model B) may have been related more to their consideration of 
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multiple lines of evidence (i.e., the four evidences presented in the model-evidence link 
diagram) than to a single psychological response about Evidence #2.  
The study results do, however, reveal that the degree of critical evaluation may be 
important to plausibility reappraisal. Participants who engaged in critical evaluation 
changed both their relative plausibility perceptions between the two competing climate 
change theories and the model they thought was correct. Furthermore, these participants 
also experienced a greater degree of conceptual change about the causes of climate 
change. Relative plausibility perceptions between two (or more) competing theories 
appear to be necessary for conceptual change. Other factors may also contribute to 
conceptual change (e.g., message comprehensibility, personal relevance, need for 
cognition; Dole & Sinatra 1998) and it is still feasible that psychological responses in 
single evidence to model links are involved in this process. However, the results of this 
study support the following idea: if the plausibility of a scientifically accurate conception 
is not greater than that of an alternative, it is unlikely that conceptual change will result—
even if other factors are conducive for change. This study specifically showed that 
participants who engaged in an activity promoting critical evaluation shifted their relative 
plausibility perceptions towards the scientifically accepted model of human-induced 
climate change. This plausibility reappraisal also accompanied a shift in perceptions 
about which model the participants thought was correct—again toward the scientifically 
accepted model—as well as knowledge reconstruction about the causes climate change. 
Because the earlier model did not reflect the relative plausibility judgment and the 
findings of this dissertation study, I have revised my model on the role of plausibility in 
conceptual change (as shown Figure 11 and discussed in more detail below). 
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Figure 11. A modified model of the role of plausibility judgment in a conceptual change 
situation initiated by cognitive dissonance.  
This modified model contains most of elements that I discuss in detail in Chapter 
2. For example, the plausibility judgment is initiated by anomalous incoming information 
and pre-processing based on source reliability. The plausibility judgment is made in 
relationship with potential interacting factors (e.g., epistemic motives and dispositions, 
motivation, and topic emotions). The judgment is made along various degrees of 
evaluation that follows a continuum of cognitive processing from completely implicit to 
completely explicit. Furthermore, the study results reinforce the notion of plausibility 
reappraisal through explicit, critical evaluation can be facilitated instruction.  
The major difference in this modified model is that I have replaced the last node, 
which was titled “response,” with “resulting potentiality for conceptual change.” This 
potentiality for conceptual change is based on the relative strength of the incoming (or 
reappraised) information to background knowledge. When the plausibility of the 
incoming information is much less than an individual’s background, there is virtually no 
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potential for conceptual change. A somewhat greater potential exists when the 
plausibility perceptions are about equal, but the potential is only weak. In this situation, 
an individual may be uncertain and rate plausibility of both conceptions as moderate, or 
may rate both with high (or low) plausibility (note that plausibility of both as either very 
high or very low is an example of how these judgments differ from probabilistic 
reasoning). Finally, a strong potential for conceptual change only occurs when the 
plausibility of the incoming information is much greater than that of the alternative. 
I see this potential for conceptual change as a continuum, as represented by the 
arrow in Figure 11, and not as three distinct categories. This potential for conceptual 
change is analogous to Dole and Sinatra’s (1998) engagement continuum, where there 
may be a gradual variation of “information processing, strategy use, and reflectivity” (p. 
121) that individuals employ in a conceptual change learning environment. However, this 
continuum relates specifically to the relative plausibility of the incoming information to 
the individual’s existing conception. Whereas cognitive, affective, and metacognitive 
processes are involved in making plausibility judgments and reappraisals, it is simply the 
relative strength of two competing conceptions that may determine the potential for 
conceptual change (i.e., as indicated by participants’ changes in both relative model 
plausibility perceptions toward the scientifically accepted model and knowledge of 
human-induced climate change). Of course as I have discussed earlier, other factors may 
also be required for an individual to experience conceptual change. Be that as it may, 
these findings support the suggestion that a necessary condition for knowledge 
reconstruction is that the plausibility of incoming information supersedes the plausibility 
of any competing alternatives. 
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The other change to the modified model (Figure 11) is that I relabeled the path 
from the judgment node to the result node from “judgment implementation” to 
“comparison with background knowledge.”  This study suggests that is not a simple 
matter of psychologically responding to incoming data relative to your preexisting theory 
(Chinn & Brewer, 1993), but rather a more elaborative coordination of multiple lines of 
evidence with alternative models, and in the case of conceptual change learning, at least 
some of these alternatives are mental representations in individuals’ background 
knowledge. Complex and metacognitive coordination of theories and evidence is a 
thinking skill used by scientists (Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000). Furthermore, such a scientific 
habit of mind may be required to gain greater understanding and knowledge 
reconstruction of complex topics, such as global climate change.  
Implications for Instruction 
 The study findings provide evidence that instruction promoting critical evaluation 
and plausibility reappraisal can facilitate conceptual change. The instructional scaffold 
used in this study was the model-evidence link (MEL) diagram, where participants 
weighed the links between scientific evidences and two alternative models of climate 
change. As I discussed in the previous section, the MEL helped students to coordinate 
evidence with theories in a mode of critical evaluation. Recently, the National Research 
Council (NRC) of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine 
published a report providing a framework for the next generation of science education 
standards (NRC, 2012). The report authors state that coordination of evidence and theory 
through critical evaluation supports the learning of epistemic practices of scientists and 
engineers (NRC, 2012). With the framework calling for changing students’ conceptual 
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understanding of such epistemic practices (i.e., epistemic conceptual change; Chinn & 
Sinatra, 2011), the MEL is an instructional scaffold appropriate for meeting this 
challenge.  
 The new framework for science education standards (NRC, 2012) also places 
evaluation at the intersection of “two spheres of activity” (p. 45) common to science and 
engineering: (a) investigating and (b) developing explanations and solutions. The 
framework also states that evaluation requires critical thinking, “whether in developing 
and refining an idea…or in conducting an investigation. The dominant activities in 
[evaluation] are argumentation and critique, which often lead to further experiments and 
observations or to changes in proposed models, explanations, or designs” (NRC, 2012, p. 
46). Employing critical evaluation in the classroom may then lead to plausibility 
reappraisal—as suggested by this study—and cognitively reconstructing misconceptions 
into conceptions consistent with scientific understanding.  
 Engaging students explicitly in considering and reappraising their plausibility 
judgments may also increase students’ understanding of the nature of science. A key 
component to understanding the nature of science is the idea that scientific knowledge is 
tentative (Lederman, 1999). But of equal importance to knowing that scientific 
knowledge is tentative, students should also “be able to step back from evidence or an 
explanation and consider whether another interpretation of a particular finding is 
plausible with respect to existing scientific evidence and other knowledge that they hold 
with confidence” (NRC, 2007, p. 39, emphasis mine). This explicit and conscious 
reappraisal of plausibility judgments is essential for understanding the nature of scientific 
knowledge and how scientific knowledge develops over time. Whereas individual 
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scientists may not actively engage in plausibility reappraisal of the theoretical 
frameworks critical to their research agenda, the larger scientific community will evaluate 
major scientific theories and eventually dispel of those that are deemed less plausible 
than competing theories (Lakatos, 1970). Instruction using explicit plausibility 
reappraisal could then facilitate understanding of the development of scientific 
knowledge. In fact, the new framework for science education standards specifically calls 
for instruction where, students “come to appreciate that alternative interpretations of 
scientific evidence can occur, that such interpretations must be carefully scrutinized, and 
that the plausibility of the supporting evidence must be considered,” and ultimately 
understand “that predictions or explanations can be revised on the basis of seeing new 
evidence or of developing a new model that accounts for the existing evidence better than 
previous models did” (NRC, 2012, p. 251).  
The 7th grade study participants in this study revealed a capability to learn how to 
use critical evaluation and reappraise their plausibility judgments. This is congruent with 
the suggestion that students can begin to comprehend the meaning of plausibility in 
middle school (Snow, 2010). The participants specifically showed a significant 
relationship between weighing of contradictory evidence (i.e., evidence opposed to the 
alternative model) and their plausibility judgments (i.e., the only significant association 
revealed in their explanations). Thus, contradictory evidence had greater bearing on the 
participants’ plausibility judgments than evidence that strongly supported, supported, or 
had nothing to do with the models. In this way, participants engaged in a practice that 
was similar to the overall scientific community (i.e., looking for evidence contrary to a 
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theory), and by doing so may have also gained a greater understanding of how scientific 
knowledge is constructed.  
The treatment activity occurred in just two class meetings, constituting about 90 
minutes of total instruction. Treatment group participants quickly learned how to 
critically evaluate evidence and reappraise their plausibility judgments when scaffolded 
by the MEL diagram. In other words, these participants experienced a powerful effect in 
a relatively short amount of time. With Chinn and Buckland (2012) using the model-
evidence link diagrams over the course of a semester—and also showing appreciable 
benefits to learning—the effects of sustained instruction using this instructional scaffold 
may have a greater effect on students’ ability to engage in plausibility reappraisal. This 
also suggests that middle school students can engage in explicit and conscious 
plausibility reappraisal of alternative theories to increase their knowledge about the 
nature of science. This last statement about plausibility reappraisal is speculative, but 
provides a hopeful prospect that instruction can promote epistemic conceptual change, a 
process that is critical for promoting greater understanding of science and abilities to be 
engaged in scientific reasoning (Sinatra & Chinn, 2011). Along with this potential for 
epistemic conceptual change, this study provides evidence that instruction promoting 
critical evaluation and plausibility reappraisal leads to conceptual change about the 
relatively complex topic of climate change. A summary of these implications that I 
developed for educators in included Appendix H. 
Implications for Future Research and Concluding Thoughts 
 A number of studies (Connell & Keane, 2004, 2006; Lombardi & Sinatra, 2012) 
together provide a growing body of evidence supporting the importance of cognitive 
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plausibility judgments. This study provides further empirical evidence that critical 
evaluation can lead to plausibility reappraisal, which in turn helps support the modified 
model of plausibility judgments in conceptual change (see the discussion earlier in this 
chapter). However, the model is in need of further testing, where one possible 
investigative avenue might be in examining the factors that lead to cognitive 
preprocessing of the incoming information’s source reliability. As a reminder, source 
reliability may depend on the complexity of the information, the corroborative alignment 
of the information with background knowledge, and the perceptions about the degree of 
conjecture inherent in the incoming information (Connell & Keane, 2004, 2006), as well 
as other cognitive processes (e.g., heuristics and biases). More needs to be understood 
about these during conceptual change learning, and specifically, how these factors 
influence the initial plausibility judgment about incoming anomalous information. 
An area for future examination of source reliability may be misconceptions about 
what scientists mean by uncertainity. Lombardi and Sinatra (2012) speculate that 
individuals’ judgments may be influenced by “insufficient understanding about scientific 
uncertainties as they gauge the plausibility of human-induced climate change” (p. 213). 
Individuals who confront scientific information that is parameterized by a range of 
uncertainty (e.g., climate models that predict a range of future global temperatures) may 
deem that information to be of lower plausibility because they perceive scientific 
uncertainty as a high degree of conjecture. Similarly, the factor of corroborative 
alignment may be related to the perceived trustworthiness of the information. A study by 
Bråten, Strømsø, and Britt (2009) showed that individuals’ trustworthiness perceptions of 
different information sources on climate change related strongly to their comprehension. 
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Trustworthiness as a measure of source reliability may therefore influence the initial 
plausibility judgment, and ultimately the possibility for greater cognitive engagement 
with the incoming information. Researchers are currently examining many facets of the 
interaction between differing source texts and epistemic cognition (see for example, 
Ferguson, Bråten, & Strømsø, 2012), and my model may present an opportunity to 
examine the plausibility judgment as an important mediator in this interaction.  
 Another possible avenue for future research is to look at how motivational factors 
may be related to the degree of evaluation that occurs in both the initial plausibility 
judgment and potential plausibility reappraisal. For example, Sinatra and Taasoobshirazi 
(2011) describe the process of intentional conception change, where “motivation drives 
the cognition and metacognition needed for conceptual change” (p. 209). With intentional 
conceptual change, individuals have the goal of examining incoming information in 
comparison to their background knowledge and evaluating the need for knowledge 
reconstruction. Research into whether explicit use of plausibility judgments may facilitate 
such a goal-directed comparison could provide greater understanding of the self-
regulatory skills that promote conceptual change. In turn, this could help us better 
understand the interaction of learner and message characteristic as postulated by Dole and 
Sinatra’s (1998) Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge Model (CRKM). 
 A third avenue for future research would extend our understanding of how 
instruction promoting critical evaluation leads to plausibility reappraisal and conceptual 
change. This study provided initial evidence that the model-evidence link diagram can 
lead to both plausibility reappraisal and conceptual change, but the potential exists that 
other instructional strategies may also lead to these cognitive processes. For example, 
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Nussbaum and Edwards (2011) have shown that critical questions can be used to increase 
students’ abilities to successfully evaluate arguments. Critical questions—such as “What 
is the likelihood?” and “How do scientists know?—may enable students to evaluate 
connections between evidence and scientific models, although more research in this area 
is warranted. Furthermore, incorporating collaborative argumentation into instruction 
may allow for greater elaboration and evaluation when explicitly considering both 
judgments based on plausibilistic reasoning, as well as more precise probabilistic 
reasoning (Nussbaum, 2011a).  
 In addition to the use of critical questions and collaborative argumentation, the 
effectiveness of various text forms on plausibility reappraisal may be a fourth avenue for 
future study. Sinatra and Broughton (2011) have called for more research about refutation 
texts—a particularly effective medium for promoting conceptual change. Specifically, 
these researchers wonder about “how best to increase the value-added benefit of 
refutation text for promoting science learning” and how the text “can be augmented to 
increase the refutation text advantage” to facilitate conceptual change (Sinatra & 
Broughton, 2011, p. 389). Research about the incorporation of critical evaluation of 
evidence to model connections and plausibility reappraisal into refutation text may be one 
way to increase this advantage. In the broader scheme of progressing our understanding 
about the role of plausibility judgments in conceptual change, studies using other 
instructional methods to promote critical evaluation along with various text sources could 
provide additional empirical tests to my model, and specifically, a more thorough 
inspection of the reappraisal mechanism. 
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 A fifth avenue for future research may be examining how instruction influences 
the development of scientific thinking. This study showed that middle school student can 
engage in critical evaluation and plausibility reappraisal of competing climate change 
theories by coordinating multiple lines of evidence and such coordination is characteristic 
of scientific thinking (Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000). Previous research has been mixed on 
when individuals naturally develop the ability to think scientifically, with most pointing 
toward late adolescence and adulthood (Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000). However, instruction 
can promote critical evaluation and plausibility reappraisal in adolescents (as shown by 
my findings) and research could examine if such abilities could be facilitated at an earlier 
age (e.g., upper elementary grades 4 and 5). Whereas, using the term “plausibility” with 
elementary students may prove to be difficult, elementary students may be able to learn 
how to weigh connections between evidences and alternative theories (e.g., by using a 
model-evidence link diagram) and relate these connection to how scientists make 
judgments. It would also add to our understanding of basic cognitive processes to 
investigate how elementary students can coordinate multiple lines of evidence. Such 
studies help us better understand how and when an instructional foundation can be 
developed that facilitates students’ use of explicit critical evaluation and understanding 
about how scientists construct and reconstruct knowledge. 
 A sixth avenue for future research may be in the investigation of the relationship 
between an individual’s metacognitive abilities and his or her ability to reappraise 
plausibility judgments. The present study examined the connections between critical 
evaluation that occurs in scientific modes of thought (i.e., analyzing how evidentiary data 
support a hypothesis and its alternatives) and the plausibility reappraisal. Consequently, 
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with metacognitive processing usually involving evaluating of science learning (Schraw, 
Crippen, & Hartley, 2006), an interesting relationship may exist between metacognition 
and plausibility reappraisal. Instruction that makes the plausibility judgment explicit may 
help facilitate evaluation of what an individual knows, along with increasing 
understanding about how they know. Therefore, research into associations with 
metacognitive ability may potentially extend the importance of plausibility judgments 
beyond conceptual change learning to more general situations of self-regulated learning.  
 Finally, it is important to consider the implications of this study for future 
educational research around the scientific topic of this study: global climate change. This 
study expands our understanding of fundamental mechanisms involved in conceptual 
change, and specifically helps substantiate the idea that reconstructing knowledge about 
human-induced climate change is neither a simple matter of debunking nonscientific 
positions nor learning about the several lines of evidence that support the scientific 
model. Rather, moving toward the scientifically accepted conception that humans are 
altering Earth’s climate may well require connecting evidences to alternative models and 
evaluating the strength of these connections with respect to each alternative. Doing so in 
an instructional setting may seem counterintuitive to those that are involved in the 
climate change debate on a daily basis, but individuals who are committed to developing 
a citizenry that is climate-literate (i.e., understanding of humans’ influence on climate 
and climate’s influence on society; U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2009) must 
be open to the notion that discussing alternative explanations may lead to greater 
awareness and understanding of the science. The community of scholars examining 
climate change education is growing and additional research on the role of the 
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plausibility judgment in altering conceptions about climate change may provide a fruitful 
contribution to this community by helping develop climate-literate individuals. Such 
literacy is critical to developing a society that characteristically exhibits scientific habits 
of mind and is equipped to deal with future challenges in a way that is beneficial to our 
nation.  
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Appendix A: Plausibility Perceptions Measure (PPM) 
 
Grade 7 Reading Level Version 
 
Read the following statements. Rate the plausibility on a scale from 1 to 10: 1 being 
greatly implausible (or even impossible) and 10 being highly plausible. Try to use the full 
range of numbers in your responses. 
 
1. The Earth is warming. Rising air and ocean temperatures, melting glaciers, and rising 
sea levels are evidence of this warming. 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                    
2. Evidence from around the world shows climate is changing in many regions. 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                    
3. Greenhouse gas levels are increasing in Earth’s atmosphere. Human industry has 
caused these gases to increase. 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                    
4. Human activities that release greenhouse gases are causing global warming. 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                    
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5. Human influences on climate include rising sea levels and melting of snow and ice. 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                    
6. Human releases of greenhouse gases will increase. This will cause much greater 
warming in the future. 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                    
7. Releases of greenhouse gases by human activities could remain at the same level. But 
climate change will still occur for centuries because of these releases. 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                    
8. Human caused global warming will lead to some impacts that are sudden, such as 
massive polar ice melt. 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
                    
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Appendix B: Human-induced Climate Change (HICCK) Instrument 
Below are statements about climate change. Rate the degree to which you think that 
climate scientists agree with these statements.  
(Note that items with an asterisk directly relate to misconceptions tabulated by Choi et 
al., 2009. These asterisks will not be included on the version used by participants.)  
 
 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
1. The Sun is the main source of 
energy for Earth’s climate.  1 2 3 4 5 
2. Human have very little effect on 
Earth’s climate.  1 2 3 4 5 
3. We cannot know about ancient 
climate change. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. Earth’s climate has probably 
changed little in the past.  1 2 3 4 5 
5. Earth has recently been receiving 
increasing amounts of the Sun’s 
energy.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. The Sun’s brightness is one way to 
measure solar activity. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Sunspot number is related to solar 
activity. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. The Earth receives the Sun’s energy 
mostly from ultraviolet light.* 1 2 3 4 5 
9. Earth’s atmosphere reflects away 
almost all of the Sun’s energy. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. The greenhouse effect refers to 
Earth’s protective ozone layer.* 1 2 3 4 5 
11. Greenhouse gases make up less 
than 1% of Earth’s atmosphere. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. Burning of fossil fuels produces 
greenhouse gases. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. Humans produce billions of tons of 
greenhouse gases each year. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. Humans are reducing the amount of 
fossil fuels they burn. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. Greenhouse gas levels are 
increasing in the atmosphere. 1 2 3 4 5 
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Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
16. Greenhouse gases absorb some of 
the energy emitted by Earth’s 
surface. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Earth’s climate is currently 
changing. 1 2 3 4 5 
18. Humans are behind the cause of 
Earth’s current climate change.  1 2 3 4 5 
19. Earth’s climate is not currently 
changing. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. Current climate change is caused by 
human activities.  1 2 3 4 5 
21. Current climate change is caused by 
an increase in the Sun’s energy.* 1 2 3 4 5 
22. Current climate change is caused by 
the ozone hole.* 1 2 3 4 5 
23. Current climate change is caused by 
changes in Earth’s orbit around the 
Sun.* 
1 2 3 4 5 
24. Current climate change is caused by 
volcanic eruptions.  1 2 3 4 5 
25. Current climate change is caused by 
increasing dust in the atmosphere.* 1 2 3 4 5 
26. Earth’s climate is warmer now than 
it has ever been. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. Future climate change may be 
slowed by reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
1 2 3 4 5 
28. Humans cannot reduce future 
climate change.  1 2 3 4 5 
29. The Earth is warming faster at night 
compared to daytime. This is 
evidence that humans are causing 
climate change.  
1 2 3 4 5 
30. Satellites do not provide evidence 
that humans are changing Earth’s 
climate.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
31. Earth’s average temperature has 
increased over the past 100 years. 
This is evidence of climate change.  
1 2 3 4 5 
32. Average sea level is increasing. 
This is evidence of climate change. 1 2 3 4 5 
33. Less energy has been stored in 
Earth’s oceans recently. This is 
evidence of climate change. 
1 2 3 4 5 
34. Most of the world’s glaciers are 
decreasing in size. This is evidence 
of climate change. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix C: Distinctions between Weather and Climate Measure (DWCM) 
Read the following statements. Decide if the statement best fits into the category of 
weather or climate and check the appropriate box. 
1. There was a heat wave last summer.   Climate   Weather
2. It rarely snows in Southern Alabama.   Climate   Weather
3. It is colder than normal outside.   Climate   Weather
4. By mid-May, it is usually warm enough to go to the beach.   Climate   Weather
5. The monsoon rains will probably begin in June.   Climate   Weather
6. Clouds cover about 40% of the sky.   Climate   Weather
7. For the last 4 years, the least rainfall occurred during October.   Climate   Weather
8. There was considerable fogginess on the drive from Los Angeles to 
Santa Barbara. 
  Climate 
  Weather
9. The average annual temperature in Reno is 51F.   Climate   Weather
10. Miami’s record low temperature is 30F.   Climate   Weather
11. We are predicting that temperatures will be greater than normal this 
autumn. 
  Climate 
  Weather
12. Over the last 7 years, a drought has caused lake levels to drop about 
13 feet. 
  Climate 
  Weather
13. Tree rings reveal that the region received greater rainfall 700 years 
ago. 
  Climate 
  Weather
14. It often rains on the windward coasts of the Hawaiian Islands.   Climate   Weather
15. Snowpack at the ski resort has been below average for the last ten 
years. 
  Climate 
  Weather
16. Skies have been partly cloudy for the last three days.   Climate   Weather
17. The record annual rainfall in Atlanta is 71 inches.   Climate   Weather
18. The tomato growing season in northern Minnesota is from mid-June 
to August. 
  Climate 
  Weather
19. The 7-day forecast indicates a rainy week ahead.   Climate   Weather
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20. It snowed a total of 42 inches in Chicago last winter.   Climate   Weather
21. The average temperature in Greenland was about 2F greater 
between 1950 and 2000 than between 1900 and 1950. 
  Climate 
  Weather
22. Computer models predict that 5 hurricanes will make landfall next 
year. 
  Climate 
  Weather
23. We do not expect any tornadoes to occur in Nebraska during the 
month of February. 
  Climate 
  Weather
24. The city experienced three blizzards last winter.   Climate   Weather
25. It has rained twice as often on the mountain compared to the nearby 
valley for the last 40 years. 
  Climate 
  Weather
26. The North Pacific Current lowers temperatures near the coast.    Climate   Weather
27. Strong and dry winds have contributed to an active fire season this 
summer. 
  Climate 
  Weather
28. The airport runway direction was determined by the average wind 
conditions. 
  Climate 
  Weather
29. An area of high pressure usually forms over Bermuda during the 
summer. 
  Climate 
  Weather
30. The wind blows from west to east in the jet streams.   Climate   Weather
31. The number of glaciers in the Canadian Rockies has decreased over 
the last 100 years. 
  Climate 
  Weather
32. The sound of thunder means that storms may be nearby.   Climate   Weather
33. A low pressure system has been moving across the United States 
slowly. 
  Climate 
  Weather
34. Strong thunderstorms occurred when a frontal system passed our 
city. 
  Climate 
  Weather
35. Rome, Italy usually has hot, dry summers and cool, wet winters.   Climate   Weather
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Appendix D: Beliefs about Climate Change Evidence (BCCE) 
Below are several statements about global climate change. Decide how much you agree 
or disagree with each statement. 
 
 
Strongly 
disagree Disagree 
Neither 
agree or 
disagree 
Agree Strongly agree 
1. Global temperatures have 
increased over the past 
100 years. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2. Average sea levels have 
increased over the past 50 
years. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. Atmospheric greenhouse 
gas concentrations have 
been rising for the past 50 
years. Human activities 
have led to greater 
releases of greenhouse 
gases. Temperatures have 
also been rising during 
these past 50 years. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Solar activity has 
decreased since 1970. 
Lower activity means that 
Earth has received less of 
the Sun’s energy. But, 
Earth’s temperature has 
continued to rise. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5. Satellites are measuring 
more of Earth’s energy 
being absorbed by 
greenhouse gases. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Increases and decreases in 
global temperatures 
closely matched increases 
and decreases in solar 
activity before the 
industrial revolution. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix E: Model Plausibility and Correctness 
Read the following information carefully. 
 
Humans create models to help explain things.  
 
Below are two models. These provide different explanations for why global temperatures 
have increased over the past 100 years and average sea levels have increased over the 
past 50 years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Model A: Climate change is caused by humans who are releasing gases into the 
atmosphere. 
 
A person who supports this model makes the following argument: 
 
A few gases in Earth’s atmosphere prevent some of energy Earth’s energy from 
escaping out into space. Human activities are increasing the amount of these gases in 
the atmosphere. Therefore, humans are causing climate change.   
 
Model B:  Climate change is caused by increasing amounts of energy released 
from the Sun. 
 
A person who supports this model makes the following argument: 
 
The Sun is the main source of energy for planet Earth. Scientists have shown that for 
thousands of years Earth’s average temperature increases when the Sun releases more 
energy. Therefore, the Sun is causing climate change.  
Circle the plausibility of each model. [Make two circles. One for each model.] 
 
 
Greatly 
implausible 
(or even 
impossible)         
Highly 
Plausible 
Model 
A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Model B 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
 
 
Circle the model which you think is correct. [Only circle one choice below.] 
 
Very certain 
that Model A 
is correct 
Somewhat 
certain that 
Model A is 
correct 
Uncertain if 
Model A or B is 
correct 
Somewhat 
certain that 
Model B is 
correct 
Very certain 
that Model B 
is correct 
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Appendix F: Instructional Scaffold: Human-Induced Climate Change Model-
Evidence Link (MEL) Diagram 
MEL Part A: How do scientists change their plausibility judgments? 
Scientists may change their plausibility judgments about scientific ideas. They do this by 
looking at the connections between evidence and the idea. Evidence may: 
 Support an idea 
 Strongly support an idea 
 Contradict (oppose) an idea 
 Have nothing to do with the idea 
 
Which type of evidence do you think is most important to a scientist’s 
plausibility judgment? Use numbers 1 to 4 to rank each evidence. (1 = most 
important and 4 = least important) 
Type of evidence Your ranking 
Evidence supports the idea  
Evidence strongly supports the idea  
Evidence contradicts (opposes) the idea  
Evidence has nothing to do with the idea  
 
 
Carefully read the following paragraph. 
 
Scientific ideas must be falsifiable. In other words, scientific ideas can never be proven. 
But, ideas can be disproven by opposing evidence. When this happens, scientists must 
revise the idea or come up with another explanation. Falsifiability is a very important 
principle when evaluating scientific knowledge. 
 
With falsifiability in mind, re-rank each evidence from 1 to 4. (1 = most 
important and 4 = least important) 
Type of evidence Your ranking 
Evidence supports the idea  
Evidence strongly supports the idea  
Evidence contradicts (opposes) the idea  
Evidence has nothing to do with the idea  
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MEL Part B: Evidence Text 
Evidence #1: Atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations have been rising for the 
past 50 years. Human activities have led to greater releases of greenhouse gases. 
Temperatures have also been rising during these past 50 years.  
This graph shows carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere. The symbol for carbon 
dioxide is CO2. These levels have been increasing. CO2 in the atmosphere absorbs energy 
emitted by the Earth. The atmosphere reradiates some of this absorbed energy back to 
Earth. People call CO2 a greenhouse gas because it keeps some of Earth’s energy from 
escaping to space. 
 
This blue line shows increasing releases of CO2 by human activities. Burning coal, 
gasoline, natural gas, and wood releases CO2 into the atmosphere. The yellow line shows 
increasing carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Both the yellow and blue lines have been 
increasing with time. 
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Evidence #2: Solar activity has decreased since 1970. Lower activity means that 
Earth has received less of the Sun’s energy. But, Earth’s temperature has continued 
to rise. 
 
This graph shows solar activity levels. The Sun’s brightness is one way to measure solar 
activity. The blue line shows the Sun’s brightness. Since 1970, the Sun’s brightness has 
been decreasing. The red line on the graph shows Earth’s temperature. The graph shows 
that temperatures are increasing while solar activity is decreasing. The region outlined by 
the dashed circle show where solar activity is increasing and temperature is decreasing. 
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Evidence #3: Satellites are measuring more of Earth’s energy being absorbed by 
greenhouse gases. 
 
This figure above shows Earth’s energy budget. Earth absorbs about half of the Sun’s 
energy. Most of the Sun’s energy comes to Earth as visible light. Earth reradiates this 
absorbed energy as invisible light called infrared. Some of this infrared energy is 
absorbed by the atmosphere and sent back to Earth. Some escapes into space. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NASA made the map above using satellite data. The map shows how much energy is 
escaping Earth’s atmosphere. Over time, NASA has recorded less infrared energy leaving 
Earth’s atmosphere. 
  
Outgoing Energy 
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Evidence #4: Increases and decreases in global temperatures closely matched 
increases and decreases in solar activity before the industrial revolution. 
 
This graph shows sunspot activity and temperature. Sunspot activity is the dashed line. 
Solar activity increases when the Sun has more sunspots. The red line shows temperature. 
The shapes of the sunspot and temperature curves match closely. Peaks in the 
temperature are near peaks in sunspot activity. Dips in temperature are near dips in 
sunspot activity. 
 
These data show sunspot activity and temperature for the past 9000 years. These data are 
based on evidence collected from tree rings. Some of the tree rings are from trees that are 
still living. Some of the trees rings are from ancient trees that have died. 
  
Sunspot Activity Change 
Temperature Change 
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MEL Part C: Diagram and Explanatory Tasks 
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Appendix G: Comparison Activity 
 
Name__________________________ Teacher _________________ Period________ 
 
How is Global Climate Changing? 
 
Do you think the world’s climate is changing? If so, what will happen in the future? What 
will the climate be like for you, your children, and your grandchildren? 
 
Scientists have been collecting evidence about climate change. Four main evidences are 
discussed on separate sheets. 
 
1. Read each of the four evidences and answer the following questions: 
 
a. What trends, if any, do you notice in the data over time? 
 
 
 
 
 
b. Do global temperatures appear to be increasing, decreasing or staying 
about the same? Explain how you can tell. 
 
 
 
 
 
c. How could you explain what you observe from the evidence? 
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2. Now think about what future climate change might be like. 
a. Will it be much warmer or much cooler than it is now? If so, how much 
warmer or cooler? Or will climate be about the same as now? 
 
 
 
b. Write down your prediction for what you think the climate will be like 100 
years from now. Also include the reasons for your predictions. Hint: you 
should use information from the four evidences in your reasons. 
 
 
 
 
c. Discuss your predictions with your group. List the predictions and reasons 
the other group members have. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d. In your group, develop a final prediction, with reasons, that all group 
members agree on. List that final prediction here. (a) What parts of the 
four evidences support your final prediction? (b) What parts of the four 
evidences do not support your final prediction? 
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Appendix H: Summary for Educators 
 
Engage students in explicit critical evaluation of alternative explanations and plausibility 
reappraisal to promote conceptual change. 
 Students should simultaneously consider the strength of connections between 
evidence and alternative scientific explanations (e.g., hypotheses and theories), as 
well as explanations promoted by science skeptics, particularly for controversial 
issues such as climate change. 
 Such simultaneous consideration not only facilitates understanding of 
scientifically accurate conceptions, but helps students understand scientific and 
engineering practices. 
 Students should understand that scientific knowledge is tentative, but students 
should also understand that scientists and engineers evaluate connections between 
evidence and explanations to construct their knowledge and solve problems.  
 Through the process of critical evaluation, students should understand that certain 
hypotheses and theories have greater explanatory power than other alternative 
ideas. 
 Instruction about critical evaluation and plausibility appraisal should be explicitly 
taught to students in order to help them develop their abilities to reason about 
scientific topics. 
 Teaching about socio-scientific topics of great relevance (e.g., climate change) 
provides opportunities for students to engage in the authentic scientific practice of 
critical evaluation and plausibility reappraisal. In turn, socio-scientific topics can 
increase students’ understanding of fundamental scientific principles. Therefore, 
instructors should not avoid controversial topics, but rather use such topics as 
vehicles to deepen knowledge.  
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